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Abstract 
Joseph Priestley and the Intellectual Culture of Rational Dissent, 1752-1796 
 
Recent scholarship on the eighteenth-century polymath Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) has 
focused on his work as a pioneering scientist, a controversial Unitarian polemicist, and a 
radical political theorist. This thesis provides an extensive analysis of his comparatively 
neglected philosophical writings. It situates Priestley’s philosophy in the theological 
context of eighteenth-century rational dissent, and argues that his ideas on ethics, 
materialism, and determinism came to provide a philosophical foundation for the 
Socinian theology which came to prominence among Presbyterian congregations in the 
last decades of the century.       
   
Throughout the thesis I stress the importance of rational debate to the development of 
Priestley’s ideas. The chapters are thus structured around a series of Priestley’s 
engagements with contemporary figures: chapter 1 traces his intellectual development in 
the context of the debates over moral philosophy and the freedom of the will at the 
Daventry and Warrington dissenting academies; chapter 2 examines his response to the 
Scottish ‘common sense’ philosophers, Thomas Reid, James Beattie, and James Oswald; 
chapter 3 examines his writings on materialism and philosophical necessity and his 
debates with Richard Price, John Palmer, Benjamin Dawson, and Joseph Berington; 
chapter 4 focuses on his attempt to develop a rational defence of Christianity in 
opposition to the ideas of David Hume; chapter 5 traces the diffusion of his ideas through 
the syllabuses at the liberal dissenting academies at Warrington, Daventry, and New 
College, Hackney. The thesis illustrates the process by which Priestley’s theology and 
philosophy defeated a number of rival traditions to become the predominant intellectual 
position within rational dissent in the late eighteenth century. In the course of doing so, it 
illuminates some of the complex interconnections between philosophical and theological 
discourses in the period.  
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Introduction: philosophy and rational dissent 
 
Towards the beginning of David Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural and Revealed 
Religion (1779) the three characters, Philo, Demea, and Cleanthes, discuss the changing 
relationship, throughout history, between religion and philosophy. Whereas the Church 
Fathers and the Protestant reformers had been united in their exaltation of faith and in 
their declamations against reason, ‘our sagacious divines’, Philo tells Cleanthes, ‘have 
changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of the STOICS, 
PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and ACADEMICS’. ‘If 
we distrust human reason’, Philo continues, ‘we have now no other principle to lead us 
into religion’.
1
 Although hardly sensitive to the complexities of intellectual history, 
Philo’s speech is a fair analysis of the trajectory of the post-Restoration Church. The 
ascendancy, within the Church of England, of the latitudinarian movement coincided 
with the rise of philosophical theism, or rational theology, as the dominant intellectual 
tendency among Anglican apologists of the early eighteenth century.
2
  
 When rational dissent emerged within English Presbyterianism in the second half 
of the century, it was to this Anglican tradition that it owed its primary intellectual 
allegiance. The flow of ideas from the latitudinarians to the rational dissenters can be 
traced through a number of important eighteenth-century authors. The dissenting 
ministers Isaac Watts (1674-1748) and Philip Doddridge (1702-1751), both, it ought to be 
stressed, figures who attempted to balance the rational and evangelical tendencies of 
dissent, nevertheless contributed significantly to the development of the rational strain by 
producing important works which attempted to show the reasonableness of Christian 
belief, many of which were widely used as textbooks in the eighteenth-century dissenting 
academies. The dissenting minister and academy tutor Henry Grove (1684-1738) was 
another important figure in this respect; for over thirty years Grove lectured on ethics at 
the Taunton dissenting academy and produced a widely read System of Moral Philosophy 
(published posthumously in 1749) which attempted to ground morality on philosophical 
                                                 
1
 David Hume, Principal Writings on Religion including Dialogues concerning Natural and Revealed 
Religion and The Natural History of Religion, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford, 1993), 41-2. 
2
 See Rivers, vol. I, 25-88. 
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as well as purely scriptural tenets.
3
 Throughout the eighteenth century, and especially 
after the Salters’ Hall debate of 1719, the rational and the evangelical strains of dissent 
became increasingly opposed to one another. When the phrase ‘rational dissenters’ first 
began to be used in the early 1760s, it most often denoted, at least when used by those 
sympathetic to its aims, a group of Presbyterian divines advocating a species of practical 
and rational religion, in opposition to the evangelical doctrine of the rival bodies of 
dissent.
4
 The formulation of a rational, philosophical understanding of Christianity came 
to differentiate the theology of the rational dissenters from what they perceived as both 
the ‘superstition’ of the Catholics and high-church Anglicans and the ‘enthusiasm’ of the 
Calvinistic dissenters. In the last three decades of the century, as rational dissent became 
increasingly associated with the theology of Socinianism, or, as it came to be known, 
Unitarianism, this insistence on the powers of human reason and on the rationality of 
Christian belief gained emphasis, largely in reaction to the rise of evangelical Calvinism 
among the Congregationalist and Baptist congregations comprising the orthodox wing of 
Protestant dissent.  
 However, the philosophical writings of the rational dissenters have not received 
the critical attention they deserve. Most studies of rational dissent to date have tended to 
stress either the theological or the political and social aspects of its history.
5
 Most 
scholarship from within the field of the history of philosophy has focused on the writings 
                                                 
3
 Henry Grove, A System of Moral Philosophy, ed. T. Amory, 2 vols (1749). M. A. Stewart credits Grove 
with being ‘the first significant Dissenter to recognise ethics as a discipline autonomous from theology’, M. 
A. Stewart, ‘The Curriculum in Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies’, in Haakonssen (2006), vol. I, 97-120, 
109. 
4
 The earliest eighteenth-century usage of the phrase which I have come across is in Soame Jenyns’s A Free 
Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil (1761). Here, Jenyns defines ‘rational dissenters’ in opposition 
to the Methodists, and is sympathetic to neither sect; whereas the former have ‘arbitrarily expunged out of 
their Bibles every thing, which appears to them contradictory to reason […] or in other words, every thing 
which they cannot understand’, the latter ‘are determined to listen to no reason at all, having with all reason 
and common-sense declared eternal warfare’, Soame Jenyns, A Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of 
Evil, 4
th
 edn (1761), xvi-vii. William Enfield’s 1770 use of the phrase stresses the links between the forms 
of worship adopted by the rational dissenters and the moderate Anglicans in opposition to the ‘crude, 
injudicious, and often mysterious and unintelligible extemporary prayers of the rigid independents’, 
William Enfield, Remarks on Several Late Publications relative to the Dissenters (1770), 55. Joseph 
Priestley first began to use the term ‘rational Dissenters’ in 1769, in Considerations on Differences of 
Opinion among Christians (1769) and A View of the Principles and Conduct of the Protestant Dissenters, 
with respect to the Civil and Ecclesiastical Constitution of England (1769). In the Considerations, Priestley 
writes in his letter to the evangelical clergyman Henry Venn that ‘rational Dissenters’ is ‘a term which I 
am, surely, as much at liberty to use, by way of distinction, as you are to assume the title of orthodox for 
the same purpose’, Priestley, Considerations on Differences of Opinion among Christians (1769), 77.      
5
 This is the general tendency, for example, of the essays collected in Haakonssen (1996). 
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of individual thinkers; the majority, it is probably fair to say, on the Presbyterian minister 
Richard Price (1723-91), who has retained a minor yet important place in histories of 
moral philosophy until the present day.
6
 With regard to some of the lesser-known figures, 
Isabel Rivers has written on Doddridge, Watts, and Grove, but her extensive survey of 
eighteenth-century moral philosophy does not cover the contribution of the Unitarians of 
the last decades of the century.
7
 The only attempt at a systematic study of the 
philosophical ideas of rational dissent, Alan P. F. Sell’s Philosophy, Dissent and 
Nonconformity (2004), attempts to cover a huge amount of ground, with the inevitable 
result that the attention paid to individual thinkers is sparse. Moreover, the study makes 
no attempt to situate the ideas of these thinkers in relation to wider intellectual history.
8
 
Thus, in comparison to the body of scholarship dedicated to, for example, the 
philosophical history of the Scottish Enlightenment, or the French philosophes, it is fair 
to say that the contribution of rational dissent to European intellectual history has been 
largely ignored.  
 This thesis is then, at least secondarily, an attempt to go some way towards 
remedying this situation. By providing a thorough examination of philosophical debate 
among rational dissenters in the second half of the eighteenth century I hope to outline 
what I have called an ‘intellectual culture of rational dissent’. In addition to some of the 
figures mentioned above, I here survey the careers and writings of a number of authors 
who have been largely, in some cases wholly, ignored by previous intellectual historians: 
among them Edmund Law, Philip Doddridge, John Taylor, John Seddon, William Rose, 
Joseph Berington, Benjamin Dawson, John Palmer, Matthew Turner, and Thomas 
Belsham. However, in adopting the phrase ‘intellectual culture’ I mean to delineate a 
field of analysis broader than a selection of published works in philosophy and theology. 
In an attempt to trace the diffusion of philosophical ideas through the wider culture of 
rational dissent, I draw on a variety of sources, including private correspondence, lecture 
notes, and journal reviews. This methodology also enables me to move away from a 
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the 
Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century, 2
nd
 edn (London, 2002), 170. For a fuller account of the secondary 
criticism on Price see chapter 3. 
7
 On Doddridge see Rivers, vol. I, 164-204; vol. II, 192-5; The Defence of Truth through the Knowledge of 
Error: Philip Doddridge’s Academy Lectures (London, 2003). On Watts see Rivers, vol. I, 164-204; 
‘Watts, Isaac (1674-1748)’, ODNB. On Grove see Rivers, vol. II, 190-2. 
8
 Alan P. F. Sell, Philosophy, Dissent and Nonconformity (Cambridge, 2004). 
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traditional, hermeneutic approach to the interpretation of philosophical texts, and towards 
an understanding of how certain texts functioned in particular educational, 
denominational, or polemical contexts. 
 The primary objective of this thesis, however, is to provide an extensive analysis 
of the philosophical work of Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), arguably the figure who 
exerted the most important, and certainly the most lasting, influence over the intellectual 
culture of rational dissent. Priestley’s own career provides the boundaries of my 
chronological framework: I begin in the early 1750s, when he entered the dissenting 
academy at Daventry, and end around 1796, the year of the dissolution of New College, 
Hackney, two years after Priestley himself had left England permanently for North 
America. Priestley’s philosophy is most often explored as a means to understanding his 
scientific or his political theories.
9
 This said, his philosophical work has by no means 
been ignored by intellectual historians: Robert E. Schofield, the historian of science and 
Priestley’s most recent biographer, has written on many aspects of his philosophy.
10
 John 
G. McEvoy and J. E. McGuire and, more recently, James Dybikowski have sketched 
systematic accounts of Priestley’s philosophical system.
11
 Schofield and McEvoy and 
McGuire, in particular, have done much to develop a synoptic approach to understanding 
Priestley’s interests in science, religion, and philosophy.
12
 On more specific aspects of 
Priestley’s ideas, Alan P. F. Sell and Aaron Garrett have examined Priestley’s response to 
                                                 
9
 J. G. McEvoy, ‘Joseph Priestley, “Aerial Philosopher”: Metaphysics and Methodology in Priestley’s 
Chemical Thought, from 1772 to 1781’, Ambix, 25 (1978), 1-55, 93-116, 153-75; 26 (1979), 16-38; 
‘Causes, Laws, Powers and Principles: The Metaphysical Foundations of Priestley’s Concept of 
Phlogiston’, in Science, Medicine, and Dissent: Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), ed. R. G. W. Anderson and 
Christopher Lawrence (London, 1987), 55-71. Peter N. Miller, Defining the Common Good: Empire, 
Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge, 2004), 333-8. 
10
 Robert E. Schofield, The Enlightened Joseph Priestley: A Study of His Life and Work from 1773 to 1804 
(Pennsylvania, 2004), 43-91; ‘Joseph Priestley on Sensation and Perception’, in Studies in Perception: 
Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, ed. Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull 
(Columbus, 1980), 336-54; ‘Joseph Priestley, Eighteenth-Century British Neo-Platonism, and S. T. 
Coleridge’, in Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences: Essays in Honour of Bernard Cohen, ed. 
Everett Mendelsohn (Cambridge, 1984), 237-54. 
11
 John G. McEvoy and J. E. McGuire, ‘God and Nature: Priestley’s Way of Rational Dissent’, Historical 
Studies in the Physical Sciences, 6 (1975), 325-404; John G. McEvoy, ‘Joseph Priestley, Scientist, 
Philosopher and Divine’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 128.3 (1984), 193-9; James 
Dybikowski, ‘Joseph Priestley, Metaphysician and Philosopher of Religion’, in Rivers and Wykes, 80-112. 
12
 W. H. Brock, ‘Joseph Priestley, Enlightened Experimentalist’, in Rivers and Wykes, 49-79, 66-8, 
provides a bibliographical overview. For an earlier attempt to develop a synoptic account of Priestley’s 
ideas see Erwin N. Hiebert, ‘The Integration of Revealed Religion and Scientific Materialism in the 
Thought of Joseph Priestley’, in Joseph Priestley: Scientist, Theologian, and Metaphysician, ed. Lester 
Kieft and Bennett R. Willeford (Cranbury, NJ, 1980), 27-61.  
 15 
Thomas Reid, and Richard Popkin has analysed his response to Hume.
13
 John W. Yolton 
has located Priestley’s theory of matter in the context of the development of eighteenth-
century materialism, and James A. Harris has considered Priestley’s necessitarianism in 
relation to eighteenth-century debates over the freedom of the will.
14
 Despite the work of 
these scholars, however, there is no modern book-length study devoted to Priestley’s 
philosophical career; more extensive accounts of Priestley’s philosophical writings 
remain buried in unpublished PhD theses.
15
 In comparison to the available literature on 
Priestley’s contemporaries, Hume, Reid, and even Price, Priestley as a philosopher 
remains a neglected figure.
16
  
 Moreover, very few of the existing accounts of Priestley’s work have attempted to 
position his philosophical writings within the theological context of eighteenth-century 
rational dissent.
17
 In this thesis I show how Priestley’s ideas on ethics, materialism, and 
necessity were developed as an attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for the 
Socinian theology which came to prominence among Presbyterian congregations in the 
last decades of the century. This kind of focus on the interconnected histories of 
philosophy and theology is not original: in studies of seventeenth-century thought the 
                                                 
13
 Alan P. F. Sell, ‘Priestley’s Polemic Against Reid’, The Price-Priestley Newsletter, 3 (1979), 41-52; 
Aaron Garrett, ‘In Defense of Elephants: Priestley on Reid’, The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2 (2004), 
137-53; Richard H. Popkin, ‘Joseph Priestley’s Criticism of David Hume’s Philosophy,’ Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 15 (1977), 437-47; The High Road to Pyrrhonism (San Diego, CA, 1980), 213-26. 
14
 John W. Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis, 1983), 107-
26. James A. Harris, ‘Joseph Priestley and “the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity”’, E&D, 20 
(2001), 23-44, reprinted in part in Harris’s Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-
Century British Philosophy (Oxford, 2005), 167-78.    
15
 Examples of unpublished studies of Priestley’s philosophy include: Charles Huber Lesser, ‘Joseph 
Priestley (1733-1804): The Mind of a Materialist. An Intellectual Biography’ (unpublished Ph.D. diss., 
University of Michigan, 1974); Richard Adams Rice, ‘Joseph Priestley’s Materialist Theory of Cognition: 
its Evolution and Historical Significance’ (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1969). More 
accessible unpublished studies which cover aspects of Priestley’s philosophical thought include: Alison 
Kennedy, ‘John Kenrick and the Transformation of Unitarian Thought’ (unpublished Ph.D. diss., 
University of Stirling, 2006), esp. 41-91; Matthew Niblett, ‘Moral Philosophy, Republican Thought, and 
the Intellectual Culture of Liberal Dissent in England, 1750-1789’ (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of 
Oxford, 2007), esp. 130-196.       
16
 Priestley receives only a number of passing mentions in the recently published Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth Century Philosophy, most notably in relation to materialist notions of human nature in Aaron 
Garrett’s ‘Human Nature’, vol. I, 160-233, and Udo Thiel’s ‘Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity’, 
vol. I, 286-318, and educational thought in Geraint Parry’s ‘Education’, vol. I, 608-38.  Dybikowski has 
recently drawn attention to Priestley’s neglect, and argued that there should be a contemporary book 
dedicated to his philosophy, Dybikowski, ‘Joseph Priestley, Metaphysician and Philosopher of Religion’, 
111. 
17
 One noteworthy attempt to do this is Douglas Hedley’s short summary of Priestley’s ideas in Coleridge, 
Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the Spirit (Cambridge, 2000), 53-7. 
 16 
idea of a ‘Socinian philosophy’ has a long history.
18
 However, studies of eighteenth-
century intellectual history have all too often ignored the theological context in which the 
period’s philosophical ideas were inextricably embedded. Although I give due attention 
to tracing Priestley’s intellectual influences, my approach is informed by the assumption 
that the most effective way of understanding Priestley’s philosophical work is as a set of 
opinions which developed dialogically through a series of articulated responses in 
particular historical situations. The chapters are thus focused on a series of Priestley’s 
engagements with contemporary figures: chapter 1 traces his intellectual development in 
the context of the debates over moral philosophy and the freedom of the will at the 
Daventry and Warrington dissenting academies. Chapter 2 examines Priestley’s response 
to Thomas Reid and the Scottish ‘common sense’ philosophers. Chapter 3 analyses his 
writings on materialism and philosophical necessity and his debate with Richard Price. 
Chapter 4 focuses on his attempt to develop a rational defence of Christianity in 
opposition to the ideas of David Hume. Chapter 5 traces the diffusion of Priestley’s ideas 
through the philosophy syllabuses in the liberal dissenting academies. I also argue that 
aspects of Priestley’s ideas developed through a process of debate and collaboration 
within his circle of friends and correspondents, many of whom were also dissenting 
ministers. In order to trace the workings of this process, I draw extensively on Priestley’s 
letters to the Unitarian minister Theophilus Lindsey (1723-1808), a new annotated 
electronic edition of which I have published for the Dr Williams’s Centre for Dissenting 
Studies as a supplementary part of this project, and on Grayson Ditchfield’s recent 
edition of the letters of Theophilus Lindsey.
19
    
 Before turning to Priestley himself, however, I should like to clarify further what I 
mean by discussing an ‘intellectual culture’ of rational dissent. What grounds are there 
for interpreting the philosophical writings of the rational dissenters as a distinct sub-
group of eighteenth-century philosophy, comparable to, for example, the Scottish 
philosophy of the period?  
                                                 
18
 Nicholas Jolley, for example, writes of Leibniz’s ‘study of Socinian philosophy’ in his analysis of 
Leibniz’s responses to John Locke and Christoph Stegmann, Nicholas Jolley, ‘Leibniz on Locke and 
Socinianism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 39.2 (1978), 233-50. 
19
 Letters to Lindsey, see also Simon Mills, ‘Aspects of a Polymath: Unveiling J. T. Rutt’s Edition of 
Joseph Priestley’s Letters to Theophilus Lindsey’, E&D, 24 (2008), 24-53; Ditchfield. 
 17 
 Firstly, the intellectual history of rational dissent (much like that of Scottish 
philosophy) is closely bound up with the history of a number of educational institutions: 
the liberal dissenting academies. As M. A. Stewart has argued, the academies at Taunton, 
Tewkesbury, Findern, Kibworth, Dublin, Northampton, Daventry, Warrington, and 
Hackney were important centres for the dissemination of philosophy.
20
 Chapters 1 and 5 
of this thesis are thus largely concerned with the philosophical syllabuses at the 
dissenting academies at Daventry, Warrington, and Hackney.  
 Secondly, the rational dissenters were united by a particular set of intellectual 
questions and concerns regarding the relationship between certain theological doctrines 
and philosophical beliefs concerning the human mind, the natural world, and ethics. 
These concerns are reflected in the way that philosophy was usually divided into 
pneumatology (comprising natural religion and the study of the human mind) and moral 
philosophy, and was usually taught, at least in the academies, as part of a curriculum 
which included the study of the Scriptures, the patristic authors, and ecclesiastical 
history. Essentially, the rational dissenters were concerned to establish how one of 
various competing conceptions of ‘rationality’ could be shown to be compatible with 
Christian belief. In this they were not alone. Many thinkers in the Church of England and 
the Church of Scotland reflected on very similar questions; in discussing an ‘intellectual 
culture of rational dissent’ I do not mean to imply that the philosophical ideas of the 
rational dissenters were developed and discussed in any kind of vacuum. As I have 
already suggested, when rational dissent first emerged it was very much in the tradition 
of the Anglican latitudinarians. As rational dissent developed during the eighteenth 
century, it retained important connections with thinkers within the Church of England 
and in the Scottish Church and universities.  
 Thirdly, there is the question of influence. Much like the latitudinarian tradition, 
the philosophical heritage of rational dissent was extremely eclectic. This eclecticism is 
well exemplified in Philip Doddridge’s published philosophy lectures, which included 
references to the classical moralists, particularly Plato and Cicero; the Church Fathers, 
particularly Origen; the Protestant natural law theorists, Hugo Grotius and Samuel 
Pufendorf; the seventeenth-century rationalists, particularly Descartes; the eighteenth-
                                                 
20
 M. A. Stewart, ‘The Curriculum in Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies’, 108. 
 18 
century latitudinarians, particularly Clarke; Locke; and most of the major philosophers 
and theologians of the early and mid-eighteenth century, including, significantly, free-
thinkers such as John Toland, Anthony Collins, and Hume. Broadly speaking, however, 
there were three identifiable philosophical traditions within rational dissent as it emerged 
after 1760.  
 The first of these was the rationalist tradition, most prominently associated with 
Richard Price and John Taylor (1694-1761), the first divinity and moral philosophy tutor 
at the Warrington Academy. This tradition was indebted to Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), 
the most influential latitudinarian philosopher of the eighteenth century, and Joseph 
Butler (1692-1752), as well as a number of lesser-known figures such as the Anglican 
moral philosophers John Balguy (1686-1748) and William Wollaston (1659-1724). It 
advocated a rationalist approach to ethics and a libertarian position on the freedom of the 
will and was usually, although not exclusively, associated with the theology of Arianism. 
 The second tradition was the empiricist tradition which came to be associated 
with, and indeed largely defined by, Priestley. This tradition was indebted to John Locke 
(1632-1704) and David Hartley (1705-1757), as well as to lesser-known figures in the 
Lockeian tradition such as Edmund Law (1703-1787) and John Gay (1699-1745). 
However, it also had links to free-thinkers and materialists such as Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679) and Anthony Collins (1676-1729). It developed an empirical and voluntarist 
account of morals which drew heavily on Hartley’s theory of the association of ideas and 
eventually, under Priestley’s influence, formulated a deterministic account of human 
actions and a materialist metaphysics. It was usually, again under the influence of 
Priestley, associated with the theology of Socinianism, or Unitarianism.  
 The third tradition available to rational dissenters, often overlooked, can be traced 
back to the writings of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-
1713). From around the mid-century onwards, many rational dissenters, often as a result 
of their Scottish university educations, came under the influence of the Shaftesburian 
ethical tradition, promulgated, with important differences, by George Turnbull (1698-
1748) and David Fordyce (1711-1751) at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and by Francis 
Hutcheson (1694-1746) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) at the University of Glasgow. 
Shaftesburian ethics, the influence of which can be found in both Doddridge’s and 
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Grove’s moral philosophy lectures, held that moral judgments were at least partly 
dependent on an innate moral sense. This Shaftesburian philosophical tradition was 
usually associated with the moderate Calvinism and theological eirenicism of William 
Leechman (1706-1785), Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, under whom a significant 
number of English rational dissenters were educated.  
 The Shaftesburian and the rationalist traditions are important to this project 
largely because, I argue, the second, empiricist, tradition was developed, in part at least, 
as a reaction against them. Priestley was as much a polemicist as he was a philosopher. 
His (arguably successful) attempt to make his empiricist philosophy and his Socinian 
theology the predominant intellectual position within rational dissent necessitated that he 
defeated the rival claims of the other two traditions. It is in the course of these often 
acrimonious debates that the interconnections between philosophy and theology become 
clear. The most common charge levelled by Priestley against proponents of the other two 
traditions was that they relied on the long-exploded theory of innate ideas, which could 
be made to sanction irrational theological dogmas. Against Priestley, representatives from 
the other two traditions most usually countered that his Socinianism and his empiricism 
would lead unavoidably to deism, and even to atheism. It is this battle of ideas which I 
now set out to explore.        
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1. Priestley’s intellectual development: the Daventry and Warrington dissenting 
academies (1752-1767) 
 
The dissenting academies of the second half of the eighteenth century were a key 
influence on the formation of a distinctive intellectual culture within rational dissent.
1
 
The majority of the figures discussed in the following chapters either studied at or 
worked for periods as tutors in the academies. Many of them, including Philip Doddridge, 
John Taylor, Priestley, and Thomas Belsham, were influential figures in the development 
of dissenting education. Many of the texts I shall discuss here were written while their 
authors were academy tutors and in some cases were used as textbooks on the academy 
syllabuses. This is, of course, particularly relevant to Priestley himself. Between 1752 
and 1755 Priestley was a student at the Daventry academy. After a short period as a 
dissenting minister with congregations at Needham Market and Nantwich, he entered the 
Warrington Academy as tutor in languages and belles-lettres where he remained between 
1761 and 1767. After he had left Warrington, Priestley remained interested in the 
progress of the English dissenting academies. His letters written from Birmingham in the 
late 1780s indicate that he was involved in discussions regarding the affairs of New 
College, Hackney, founded in 1786.
2
 His letters of this period to Thomas Belsham, the 
first tutor in divinity at New College, evince an ongoing concern with the academy’s 
fortunes throughout the later 1780s. In 1791, following the Birmingham riots, Priestley 
took up a position as a tutor at Hackney where he remained for three years lecturing on 
history and natural philosophy until leaving for North America in 1794. 
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2
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 Taking as its focus the philosophy syllabuses at the Daventry and Warrington 
academies, this chapter provides an outline of the intellectual background against which 
Priestley’s thought developed. It is important to note that Priestley’s own account of his 
early intellectual development was predominantly doctrinal. The Memoirs he compiled in 
the late 1780s chart a progression from the Calvinism of his childhood to the mature 
Socinian position he adopted at Leeds after re-reading the patristic scholar Nathaniel 
Lardner’s A Letter…concerning…the Logos in the late 1760s.
3
 However, my aim in this 
chapter is not to trace the evolution of Priestley’s theology. Rather, it is to illustrate the 
beginnings of Priestley’s attempt to formulate the epistemological system which would 
come to underpin the Socinianism he adopted shortly after leaving Warrington. My 
contention is that Priestley’s early engagement with debates in moral philosophy, which 
formed an integral part of the syllabuses at Daventry and Warrington, and his early 
encounter with debates on the freedom of the will, which provided the subject matter for 
many of his discussions with his tutors and his fellow students at Daventry, laid a crucial 
foundation for the theological system he later came to embrace.  
 I begin with an analysis of Philip Doddridge’s academy lectures (the textbook 
used at Daventry and Warrington) to illustrate how eighteenth-century debates in 
philosophy were discussed in the academy lectures. I then outline how these debates were 
encountered by Priestley at Daventry, drawing on an extract from his 1754 journal which 
provides a record of his day-to-day activities, including a valuable account of the 
academy lectures and of Priestley’s own reading.
4
 Subsequently, I examine how the same 
debates were presented in the lectures at Warrington prior to and during Priestley’s years 
as a tutor there through an analysis of the philosophy teaching of John Taylor and John 
Seddon. Finally, I trace Priestley’s engagement with these ideas through an analysis of a 
selection of his early writings. In the course of the discussion of moral philosophy, 
particular attention will be paid to the links between the English dissenting academies 
                                                 
3
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4
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and the Scottish universities. I argue that a number of important connections existed 
between several key figures in the development of Scottish moral philosophy (principally 
Francis Hutcheson at the University of Glasgow and David Fordyce at Marischal 
College, Aberdeen) and a number of tutors at the dissenting academies. These 
connections influenced the moral philosophy taught by the academy tutors as they 
attempted to negotiate the relationship between virtue and various conceptions of a moral 
sense, derived ultimately from the writings of the Earl of Shaftesbury but popularised 
through the teaching and writings of Hutcheson and Fordyce. This analysis opens my 
account of the relationship between the Scottish universities and the English rational 
dissenters, and will be important for understanding Priestley’s later engagement with 
Thomas Reid, James Beattie, and James Oswald explored in chapter 2. 
 
Philip Doddridge’s academy lectures  
 
Any discussion of the philosophy syllabuses at the liberal dissenting academies must 
begin with Philip Doddridge’s academy lectures. Doddridge was an Independent minister 
and an academy tutor at Northampton.
5
 His lectures, which originated in the form of a 
four-year course when he began his career as a tutor in 1730, would become the most 
significant influence on the teaching at the liberal dissenting academies for at least two 
generations, forming the core of the syllabuses at Daventry and Warrington until well 
into the 1770s.
6
 The lectures undoubtedly contributed significantly to the development of 
philosophical thinking among rational dissenters. In fact, they deserve to be more widely 
known for their contribution to the development of philosophy in eighteenth-century 
Britain. Priestley was probably exaggerating, but perhaps not to such a great extent, when 
he wrote in 1778 that in the academies where Doddridge’s lectures were studied ‘one half 
of the metaphysicians of the nation are formed’.
7
  
                                                 
5
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6
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7
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 Doddridge’s lectures were unique in the eighteenth century for the sheer range of 
arguments and authors represented across a broad selection of philosophical and 
theological topics. Although Doddridge’s own position on each of the subjects covered is 
usually made clear, the students were referred to a number of opposing arguments on 
each of the topics discussed. This practice of outlining an objective picture of theological 
and philosophical controversies provoked the disapprobation of later commentators.
8
 
However, it largely came to define the pedagogical method employed in the liberal 
dissenting academies in the second half of the century. The lectures generally proceed by 
stating a proposition which is then elaborated through demonstrations and corollaries. 
The principal objections to this position are then outlined through a series of scholia, 
often divided into a counter-argument followed by an answer defending the original 
proposition. Each demonstration, corollary, and scholium is supplemented by a wide-
ranging list of references to philosophers and theologians, both ancient and modern, 
which the students were expected to follow up in their own reading, often being required 
to give an overview of opposing positions at the beginning of the subsequent lecture.
9
  
 A full analysis of Doddridge’s philosophy lectures would necessitate a separate 
study. My concern here is with two aspects of the book. Firstly, I shall examine 
Doddridge’s presentation of contemporary debates in moral philosophy. Doddridge’s 
outline of aspects of Shaftesburian ethics alongside his own rationalist position set an 
important precedent for the moral philosophy teaching in the later academies. Secondly, I 
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shall examine Doddridge’s discussion concerning the question of the freedom of the will. 
As with the syllabuses of philosophy being developed in some of the Scottish 
universities, Doddridge’s lectures attempted to ground ethics within a wider conception 
of human nature. The lectures begin with a section ‘Of the powers and faculties of the 
human mind, and the instinct of brutes’ (where Doddridge proposes ‘To take a survey of 
the principal faculties of the human mind’), before proceeding to cover ‘the being of God, 
and his natural perfections’, ‘Of the nature of moral virtue in general, and the moral 
attributes of God’, followed by the more specifically theological sections.
10
 Doddridge’s 
general epistemology, outlined in Part I, is derived from Locke, Descartes, and Isaac 
Watts. He rejects any innate ideas in the mind (proposition 5), derives all ideas from 
sensation and reflection, and argues against both Watts’s position that ‘Abstraction’ 
constitutes a third source of generating ideas and Peter Browne’s position that all ideas 
are originally derived from sensation.
11
 However, within this epistemological framework, 
Doddridge allows for a number of instincts, defined as impulses to action preceding a 
rational consideration of the beneficial consequences attendant upon it. These instincts, 
among which Doddridge lists the ‘natural appetites’ and ‘parental affection’, ‘greatly tend 
both to the good of individuals and the species’. Although this is not necessarily 
inconsistent with Doddridge’s Lockeian position, one of the references here is 
particularly interesting: in the subsequent corollary Doddridge refers his students to 
Francis Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 
(1725).
12
 
When Doddridge turns specifically to ethics in Part III of his lectures, he advocates 
a rationalist approach where virtue is defined as acting in accordance with the moral 
fitness of things.
13
 The conditions for moral action are dependent on a conception of 
God’s nature (as distinct from his will) containing the immutable ideas of ‘the nature, 
circumstances and relations of things’.
14
 Virtue inheres not in the effects of an action, but 
in the agent’s conformity to these immutable ethical relations. The possibility of acting 
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virtuously assumes a freedom of choice, although Doddridge concedes that exactly how 
this freedom is to be understood is a complex point. He locates his own position in a 
tradition including Samuel Clarke, John Balguy, ‘those of the ancients’ who defined 
virtue as ‘living according to nature’, and, to a slightly lesser extent, William 
Wollaston.
15
 Interestingly though, just as Doddridge had slightly modified his 
epistemology to account for the existence of certain instincts, within this rationalist 
ethical framework he allows for a ‘Moral Sense’, defined as ‘a kind of natural instinct’, 
which apprehends the qualities of actions ‘previous to any reasoning upon the remoter 
consequences’.
16
 Ethical action is thus, in part, aestheticised so that ‘virtue is 
spontaneously perceived as ‘BEAUTY or excellency’ and vice as ‘TURPITUDE and 
deformity’.
17
 The references are to Hutcheson’s An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of 
the Passions and Affections (1726) and Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times (1711). It is worth noting, however, that in his subsequent discussion 
Doddridge carefully differentiates his own notion of the moral sense from Hutcheson’s. 
Doddridge argues that although there certainly is a moral sense, this does not imply an 
‘innate idea’ any more than the ‘intuitive discerning of self-evident propositions’ implies 
that the ideas connected with them are innate. Furthermore, Doddridge criticises 
Hutcheson, arguing that to allow the instinct of the moral sense to be the foundation of 
virtue risks making virtue an arbitrary matter.
18
 He implies that Hutcheson has essentially 
misinterpreted Shaftesbury, who, Doddridge argues, is properly understood as a 
rationalist in ethics. Shaftesbury, Doddridge argues, considers virtue as founded on ‘the 
eternal measure and immutable relation of things’, or, as consisting ‘in a certain just 
disposition of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong’.
19
  
Doddridge’s engagement with aspects of Shaftesburian moral philosophy in his 
lectures has an interesting history. As early as January 1721, when Doddridge was in his 
early twenties, he had written to his friend Samuel Clark (1684-1750) informing him that 
he was reading ‘Lord Shaftesbury’s Works’, noting that ‘as far as I can judge by the half I 
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have dispatched, [they] contain a strange mixture of good sense and extravagance’.
20
 
Clark responded, advising Doddridge to guard against Shaftesbury’s critical reflections 
on revealed religion, for which Doddridge thanked him, assuring his mentor of his 
caution.
21
 As an academy tutor, Doddridge maintained links with the Scottish 
universities; he was awarded the degree of DD from Marischal College, Aberdeen in 
1736 and from King’s College, Aberdeen the following year. He was also acquainted 
with at least one important figure in the development of Scottish moral philosophy: 
David Fordyce. Fordyce was a lecturer at Marischal College between 1742 and 1751. 
Paul Wood has located him in a tradition stemming from George Turnbull (1698-1748) 
(of whom Fordyce wrote approvingly to Doddridge) in which ethics is properly thought 
to be grounded in a scientific conception of human nature.
22
 Fordyce’s own work 
advocates a similar approach. His The Elements of Moral Philosophy, published 
posthumously in 1754, recommends an application of the method developed in the 
natural sciences to the study of ethics.
23
 This methodology is combined with an interest in 
Shaftesburian moral sense theory.
24
 In the Elements, Fordyce posits an innate faculty of 
the moral sense, an ‘inward Judge’ which serves as a disinterested arbiter over all 
‘Actions and Principles of Conduct’.
25
  
 From around 1737 Fordyce had passed some years in England.
26
 He spent time at 
Doddridge’s academy, and began a correspondence with Doddridge which he was to 
resume after his return to Scotland.
27
 Doddridge evidently thought favourably of Fordyce 
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and his writings. In a letter to Clark of February 1738 he referred to him as ‘an excellent 
Scholar’, adding ‘nor did I ever meet with a Person of his Age who had made deeper & 
juster Reflections on human Nature’.
28
 Fordyce’s letters to Doddridge indicate that the 
two men discussed the subject of moral philosophy in some depth. Fordyce sent 
Doddridge a copy of his manuscript work, an ‘Essay on Human Nature’, in 1739, parts of 
which at least, Doddridge read and returned with his own comments.
29
 Fordyce’s 
Dialogues concerning Education (1745; 1748), recommended by Doddridge in a letter to 
Clark, was a rhapsodic celebration of Doddridge’s educational methods and affectionate 
religion and Shaftesburian moral philosophy.
30
 Fordyce’s The Elements of Moral 
Philosophy was listed among the references in Doddridge’s lectures.
31
 Despite their 
evident acquaintance, however, it is debatable whether Fordyce significantly influenced 
Doddridge’s philosophy teaching. Isabel Rivers has argued that Fordyce’s Dialogues was 
‘an act of creative transformation that masked the significant differences between the 
philosophy teaching of the two men’, and stresses the point that Doddridge’s 
interpretation of Shaftesbury owed less to Fordyce than to English theologians such as 
Joseph Butler.
32
 However, Doddridge’s own position is not, in this case, the most 
important factor. Doddridge was clearly a rationalist with respect to ethics. However, the 
references to and summaries of the writings of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Fordyce in 
his lectures would introduce two generations of English dissenters to these thinkers and 
debates through the syllabuses of moral philosophy at the liberal dissenting academies. 
Crucially, this meant that students would encounter these ideas in educational 
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environments where they were encouraged to engage critically with both sides of a 
debate and were free to decide for themselves on philosophical and theological disputes. 
 Doddridge’s lectures introduced the question of liberty and necessity in lectures 
18-20. The principal texts referred to are Locke’s Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, Watts’s Philosophical Essays (1733), and Anthony Collins’s A 
Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), yet the range of references is 
typically eclectic.
33
 Doddridge’s own position is broadly libertarian. However, he 
typically outlines several of the arguments of necessitarian thinkers. Furthermore, a close 
examination of these lectures reveals that Doddridge’s own position is by no means 
straightforward. In lecture 18 Doddridge differentiates between four kinds of liberty: 
natural liberty, external liberty, philosophical liberty, and moral liberty. Natural liberty is 
defined as a liberty of choice; external liberty as a liberty of action; philosophical liberty 
as a liberty to act in accordance with reason; moral liberty as being under no constraint of 
any superior being.
34
 The four of these in union form a ‘Compleat liberty’, defined as ‘a 
certain symmetry or subordination of the faculties’, a state of perfection, where the agent 
is free to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.
35
  
 With regard to natural liberty, Doddridge’s position is libertarian: he affirms that 
‘The mind of man is possessed of natural liberty, i. e. liberty of choice’.
36
 This is 
defended by recourse to four arguments: firstly, our consciousness of the power to choose 
otherwise than we do in a multitude of instances; secondly, a universal consent that our 
own actions are morally judged by our own consciences, and that we rightly condemn 
ourselves for certain actions, which would be meaningless if they were wholly 
determined; thirdly, the fact that the majority of nations agree to punish individuals for 
some of their actions, which again would be nonsensical were the actions wholly 
determined; fourthly, the fact that when equal objects are presented to our choice, we 
sometimes choose one of them without being able to assign a reason for the preference. 
Following the demonstrations, Doddridge raises an objection to this position, similar to 
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that outlined by Locke in the first edition of the Essay: we are formed with a ‘necessary 
desire of happiness’, and thus cannot but choose what, in certain circumstances, is most 
conducive to promoting our own happiness.
37
 Doddridge counters this position with the 
argument that, in certain circumstances, the mind is able to go against its natural 
inclination if it will lead to some greater good in the future. Yet in these circumstances 
the mind inevitably ‘condemns itself of folly’, which it would never do if what it chose 
always appeared to be the greatest good.
38
 This defence is later qualified, however, in the 
fifth demonstration of proposition 18 where Doddridge states: ‘It is extremely difficult to 
remove all the objections against liberty of choice, especially against that which is stated 
in Prop. 16. Sch. 1.’
39
 In the following seven scholia Doddridge raises further arguments 
against his original four demonstrations, many of them derived from Collins.
40
  
On philosophical liberty Doddridge’s position is more overtly ambivalent. 
Proposition 17 asserts: ‘The philosophical liberty of the mind is much impaired, and we 
are obnoxious to a lamentable degree of servitude’.
41
 The following four demonstrations 
explain that this is due to the influence of the passions, which ‘insensibly mingle 
themselves with the whole process of reasoning […] obscuring truth and gilding error’, 
and the ‘Bodily constitution and appetite’, which frequently ‘hinder the execution of the 
wisest volitions’. According to Doddridge, however, these hindrances to a correct use of 
the reason are not insurmountable, so that ‘the way to happiness is rather difficult than 
impossible’. Doddridge here exhibits a scepticism towards the freedom of the will on 
account of the dictates of the passions; the language and references indicate that his 
position is derived from (Calvinist) theological concerns. In the first corollary he holds 
that: 
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experience may convince us too surely, that the symmetry of the soul and subordination 
of its faculties mentioned Def. 26. Cor 2. in which compleat liberty consists, is in a great 
measure violated in the human soul.
42
  
 
The references direct the students to the Anglican clergyman Jeremiah Seed’s sermon 
‘On the Corruption of Human Nature’, from which many of Doddridge’s arguments in 
this section are derived.
43
 Proposition 17 concludes the first part of the lectures on an 
ominous note, asserting: ‘There are many particulars in which the knowledge we have of 
our own minds is very imperfect, and we are a great mystery to ourselves’.
44
 In the 
following demonstrations Doddridge raises the problematic questions of the relationship 
between soul and body, dreams, and ‘the phaenomenon of phrensy’, when the ‘state of 
the nerves and juices of the body […] so strangely affect our rational powers’.
45
             
In Part II, ‘Of the BEING of a GOD and his NATURAL PERFECTIONS’, Doddridge 
raises the difficult question of how natural liberty can be reconciled with divine 
prescience:    
 
It is objected that if God be thus the author of all of our ideas and of all our motions, then 
also of all our volitions, which would be inconsistent with that liberty of choice asserted, 
Prop. 16.  
 
He attempts to solve this difficulty by arguing that the will is not ‘an effect of any 
necessary efficient cause’, but rather ‘a tendency towards the production of an effect’. 
Notwithstanding all the ‘requisites to volition’, it lies ultimately ‘in our own breast’ to 
determine whether to act one way or another. Although God ‘adds efficacy’ to our own 
determinations, ‘even when it is most foolish and pernicious’, this does not mean that he 
is the cause of the action. Doddridge defends this position against possible objections by 
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arguing that, maintaining divine prescience, it is more difficult to explain why the deity 
should not intervene to prevent certain ill-judged actions than to concede the case for him 
‘adding efficacy to them in a natural way’.
46
   
 
Philosophical debate at Daventry 
 
This sketch of Doddridge’s lectures serves as an introduction to the kind of philosophy 
that Priestley would have encountered as a student at Daventry. In addition to forming the 
core of the syllabus at Northampton, Doddridge’s lectures were used in a manuscript 
version at Daventry by Caleb Ashworth (1720-1775) and Samuel Clark (1727-1769).
47
 
The 1763 printed edition, prepared by Clark, most likely represents fairly accurately the 
content of the lectures as they were taught during Priestley’s years at the academy. 
Doddridge’s two hundred and thirty lectures were introduced in the second year and 
dominated the final three years of the four-year curriculum. The lectures would thus have 
comprised the core of the syllabus taken by Priestley, who entered the academy in 1752 
at the end of the second year of the four-year course.
48
  
 Furthermore, it was not just Doddridge’s lectures that were preserved in the 
teaching at Daventry, but, perhaps most importantly, his pedagogical method. The 
practice of outlining an objective picture of theological and philosophical disputes was 
the aspect of his own education which Priestley found most stimulating. Recalling his 
time at the academy, Priestley wrote in his Memoirs: 
 
The general plan of our studies, which may be seen in Dr. Doddridge’s published lectures, 
was exceedingly favourable to free enquiry, as we were referred to authors on both sides of 
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every question, and were even required to give an account of them. It was also expected 
that we should abridge the most important of them for our future use.
49
 
 
Doddridge’s educational method evidently became associated for Priestley with his 
conviction that controversy served as a pragmatic method for arriving at truth. The 
academy, he wrote in his Memoirs, was ‘peculiarly favourable to the serious pursuit of 
truth, as the students were about equally divided upon every question of much 
importance’. In this way, the questions of ‘liberty and necessity ’, ‘the sleep of the soul’, 
and ‘all the articles of theological orthodoxy and heresy’ were discussed, with ‘Dr. 
Ashworth taking the orthodox side of every question, and Mr. Clark […] that of heresy’. 
Lectures ‘had often the air of friendly conversations’, and the students ‘were permitted to 
ask whatever questions, and to make whatever remarks, [they] pleased’.
50
 Priestley’s 
Memoirs recall that at Daventry ‘The public library contained all the books to which we 
were referred’, and his Daventry journal records him reading the references to the 
lectures on several occasions.
51
 The journal indicates that Doddridge’s philosophy 
lectures not only supplied the core of the academic syllabus, but frequently provided the 
subject matter for discussions at the academy’s debating society.
52
 The topic of debate on 
20 November, for example, was ‘Berkeley’s scheme’, the subject of an appendix to Part 
II of Doddridge’s lectures.
53
 Priestley’s entry for 25 December records a meeting where 
John Alexander (1736-1765) and Thomas Jowell debated the deity’s ‘foreknowledge of 
contingencies’, the content of the second half of lecture 40 from Doddridge’s course.
54
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Moral philosophy formed a substantial component of the academic syllabus. A timetable 
dating from Priestley’s years at the academy indicates that the teaching of ethics 
constituted just under half of the week’s classes in the penultimate year.
55
 Furthermore, 
discussions concerning the foundation of ethics evidently featured prominently on the list 
of topics at the debating society. On 8 May Priestley recorded that he ‘delivered an 
appendix to my oration upon the nature and foundation of virtue’, and two days later that 
he ‘Composed and transcribed another method of reconciling the hypothesis about the 
nature and foundation of virtue in the wise’.
56
  
 The debate over liberty and necessity also occupied Priestley and his 
contemporaries during their student years. According to the testimony of his Memoirs, 
Priestley’s first encounter with the debate had been in the early 1750s, whilst he was still 
a grammar school pupil. Priestley defended the position of philosophical liberty in a 
correspondence with Peter Annet (1693-1769), a free-thinker and a ‘Necessarian’.
57
 
Although, according to Priestley’s later testimony, ‘Mr. Annet often pressed [Priestley] to 
give him [Annet] leave to publish’ the letters, Priestley refused, and the originals do not 
appear to have survived.
58
 Priestley’s Daventry journal confirms his statement that his 
correspondence with Annet lasted for several years: on 8 May and 14 July 1754 Priestley 
recorded receiving letters from Annet.
59
 Priestley’s later recollection that ‘liberty and 
necessity’ were among the ‘question[s] of much importance’ discussed at Daventry is 
frequently evinced by his journal: in eight separate entries from across the year Priestley 
recorded discussions on the topic.
60
 On 10 May, for example, Priestley noted: ‘In our 
room, Whitehead, Webb and I talked about liberty and necessity &c. till pretty late’; his 
entry for 13 November reads: ‘Drunk tea with Mr. Tayler, company Jackson, our class, 
Smith, Webb and Tayler; about necessity, &c.’
61
 The same subject comprised several of 
Priestley’s conversations with his tutors. On 25 May, for example, he recorded that he 
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‘Spent till eight o’clock with Mr. Ashworth in his closet in serious discourse, and about 
necessity, extremely agreeable’; on 10 December he recorded a meeting ‘With Mr. 
Ashworth reading my sermon and talking about necessity, &c.’
62
 In four entries for 
November and December Priestley recorded writing a discourse on ‘Practical Necessity’, 
adding the final corrections to the piece after the previously cited conversation with 
Ashworth.
63
 The question of liberty and necessity was also a popular topic at the 
academy’s debating society. On 11 December Priestley recorded delivering an oration to 
the society on ‘liberty no foundation for praise or blame’, presumably modelled on a 
discourse of the same name which he had recorded composing on 24 November.
64
 The 
society’s topic for 25 December was, again, ‘liberty and necessity’.
65
 The entry, one of 
the most detailed descriptions of a society meeting, records that the students discussed 
‘proof from appearances’, ‘the foundation of praise and blame upon the schemes’, and 
the ‘knowledge of contingencies’. Priestley noted that Jowell and Radcliffe Scholefield 
(1731?-1803) argued for liberty, Francis Webb (1735-1815) for necessity, and that he 
himself ‘blew for necessity till the last departed’.
66
 
 The arguments and references presented in Doddridge’s lectures would almost 
certainly have supplied the content of these debates. In fact, the references to the 
discussion of liberty and necessity in Doddridge’s lectures would have introduced 
Priestley to two important thinkers who were to shape his future philosophical career: 
Anthony Collins and David Hartley. Collins  had engaged in a debate with Samuel Clarke 
in the early eighteenth century, in the course of which he had developed materialist and 
necessitarian arguments, many of which would be reformulated by Priestley in his 1778 
debate with Richard Price.
67
 In Collins’s A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human 
Liberty Priestley would have discovered most of the arguments which would be central to 
his own later necessitarianism: the claim that necessity does not deny the freedom of all 
human actions, the claim that necessity is the only foundation for morality, and the claim 
that necessitarianism can be proved conclusively through an analysis of cause and 
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effect.
68
 Priestley would later prepare a new edition of Collins’s Inquiry in an attempt to 
propagate his own necessitarian ideas.
69
 In the preface to his later The Doctrine of 
Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777), he claimed he had first encountered the 
necessitarian doctrine by reading Collins.
70
  
 However, he claimed to have been ‘much more confirmed’ in it by reading 
Hartley.
71
 Priestley first mentioned Hartley in his Daventry journal on 10 June 1754, 
where he recorded a discussion with Thomas Walker (d. 1764), minister of Mill Hill 
Chapel, Leeds, in the course of which he had spoken ‘very much in praise of Hartley’.
72
 
He recorded studying the first volume of Hartley’s Observations on Man (1749) between 
26 October and 12 November. One month previously, Priestley had composed a letter to 
Hartley, and on 6 October he recorded drawing up ‘some queries for the examination of 
Dr Hartley’, which most likely comprised a second letter written on 11 October.
73
 Hartley 
evidently replied: on 9 December Priestley recorded showing ‘Mr. Ashworth the first 
letter of Hartley to me’, noting that ‘he [Ashworth] was prodigiously pleased with it’.
74
  
The fact that Priestley was reading and corresponding with Hartley at the same time as 
being engaged in these debates on liberty and necessity suggests that it was Hartley that 
was the major influence on his ideas at this stage.    
Hartley’s ‘doctrine of vibrations’, outlined in Part I of the Observations of Man, 
held that the ‘subtle influences’ of infinitesimal particles of matter transmit signals 
through the nervous system. In this way, Hartley developed an account of perception 
where simple ideas, primarily the ideas of pleasure and pain, are derived directly from 
material sensations.
75
 These, in turn, develop through the process of association to form 
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all our complex ideas, so that the theory of association comes, ultimately, to explain all 
the intellectual faculties.
76
 Hartley first addresses the question of liberty and necessity in 
the conclusion to Part I, ‘Containing some Remarks on the mechanism of the Human 
Mind’.
77
 He here gives his most concise definition of ‘the Mechanism or Necessity of 
human Actions’: 
 
each Action results from the previous Circumstances of Body and Mind, in the same 
manner, and with the same Certainty, as other Effects do from their mechanical Causes; 
so that a Person cannot do indifferently either of the Actions A, and its contrary a, while 
the previous Circumstances are the same; but is under an absolute Necessity of doing one 
of them, and that only.
78
 
 
This position is defined in opposition to ‘Free-will’, being either ‘a Power of doing either 
the Action A, or its contrary a; while the previous Circumstances remain the same’ or ‘a 
Power of beginning Motion’.
79
 Free will, in either of these senses, is impossible because 
all actions are determined by motives. Motives are defined as the previous circumstances 
existing in the brain, either the vibrations derived directly from sense impressions, or the 
compound effect of former impressions developed via association. Free will as defined in 
various other senses (‘the Power of doing what a person wills to do, or of deliberating, 
suspending, choosing, &c. or of resisting the Motives of Sensuality, Ambition, 
Resentment, &c.’) Hartley allows as being consistent with the doctrine of mechanism.
80
 
He thus distinguishes between free will ‘in the popular and practical sense’, which is 
consistent with the mechanistic theory of mind, and free will in the ‘philosophical Sense’, 
which is not.
81
 Hartley here appeals to the authority of experience and observation in 
support of his theory, and calls on the reader to ‘make the Trial, especially upon himself, 
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since such a Self-examination cannot but be profitable’.
82
 Observation, Hartley claims, 
can establish the doctrine of the mechanism of the mind with the same certainty as we 
can infer causation in the natural world.  
 As we shall later see, Hartley’s application of the analysis of cause and effect in 
the natural world to explain the mechanism of the mind would prove fundamental to 
Priestley’s later writings. However, it was Hartley’s attempt to reconcile his 
necessitarianism with morality and religion which was the most significant aspect of his 
work in relation to the influence it would have over Priestley as a student. The remainder 
of the conclusion to Part I is largely concerned with illustrating the moral benefits of a 
belief in philosophical necessity. This is contingent on Hartley’s theological assumption 
that the deity has ordered all things such that ‘Virtue must have amiable and pleasing 
Ideas affixed to it; Vice, odious ones’.
83
 After considering a number of possible 
objections to the theory, Hartley lists ‘some Consequences of the Doctrine of Mechanism, 
which seem to me to be strong Presumptions in its favour’.
84
 A belief in philosophical 
necessity, firstly, reconciles the prescience of God with the free will of man by removing 
free will in its philosophical sense; secondly, engenders humility and self-annihilation, 
since all actions are eventually seen to result from the grace and goodness of God; thirdly 
(for the same reason), abates resentment against others; fourthly, lends support to the 
doctrine of universal restoration, since all that is done by the appointment of a benevolent 
deity must result in happiness; fifthly, tends to cause us to labour more with ourselves 
and others ‘from the greater Certainty attending all Endeavours that operate in a 
mechanical Way’; sixthly, allows a number of scriptural passages to be interpreted which, 
retaining a belief in philosophical free will, would remain resistant to a coherent 
interpretation.
85
 In the final section of the conclusion, Hartley raises the possible 
objection that a belief in philosophical necessity, as well as in his doctrine of vibrations 
more generally, is inconsistent with the immateriality and immortality of the soul. To 
this, Hartley answers that his theory does not prove the materiality of the soul, but merely 
assumes some relationship between the soul and the body as a prerequisite to further 
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enquiries. However, Hartley does concede (following Locke) that matter, ‘if it could be 
endued with the most simple kinds of Sensation, might also arrive at all that intelligence 
of which the human Mind is possessed’.
86
 Admitting that this would ‘overturn all the 
Arguments which are usually brought for the Immateriality of the Soul’, Hartley declines 
to pursue the question any further.
87
 Finally, Hartley contends that ‘the Immateriality of 
the Soul has little or no Connexion with its Immortality’. In the final paragraph he 
advocates a variety of mortalist theory, recommending that ‘we ought to depend upon 
Him who first breathed into Man the Breath of the present Life, for our Resurrection to a 
better.
88
 
 Hartley returned to the question of liberty and necessity in Part II of the 
Observations. In proposition 14 he argues that religion requires ‘voluntary Powers over 
our Affections and Actions’, or free will in the popular and practical sense.
89
 In this way, 
‘Meditation, religious Conversation, reading practical Books of Religion, and Prayer’ are 
assigned a role as the means by which we can regulate ‘our Affections and Actions 
according to the Will of God’.
90
 However, in the following proposition Hartley stresses 
that this does not mean that religion presupposes free will in the philosophical sense, as 
defined in the first volume of the work. Subsequently, Hartley considers the objection 
that, unless philosophical liberty is admitted, there is ‘no Foundation for Commendation 
or Blame, and consequently no difference between Virtue and Vice’.  In response to this, 
Hartley posits that there are two different modes of speaking (‘as it were, two different 
Languages’) corresponding to the popular and the philosophical definitions of free will.
91
 
Speaking in the popular sense, man is justly blamed by others ‘merely for the right or 
wrong Use of his voluntary powers’.
92
 In the same mode of speaking, a similar judicial 
role is assigned to the deity, to whom ‘Justice is ascribed’ ‘only in a popular and 
anthropomorphitical Sense’. Thus, according to the same language, God is vindicated 
from being the ‘Author of Sin’ because sin and vice, as voluntary actions, are ascribed to 
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men.
93
 In the philosophical language, however, the justice of God is more properly 
spoken of as ‘Benevolence’.
94
 Happiness has thus come to replace virtue as the criterion 
of ethics. Hartley uses a Lockeian distinction between primary and secondary qualities to 
illustrate his point:  
 
according to this, Virtue and Vice are to Actions, what secondary Qualities are to natural 
Bodies; i. e. only Ways of expressing the Relation which they bear to Happiness and 
Misery, just as the secondary Qualities of Bodies are only modifications of the primary 
ones.
95
 
 
In the philosophical sense, God is spoken of as the author of sin; however, since vice and 
sin are to be properly understood as ‘Modifications and Compositions of natural Evil’, 
this is only to ascribe natural evil to the deity.
96
 However, since ‘the Balance of natural 
Good’ is infinite, even this natural evil ‘will be absorbed and annihilated by it’.
97
 Hartley 
again draws on Locke to illustrate this concept: 
 
It may a little illustrate what is here delivered, to remark, that as we should not say of a 
superior Being, whose Sight could penetrate to the ultimate Constitution of Bodies, that 
he distinguished Colours, but rather, that he distinguished those modifications of Matter 
which produce the Appearances of Colours in us, so we ought not to ascribe our 
secondary Ideas of Virtue and Vice to superior Intelligences, and much less to the 
supreme.
98
  
 
In the final paragraph of proposition 15, Hartley conjectures that a belief in free will as 
the vindication of the divine benevolence has probably arisen from an 
‘Anthropomorphitism of too gross a kind’.
99
 This last section is particularly significant as 
it is very likely to have supplied the argument for the oration delivered by Priestley to the 
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debating society on 11 December on ‘liberty no foundation for praise or blame’.
100
 Just 
two days previously, Priestley had recorded receiving his first letter from Hartley in 
answer to four queries he had sent him on 11 October.
101
 
 In fact, the influence of Hartley’s Observations on Priestley’s thinking is difficult 
to overestimate: Hartley was to exert a major influence over all of Priestley’s mature 
philosophical thought. In his Memoirs, Priestley wrote that Hartley’s work ‘produced the 
greatest and, in my opinion, the most favourable effect on my general turn of thinking 
through life’, and in the mid-1770s that ‘I think myself more indebted to this one treatise, 
than to all the books I ever read beside; the scriptures excluded’.
102
 When Priestley 
developed his own early answer to the debate on the foundation of morals, it was also to 
Hartley’s Observations that he would turn. Before considering Priestley’s writings, 
however, I shall first examine how the topic of moral philosophy was taught by some of 
Priestley’s predecessors and contemporaries at Warrington.    
 
Moral Philosophy at Warrington 
 
With some significant variations and criticisms, Doddridge’s lectures were also used in 
the teaching at Warrington whilst Priestley was a tutor there between 1761 and 1767, 
principally by John Aikin and John Seddon. Writing to Seddon from Warrington in April 
1762, Priestley referred to ‘Mr. Aikin’s intention of reading from Dr. Doddridge’s 
divinity lectures, printed or not printed’, and in his subsequent two letters enquired of 
Seddon, at this point on a visit to London, about the progress of the printing of 
Doddridge’s lectures on Aikin’s behalf.
103
 The same emphasis on moral philosophy was 
continued at Warrington. According to a plan of studies published in 1760, moral 
philosophy constituted a significant part of the third and final years of the four-year 
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course for divinity students.
104
 Lay students followed a ‘short system of Morality 
concluding with the Evidences of the Christian Religion’ in their third year.
105
  
 Furthermore, as with the example of Doddridge and Fordyce, there were some 
significant inter-personal links between the Scottish universities and the Warrington 
Academy. The relationship between Doddridge and Fordyce ought to be seen as part of a 
wider set of connections between the Scottish universities and the English dissenting 
academies. There are a number of practical reasons for these connections. Whereas in the 
early eighteenth century it had been typical for the children of dissenting families to 
attend continental universities, in the latter half of the century there was an increasing 
tendency for English dissenters to be educated in Scotland. This may have been in part 
due to the shift on the continent to the vernacular languages (rather than Latin) as the 
medium of instruction, although financial considerations undoubtedly played a major 
part. Several of the funds established specifically to assist the education of English 
dissenters provided the financial means for a Scottish university education.
106
 
Consequentially, a significant number of the English academy tutors had graduated at one 
of the five Scottish universities.
107
 This inevitably meant that some tutors brought into the 
academies aspects of the moral philosophy being developed in the Scottish universities 
among the moderate wing of Scottish Presbyterianism. The rationalist and the 
Shaftesburian approaches to ethics outlined in Doddridge’s lectures found a 
correspondence in the different approaches to moral philosophy exemplified by the 
individual tutors at Warrington. John Taylor (1694-1761), an Arian in theology, and the 
first divinity and moral philosophy tutor between 1757 and 1761, took a staunchly 
rationalist approach to ethics and was hostile to Scottish thought.
108
 Seddon (1724-1770), 
who lectured sporadically on moral philosophy throughout the 1760s, seems, like 
Doddridge, to have had some degree of sympathy with Scottish philosophy. Although 
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much has been written on the teaching of the early Warrington tutors, little of this work 
has been substantiated by much concrete evidence.
109
 In the following account, I shall re-
examine some of the available sources in order to develop a more accurate picture of 
what was actually taught in the moral philosophy lectures at Warrington.     
 As the first tutor in moral philosophy at Warrington, Taylor’s writings indicate 
the rationalist bent of the ethics taught at the academy’s inception. Taylor was on close 
terms with William Leechman (1706-1785), Professor of Divinity at Glasgow University 
between 1743 and 1761. Leechman visited the Warrington Academy in the summer of 
1759, where he met Taylor, with whom he was subsequently to correspond from 
Glasgow.
110
 He was behind Taylor’s being awarded the degree of DD by the University 
of Glasgow in 1756.
111
 Leechman, besides being an important theologian in his own 
right, was a contemporary, friend, and biographer of Francis Hutcheson. However, 
Taylor’s writings indicate that he was wholly unsympathetic to the moral philosophy 
developed by Hutcheson in the 1720s.  
 Writing to his friend George Benson (1699-1762) from Norwich in June 1757, 
Taylor expressed his approbation of the Warrington Trustees’ decision to offer Samuel 
Dyer (1725-1772), who had been a student at Glasgow, the position of tutor in moral 
philosophy.
112
 Although Dyer declined the offer, Taylor had evidently hoped that he 
would accept and was candidly forthright in declaring his reasons for this preference to 
Benson. The passage is interesting for the insight it provides into both Taylor’s aversion 
to Hutchesonian moral philosophy and the threat Taylor perceived this philosophy would 
pose to his own theology: 
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I am much pleased that they have nominated Mr Sam. Dyer, for moral Philosophy and 
polite Literature, as hoping that he is not in Mr Hutcheson’s Scheme of Glasgow, which 
would by no means suit my Divinity, nor be any proper Foundation of it, but believing 
that he understands better Principles. I hope he will accept the Office.
113
 
   
Two years later, after having commenced his duties as tutor in moral philosophy, Taylor 
published his own An Examination of the Scheme of Morality, Advanced by Dr. 
Hutcheson (1759). The Examination was a critical account of Hutcheson’s works of the 
1720s in which Taylor accused Hutcheson’s philosophy of severing the link between 
reason and the internal principles of virtue.
114
 Taylor’s A Sketch of Moral Philosophy; or 
an Essay to Demonstrate the Principles of Virtue and Religion upon a New, Natural, and 
Easy Plan (1760), published a year later for the use of his Warrington pupils, gives an 
indication of Taylor’s own position. Writing to Benson in October 1759 Taylor, in a 
passage which again illuminates  the connection he perceived between his philosophy and 
his theology, described the work as:  
 
my own Scheme of moral Philosophy, which has for 30 Years or more been the subject 
of frequent & close reflection, & the rule by which I have examined the principles of 
Revelation.
115
  
 
In the same letter, he acknowledged a debt to Richard Price, whose A Review of the 
Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals had been published a year earlier in 1758, 
yet criticised Price’s work for its adoption of ‘Notions of the operations of the mind, wch 
I think are too minute & disputable; or, however, of no use in explaining the Foundations 
of Virtue, but rather imbarras than clear the Subject’.
116
 In the preface to his own work, 
Taylor again acknowledged his debts: to his friend Phillips Glover, author of An Inquiry 
concerning Virtue and Happiness (1751), and to Price. He identified the purpose of the 
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book as being prefatory to the study of William Wollaston’s The Religion of Nature 
Delineated (1722).
117
  
 The essence of Taylor’s approach to moral philosophy can be summarised by 
definition 14: ‘TO know the Nature of Things, is the same as to know the Obligation to 
right Action’.
118
 Like Doddridge, Taylor was a rationalist in ethics, founding virtue in a 
concept of ‘Truth, or the Nature of Things’ which he regularly compares to the a priori 
truths of mathematics and geometry. His rationalist stance is reflected by the book’s 
mathematical form in which the principles of virtue are set out: ‘Just as in Euclid, the 
simple principles of Geometry are demonstrated, in a Series of Propositions’.
119
 Taylor 
identifies ‘REASON, or Understanding’ as ‘the only Faculty in the human Constitution, 
which can perceive moral Obligations’.
120
 Unlike Doddridge, he refuses to concede that 
instinct might have any role in informing moral choices. Taylor clearly distinguishes 
reason from ‘the simple Perceptions of Sense’ and ‘the Feelings of mere animal Nature’, 
both of which are incapable of deducing ‘any Truths from the Natures, or Relations of 
Objects’.
121
 In Taylor’s system, ‘all instinctive Inclinations, Passions and Affections, 
such as Fear, Sorrow, Joy, Compassion, Love, &c. must be excluded from the Notion and 
Principle of moral Action’ so that ‘Instincts can constitute no Part or Principle of 
Morality’.
122
  
 Taylor’s ethical system holds that the freedom of the will is a necessary 
prerequisite for virtuous action. Towards the start of the work, he writes that ‘The 
primary Reason, or Foundation of Virtue’ should be ‘perfectly consistent with Liberty, or 
Freedom of Choice’.
123
 In chapter IV, ‘Of Agency’, Taylor draws on an argument similar 
to the second point advanced by Doddridge in support of natural liberty: 
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Our being necessarily justified, or condemned by the Reflections of our Minds upon our 
own Actions, proves that we are accountable for them, as being the proper and only 
Authors of them.
124
 
 
Contrary to the position suggested by Doddridge (and later adopted by Hartley and 
Priestley), Taylor argues that the ‘Motives of Pleasure, or Pain, Profit, or Loss, do not 
affect Agency’. Although he concedes that ‘These work powerfully on the Mind’, they do 
not work ‘necessarily; seeing there are many who choose to act contrary to their 
Influence’.
125
 Taylor later reconciles this freedom of the will with divine prescience: 
‘though Virtue is essentially the Effect of free Choice, yet the great GOD can abundantly 
assist our virtuous Choices and Endeavours, without interfering with our Freedom, or 
Agency’.
126
 This is done, Taylor argues, ‘by proposing Motives, weakning the 
Impressions of Sense and Passion, throwing more Light into the Mind, comforting the 
Heart, strengthening virtuous Desires, Endeavours and Resolutions’.
127
   
A very different approach was exemplified in the teaching of John Seddon, who 
appears to have been more receptive to Scottish moral philosophy. Like many English 
rational dissenters, Seddon had studied in Scotland. After leaving the Kendal Academy, 
where he had been a student under Caleb Rotheram, he continued his education at the 
University of Glasgow. He is listed in the university records under a group of students 
who matriculated in 1744; whilst it is unlikely that Seddon enrolled on the arts course, it 
is certainly possible that he attended Hutcheson’s popular moral philosophy lectures, an 
option frequently pursued by divinity students.
128
 Later accounts of Seddon’s 
acquaintance with Hutcheson derive from Robert B. Aspland’s 1854 biography of 
Seddon in the Christian Reformer.
129
 In addition to noting Seddon’s friendship with 
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Leechman, Aspland wrote that ‘Seddon and his three English Friends [Robert Andrews, 
John Holland, and Richard Godwin] were favourite pupils of the Professor [Hutcheson], 
who was attracted to them by their intelligence and cultivation, and also by their 
connection with the liberal Dissenters’.
130
 The case of Robert Andrews (fl. 1747-1766) is 
interesting as a parallel to Seddon’s career, and as a possible indication of the lasting 
effects of a Scottish university education.
131
 Andrews had been educated with Seddon 
under Ashworth at Kendal. In 1747, after leaving Glasgow, he was appointed minister to 
the Presbyterian congregation at Lydgate, Yorkshire, and in 1753 moved to Platt Chapel 
in Rusholme, Lancashire. In the same year, he corresponded with Seddon on theological 
topics and on the principles of a dissenting academy.
132
 The previous year, Andrews had 
published a work entitled Animadversions on Mr. Brown’s Three Essays on the 
Characteristicks (1752), a defence of the writings of the Earl of Shaftesbury against the 
criticisms of John Brown (1715-1766).
133
 Whether Aspland’s account of Seddon’s 
acquaintance with Hutcheson was accurate or not, it is fairly certain that Seddon was at 
least familiar with Hutcheson’s writings. ‘The Rev. Mr. John Seddon of Warrington’ is 
listed as a subscriber to Hutcheson’s A System of Moral Philosophy, edited and published 
posthumously by his son in 1755 and prefaced with a biographical account of the author 
by Leechman.
134
 The same book, as well as Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into our Ideas of 
Beauty and Virtue (1725) and An Essay on the Nature of the Passions and Affections 
(1728), was among the collection in the Warrington Academy library by 1775.
135
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Moreover, there is some concrete evidence of the details of Seddon’s teaching at 
Warrington. In October 1760, Taylor, just six months before his death, wrote to Benson 
expressing his despair at the affairs of the academy. He informed Benson of ‘a new 
scheme opening in these parts’ which ‘has already, I am persuaded, infected the 
Academy, and, I apprehend, will affect both that & my self still more deeply’.
136
 The 
‘scheme’ to which Taylor was referring was very likely to have been a new system of 
moral philosophy. At some point, either in late 1759 or early 1760, Seddon had taken 
over the moral philosophy class from the ageing Taylor. Word of Taylor’s dissatisfaction 
reached the Trustees, who wrote to Taylor in January 1760, requesting him to detail the 
specifics of his complaints. The minutes of a meeting held the following September to 
address these concerns record nine paragraphs of Taylor’s grievances, among them his 
statement that: 
 
I am greatly dissatisfied that a Lecture in Moral Philosophy has been set up of late, and 
some of my Pupils drawn to attend it, in direct Repugnance to my Principles; and in 
support of such as I expressly declared against before I came into Lancashire. 
 
The response, noted in the minute book alongside Taylor’s statement, records that: 
 
The person here aimed at is Mr. Seddon, who at the request of some of the pupils that 
were ready for that Branch of Study, consented to read over with them Dr. Nettleton and 
some other Books, as they understood that the Dr. [i.e. Taylor], from the Ill state of his 
Health, did not intend to give any lectures in Moral Philosophy that session.
137
  
 
Dr Thomas Nettleton (1683-1742) was an eminent Halifax physician and a fellow of the 
Royal Society with strong links to the dissenters in the north of England.
138
 He was the 
author of the anonymously published Some Thoughts concerning Virtue and Happiness 
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in a Letter to a Clergyman (1729).
139
 The work was reissued in 1736 as A Treatise on 
Virtue and Happiness and passed through at least a further seven editions published 
between the late 1730s and 1776. Nettleton had written to Hutcheson sending him a copy 
of the Treatise in 1735, a year before the work’s publication.
140
  
 Nettleton’s book begins by distinguishing between ‘the province of the 
understanding’, the function of which is ‘to discover truth, and to improve knowledge’, 
and ‘sense’, being ‘the power to be thus affected, or to feel pleasure and pain’.
141
 
Nettleton goes on to equate virtue with happiness; following the dictates of the sense, or 
the ‘powers of affection’, the ‘scope and end of all our motions, the general aim of our 
conduct is or at least ought to be, happiness’.
142
 In section II of the work Nettleton 
defines the ‘moral sense’, variously referred to as a ‘sense of right and wrong’, the 
‘conscience’, or simply ‘honour’, as ‘the power of the mind to distinguish sentiments, 
dispositions and actions, and to be thus differently affected by them’.
143
 As perceived by 
the moral sense, moral action is aestheticised, so that ‘all those dispositions, and actions, 
that render mankind generous and beneficent, and that evidently lead to the public good, 
and to the order and harmony of society, do always appear beautiful and amiable’.
144
 The 
fact that Seddon read through Nettleton with his students, combined with the evidence of 
his subscription to Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy, lends support to later 
assertions of Seddon’s partiality for Hutchesonian moral philosophy.
145
 It is tempting to 
speculate what the ‘other Books’ referred to in the Trustees’ minutes might have been: a 
library catalogue from the Warrington Academy indicates that Nettleton’s book was 
shelved between Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks and Hutcheson’s and Burnet’s Letters 
concerning the True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness (1735).
146
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 It is also possible to further reconstruct Seddon’s teaching at Warrington using a 
set of extant manuscript lecture notes thought to have been delivered at Warrington by 
Seddon some time between 1767 and 1770.
147
 These notes indicate that Seddon’s lectures 
on philosophy were very closely modelled on Doddridge’s. Of the eleven notebooks on 
philosophical topics, six comprise an extended commentary on one or two propositions 
and their subsequent corollaries from Doddridge’s textbook. The references to page 
numbers indicate that Seddon was working from a printed volume, which must have been 
Clark’s 1763 edition. The remaining five notebooks contain notes for lectures on 
language and logic, the references in which indicate that Seddon was using Isaac Watts’s 
Logick: or, the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth (1725), which had been 
used by Doddridge at Northampton and by Ashworth and Clark at Daventry. As Isabel 
Rivers has shown, it was not uncommon for tutors using Doddridge’s lectures in the 
dissenting academies to update the syllabus by adding references to more recent works on 
the debates covered by Doddridge’s course.
148
 It is clear from the notebooks that this is 
exactly the way in which Doddridge’s lectures were used at Warrington. A number of 
references to works published from 1750 onwards show that the students were referred to 
studies from the second half of the eighteenth century. Some of these references also 
point to intellectual ties between the dissenting academies and the Scottish universities. 
In a notebook labelled ‘No 26’, for example, a commentary on Part IV of Watts’s Logick, 
Seddon refers to James Harris’s Hermes, or, A Philosophical Enquiry concerning 
Universal Grammar (1751).
149
 The same notebook contains what is very likely to be a 
reference to the work of Robert Simson (1687-1768), Professor of Mathematics at 
Glasgow.
150
 In a notebook labelled ‘No 4’ Seddon moves from Doddridge’s definition 5 
(‘Spirit is a thinking being, or a being which has the power of thought’) to a discussion of 
the distinction between body and matter and the question of whether two bodies can be 
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united without an increase of weight. He subsequently refers the students to the work of 
‘the Disciples of Dr Black’. The reference is to Joseph Black (1728-1799), who in the 
mid-1750s carried out chemical experiments on alkalis at Edinburgh University which 
demonstrated that when a quantity of magnesia alba was heated the weight of the 
substance which remained was less than the original white powder.
151
 Similarly, in a 
notebook labelled ‘No 12’, a discussion of Doddridge’s proposition 2 (‘To survey the 
pheænomena observable in Brute Animals, which seem to bear some resemblance to the 
faculties of the human mind’), there is a reference to experiments with opium carried out 
in 1755 by Robert Whytt (1714-1766), Professor of Medicine at Edinburgh, published by 
the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh in 1756.
152
 
In ethics Seddon’s lecture notes indicate a practical rather than a speculative 
approach. In a notebook labelled ‘No 39 Logic’ he posits a dichotomy between 
‘Discourses upon General and unlimited Topics’ and ‘the contemplation of limited 
propositions or particular subjects’. Whereas the latter are ‘full of real Instruction and 
increase our knowledge’, the former are ‘little better than sounds without sense’. To 
illustrate his point, Seddon refers disparagingly to ‘the endless controversies about the 
foundation of virtue whether it be founded on a sense of right and wrong or a peculiar 
sense called the moral sense or whether it depends on the will of Deity’. For Seddon, this 
kind of theoretical debate is less important than an analysis of particular actions and the 
classification of these actions as either ethically right or wrong: ‘whereas each of these 
[the positions on the foundation of virtue] are so many mediums to prove what is virtuous 
or vitious and whatever actions come under any of these descriptions may be pronounced 
virtuous’.  
Only one notebook is devoted entirely to moral philosophy, the eleventh in the 
volume, which is largely a commentary on definition 42 and the subsequent corollaries 
and scholium, definition 43, and propositions 53 and 54 from Doddridge’s lectures. The 
correspondent section in Doddridge is largely concerned with establishing the difference 
between verbal propositions deemed to be either logically or ethically true. In the scholia 
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Doddridge adduces ‘a further argument, taken from the nature of ethical truth’ that 
‘seems to imply something in it so sacred, that a violation of it is dishonourable, 
contemptible, and therefore vicious’. He subsequently refers to the opinion expressed by 
some that ‘God has given us a sense, by which we unavoidably delight in the truth’, the 
references directing the students to John Balguy’s The Law of Truth: or, the Obligations 
of Reason essential to all Religion (1733) and Joseph Butler’s The Analogy of Natural 
and Revealed Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736). In the following 
scholium Doddridge considers ‘a question of considerable difficulty and importance; 
whether it may be in any case lawful to be ethically false’. He considers the two opposing 
opinions: firstly, that the sacred nature of truth prohibits it in all cases and, secondly, that, 
in those rare instances where the happiness of mankind might be more effectually 
promoted by falsehood than truth, ‘falsehood ceases to be a vice and becomes a virtue’.
153
 
Although conceding that the question is, perhaps, ‘not possible for any human or finite 
understanding to determine’, Doddridge ultimately decides that the second is ‘a maxim so 
dangerous to human society, that it seems, that a wise and benevolent man, who firmly 
believes it, would on his own principles teach the contrary’.
154
  
In his lecture Seddon argued, with Doddridge, that the sacred nature of truth 
prohibits the speaking of falsehood in all cases, noting that ‘To speak Truth therefore is 
one of the most determinate moral maxims that can possibly be’. The ‘sense’ referred to 
in Doddridge’s lectures finds a counterpart in Seddon’s notes, which refer frequently to  a 
sense of ‘honour’ or ‘integrity’, later more fully defined as ‘a sense of honour[,] a dread 
of shame[,] an undaunted spirit[,] contempt of Danger[,] and love of Truth’. In his notes 
on ‘those circumstances that require and will justify the violation of truth’, Seddon 
considers the opinion of some that ‘self preservation is superior to Benevolence’. He 
counters this by arguing that ‘self preservation is of two kinds[:] the Preservation of life 
and the preservation of Integrity’. Interestingly, Seddon adds a consideration, not 
mentioned in this section of Doddridge’s lectures, that the motives to action are not 
always derived from reason but that ‘In general where the fear of Death or any great Evil 
stares a person in the face it leaves little Room for Reflection how to escape it and 
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generally in such cases we act from impulse and passion more than Reason’. A similar 
interest in impulses arising prior to the dictates of reason is evinced where Seddon 
counters the ‘supposition that a man[’]s life is of greater importance to him than his 
integrity’ by citing the example of the ‘parental[,] conjugal effects and the amor patriæ’, 
and the desire, ‘thought the highest pitch of virtue’, ‘to expose our own lifes for[?] the 
lives of those dearest to us’.  
The lack of any direct reference to Hutcheson in these lectures suggests, perhaps, 
that the link between Seddon and Hutcheson might have been somewhat over emphasised 
by later commentators. Nevertheless, the lectures do confirm that Seddon took a very 
different approach to ethics from Taylor’s rationalist stance. His interest in impulse and 
passion evince an approach to moral philosophy which, if not directly derived from 
Hutcheson, is not dissimilar to that found in Nettleton’s work. It is thus fair to say that the 
rationalist ethics taught by Taylor at the academy’s inception had, by the late 1760s, been 
modified by Seddon’s interest in Scottish moral sense philosophy.
155
 Unfortunately, none 
of the lectures deal in any depth with the question of liberty and necessity.
156
 However, 
Priestley’s later recollection that the tutors at Warrington during his time there were all 
‘zealous Necessarians’ might be somewhat misleading.
157
 Priestley’s assertion of a 
shared doctrinal position among the Warrington tutors conceals the extent to which the 
philosophical underpinnings of his thought were moving in a different direction from 
both the rationalist and the Shaftesburian traditions. It is in the context of the debates over 
the question of the moral sense at Warrington that I shall now turn to examine Priestley’s 
early writings.             
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The moral sense in Hartley and Priestley 
 
What is most significant in Priestley’s writings of this period is the way in which his 
thought was developing in a very different direction from the intellectual milieu in which 
he was working. This was undoubtedly due to his encounter with the works of Collins 
and Hartley, but also to his engagement with the writings of another author who would 
influentially shape his later thought: Edmund Law. Law (1703-1787) is something of a 
neglected influence on the early formation of Priestley’s ideas.
158
 He most likely served 
as an important link between Priestley and a previous generation of late seventeenth-
century natural law theorists; his writings illustrate well the means by which 
philosophical and theological ideas were fused in Priestley’s thought. Law was, at various 
times during his career, Fellow of Christ’s (1724-1737), Master of Peterhouse (1756-87), 
Knightbridge Professor of Moral Theology (1764-69), and Bishop of Carlisle (1768). At 
Cambridge, Law was an important channel for the diffusion of Lockeian thought. He was 
a close associate of Francis Blackburne (1705-1787), Theophilus Lindsey’s future father-
in-law, and his theological writings exerted a prominent influence over the future 
Unitarians John Jebb, John Disney, and Gilbert Wakefield.
159
 Law’s Considerations on 
the Propriety of requiring Subscription to Articles of Faith (1774) was his contribution to 
the debate occasioned by the petition to Parliament against compulsory subscription to 
the Thirty-Nine Articles, with which Lindsey was to become prominently involved, and 
on which Lindsey and Priestley were to correspond in the early 1770s.
160
 Law’s 
Considerations on the State of the World with regard to the Theory of Religion (1745) is 
cited in Doddridge’s lectures in Part VI, ‘In which the Genuineness and Credibility of the 
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Old and New Testament is asserted and vindicated’.
161
 Priestley recorded reading the 
work, as well as Law’s A Discourse upon the Life and Character of Christ (1749), in his 
Daventry journal over the weekend of 10-12 May 1754.
162
 Through his later friendship 
with Lindsey, Priestley certainly met Law on at least one occasion. In a letter to John 
Jebb of February 1774, Lindsey recorded a meeting at the house of David Hartley jnr 
(1731-1813) at Golden Square in London between himself and Priestley and Law, 
Richard Price, and Benjamin Franklin.
163
  
In Law’s Considerations, two themes which would prove central to Priestley’s 
thinking across the diversity of his interests are given particularly succinct expression. 
The first of these is an epistemology derived from Locke and Hartley. Law’s connection 
to Hartley can be traced through to John Gay (1699-1745), whom Hartley credited with 
providing him with the germ of the idea that would lead to his associationist theory, and 
who contributed a ‘Preliminary Dissertation concerning the Fundamental Picture of 
Virtue or Morality’, to Law’s translation of William King’s De origine mali (1731).
164
 In 
Law’s ‘The Nature and Obligations of Man, as a Sensible and Rational Being’, prefixed 
to later editions of the translation, he traced the development of the theory of the 
association of ideas from Locke, through Gay, to its fruition in Hartley.
165
 The 
Considerations cite Hartley’s Observations on Man in the second edition of 1749, and 
further references to Hartley’s work were added to later editions.
166
 During his years at 
Cambridge, Law was engaged in a lengthy correspondence with Hartley on the 
Observations.
167
 Law’s debt to Locke in the Considerations comes across most 
pertinently through his aversion to innate ideas, and through his prioritising of man’s 
intrinsic desire for happiness: 
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In short, how much more wise and beneficial is the present constitution of things! where 
all is left to Mankind themselves, who have both the forming and disposing of each other; 
nay where men are at liberty in a great measure to frame their own Natures and 
Dispositions: where they have no inconvenient or pernicious Principle to lay to Nature’s 
Charge, no properly innate Notions or Implanted Instincts, no truly natural Appetite or 
Affection to snag or bypass them, except that universal Sense and strong Desire of 
Happiness.
168
 
 
 Such a disposition to locate the foundations of moral obligation in mankind’s 
desire for happiness was an important intellectual current at eighteenth-century 
Cambridge. A trajectory of the idea can be traced from Locke’s Essay, particularly his 
chapter ‘Of Power’ from Book II, through publications such as John Clarke’s The 
Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice (1726), Gay’s ‘Dissertation’, Butler’s 
Analogy of Religion, and Hartley’s Observations, to influential theologians of the late 
eighteenth century such as William Paley.
169
 The concept is referred to in Doddridge’s 
lectures where Doddridge, discussing the question of innate ideas in the mind, concedes 
that, in one sense, ‘Mr. Locke owns innate practical principles, as the desire of 
happiness’.
170
 The idea was to have important implications for the theological framework 
eventually developed by Priestley, particularly regarding the concept of a benevolent 
deity with the happiness of mankind as the criterion of his will. In Priestley’s system the 
concept of God’s benevolence would eventually come to replace various conceptions of 
God’s nature, or the nature of things, which served as the ontological foundation for 
ethics in the rationalist schemes common to Doddridge, Taylor, and Price.
171
  
 Priestley’s early assimilation of these ideas is well illustrated by the first volume 
of his Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion. The work was first published in 1772, 
but was drafted whilst Priestley was a student at Daventry in the early months of 1755 
and used by him for a course of lectures delivered to his first congregation at Needham 
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Market in the late 1750s.
172
 In the Institutes, Priestley argues that from man’s 
consciousness of his own desire for universal happiness can be inferred the benevolent 
nature of the deity: 
 
can it be supposed that our maker would have constituted us in such a manner, as that our 
natural ideas of perfection and excellence should not be applicable to the essential 
attributes of his own nature? Our natural approbation of love and benevolence is, therefore, 
a proof of the divine benevolence, as it cannot be supposed that he should have made us to 
hate, and not to love himself.
173
   
 
Following from this, Priestley equates the will of the deity with an optimistic utilitarian 
benevolence: ‘Upon the whole, the face of things is such as gives us abundant reason to 
conclude, that God made every thing with a view to the happiness of his creatures and 
offspring’.
174
  
The second, and perhaps the more prominent theme in Law’s work with respect to 
its influence over the range of Priestley’s thought, is a teleological notion of progress 
firmly rooted within a scheme of Christian theology. In this respect, Law combines an 
optimism characteristic of a range of eighteenth-century thinkers with a rationalised form 
of Christian millenarianism shared by other prominent figures within rational dissent 
such as Richard Price. The principal thesis of Law’s work is that ‘Arts and Sciences’ and 
‘Natural and Revealed Religion’ are in a constant state of progress, with mankind’s 
knowledge of the human sciences retaining a constant relation to his knowledge of 
religion. Law argues for the ‘partial Communication of Christianity’, vindicated by the 
notion that: 
 
Mankind are not, nor ever have been, capable of entering into the Depths of knowledge at 
once, of receiving a whole system of Natural or Moral Truths together; but must be let into 
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them by degrees, and have them communicated by little and little, as they are able to bear 
it.
175
 
 
Distinguishing between ‘the Delivery of a Doctrine’ and ‘its general Reception in the 
world’, his argument holds that although the original revelation of Christianity was 
dependent on an act of divine intervention, its development and fruition depend largely 
on ‘man’s own Dispositions both natural and moral’.
176
 Concomitant with this is Law’s 
account of the gradual refinement of the doctrine of Christianity itself. As would the later 
Priestley, Law holds that Christianity must be gradually purged of its accretions, 
specifically the remnants of ‘Jewish Fables and Traditions’ and the ‘impure mixture of 
Philosophy’ bequeathed by the first gentile converts.
177
 As mankind’s knowledge of 
natural religion (broadly conceived to include all the human sciences) gradually 
increases, so too will his understanding of revealed religion: 
 
It is probable that the knowledge of Religion alone is not at a stand; but on the contrary, 
that as we continually advance in the study of GOD’S Works, so we shall come to a 
proportionally better understanding of his Word.
178
 
 
Locating himself in the tradition of the Protestant reformers, Law holds that through the 
refinement of scriptural exegesis and the advancement of textual criticism, human 
endeavour is assigned an active role in the unfolding of God’s divine plan. As human 
reason gradually perfects itself, ‘Divine Revelation will gradually clear up, and 
Christianity itself draw nearer to its fullness’.
179
  
 Priestley’s Institutes once again reflect Law’s arguments in the Considerations. 
Priestley adopts a similar notion of progress, writing towards the opening of the Institutes 
that ‘[the] Works of God [...] are not yet compleated; for as far as they are subject to our 
inspection, they are evidently in a progress to something more perfect’.
180
 Within God’s 
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providential scheme, designed to promote the ultimate happiness of mankind, human 
knowledge gradually perfects itself: 
 
Knowledge, and a variety of improvements depending upon knowledge (all of which are 
directly or indirectly subservient to happiness) have been increasing from the time of our 
earliest acquaintance with history to the present; and in the last century this progress has 
been amazingly rapid.
181
       
 
It is within this framework of Christian teleology that Priestley’s engagements with 
contemporary debates surrounding both the question of the foundation of ethics and the 
question of free will and necessity need to be understood.  
 In Hartley’s Observations, Priestley would have encountered a very different 
solution to the question concerning the foundation of morals to that proposed by authors 
working in either the rationalist or the Shaftesburian traditions. In his analysis of the 
moral sense in chapter IV of the first volume of the Observations, Hartley had described 
the formation of the moral sense (variously referred to as the conscience or the moral 
judgment) through the process of association. He compares his own approach to the 
prevailing instinctual and rationalist conceptions of the moral faculty:  
 
The Moral Sense or Judgment here spoken of, is sometimes considered as an Instinct, 
sometimes as Determinations of the Mind, grounded on the eternal Reasons and 
Relations of Things.
182
 
 
Against the first position, Hartley argues that it remains untenable in the absence of 
evidence of moral judgments arising independently of prior associations; against the 
second, that grounding morality and our judgments concerning it on any eternal criteria 
ought, similarly, to be supported by strong evidence. In the absence of such evidence 
Hartley argues for his own position that all ‘our moral Judgments, Approbations, and 
Disapprobations’ can be deduced from association alone. Hartley is thus able to claim 
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that the moral sense is neither instinctual, nor founded on an a priori concept of reason, 
but ‘generated necessarily and mechanically’.
183
  
Priestley’s assimilation of Hartley’s model of associationism, and its opposition to 
theories of taste founded on instinct, is well illustrated by his A Course of Lectures on 
Oratory and Criticism. These lectures were first published in 1777, but were composed 
whilst Priestley was a tutor at Warrington for a course of lectures delivered in 1762.
184
 In 
the preface to the published work, most likely written in the 1770s, Priestley cited his 
reason for publishing the lectures as being to provide an explication of Hartley’s theory: 
‘I have been induced to do it [publish] partly with a view to the illustration of the doctrine 
of the association of ideas, to which there is a constant reference through the whole 
work’.
185
 In this respect he lays claim to a degree of originality, asserting that ‘the theory’ 
is new. As did Doddridge and the Scots in relation to ethics, Priestley holds that some 
conception of human nature is a prerequisite to a satisfactory theory of oratory. The third 
part of the Lectures is thus largely devoted to explaining ‘the properties, or principles, in 
our frame which lay the mind open to its [oratory’s] influences’.
186
 In Priestley’s theory, 
aesthetic pleasure is traced down to the material sensations of pleasure and pain caused 
by sensory impressions. Intellectual pleasure is conceived of as an extension of sensual 
pleasures ‘combined together in infinitely-various degrees and proportions’.
187
 Priestley 
here differentiates his own theory from those based on any conception of an innate 
faculty. Noting that the effect of oratory is achieved by exciting either the ‘passions’ or 
the ‘pleasures of the imagination’, Priestley dismisses the notion of ‘some philosophers’ 
that these feelings are attributable to ‘so many distinct reflex, or internal senses, as they 
call those faculties of the mind by which we perceive them’.
188
 Rejecting the notion that 
the value of an object is perceived spontaneously by an indwelling aesthetic sense, 
Priestley uses Hartley’s theory to argue that a faculty of aesthetic judgment (or taste) is 
acquired through the process of association. In this way, aesthetic appreciation is 
radically democratised: the principles of taste are derived from education, and can thus be 
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‘acquired’ by ‘scarce any person’.
189
 That our idea of taste is not innate, Priestley 
proceeds to demonstrate (in a manner reminiscent of Locke) by noting the differences 
between the aesthetic standards held by different historical and geographical cultures.
190
 
This does not, however, mean that taste is entirely relative. In accordance with Priestley’s 
theory of progress, he posits the idea that through increased cross-cultural intercourse ‘an 
uniform and perfect standard of taste will at length be established over the whole 
world’.
191
 Taste is thus necessarily a part of the body of collective human knowledge, 
conceived by Priestley as being in a continual and divinely regulated progress towards 
perfection.  
Although Priestley did not specifically mention ethics in the Lectures, it is 
possible to infer from his position on the development of the faculty of taste his 
sentiments on the moral faculty. In fact, Priestley himself had drawn this connection 
between the two in his Institutes, writing that ‘a taste for natural, and also for artificial 
propriety, beauty, and sublimity, has a connection with a taste for moral propriety, moral 
beauty, and dignity’.
192
 In the Institutes Priestley had acknowledged Hartley as a 
significant influence, citing his dependence on the Observations for the second and third 
parts of his own work.
193
 Part II of the Institutes makes essentially the same argument 
which the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism would do in relation to taste, by applying 
Hartley’s theory of the association of ideas to explain the development of the conscience, 
or moral sense. Priestley identifies the ‘springs of all our actions’ as the ‘passions’ or 
‘affections’ resulting from the pleasure and pain experienced by an agent in contact with 
the world.
194
 These are divided into a hierarchy of classes, beginning with the ‘appetites’, 
or the desire to seek after corporeal and sensual pleasure and to avoid bodily pain, and 
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culminating in the ‘moral sense’, or ‘a love of virtue and hatred of vice in the abstract’.
195
 
Each of the classes is derived from those below it in the hierarchy through the process of 
association, so that each class is a more refined version of the lower classes. What is most 
significant is that, as in Hartley’s account, the conscience, or moral sense, is not innate, 
but is gradually formed through an individual’s contact with the circumstances of a world 
ordered by a benevolent divine will. The conscience is acquired as ‘the result of a great 
variety of impressions, the conclusions of our own minds, and the opinions of others, 
respecting what is right and fit in our conduct’.
196
 For this reason, Priestley can define the 
‘two just and independent rules of human conduct’ as ‘the will of God’ and ‘a regard to 
our own real happiness’ (the latter coinciding with the former in so far as ‘our happiness 
is an object with the divine being no less than it is with ourselves’).
197
 The conscience is 
thus ‘properly considered as a substitute’ and ‘is, in fact, improved and corrected from 
time to time by having recourse to these rules’.
198
                   
The solution to the question of the foundation of the moral sense which Priestley 
discovered in Hartley was to inform the whole of his later philosophy. Importantly, 
however, it also laid the foundation for the theological system he later came to adopt. 
Priestley’s attempt to conceive of these epistemological issues in a more explicitly 
theological context is well illustrated by one of his sermons, The Doctrine of Divine 
Influence on the Human Mind. The work elucidates some of the theological implications 
of Priestley’s rejection of an innate moral sense. Although this sermon was published to 
mark the ordination of Thomas Jervis (1748-1833) in 1779, it was modelled on a much 
earlier text drawn up by Priestley at Needham Market some time between 1755 and 1761. 
Priestley recorded in his Memoirs the composition of a treatise ‘on the doctrine of the 
divine influence’, for which he had collected and arranged a selection of relevant biblical 
texts and which he made use of in composing the later published work.
199
 How closely 
this treatise resembled the later publication is unclear: the preface of the published 
sermon locates the argument in the context of the debates over necessitarianism in which 
Priestley was involved in the late 1770s. Nevertheless, the substance of the argument, 
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based on an interpretation of two New Testament texts, presumably dates from the earlier 
period.  
In the sermon, Priestley argues for the ‘doctrine of the exclusion of all immediate 
agency of the Deity on the minds of men’.
200
 He might well have first encountered this 
question at Daventry in Doddridge’s lectures. In Part V of his lectures, ‘Of the Reason to 
expect and desire a REVELATION: and the internal and external EVIDENCE with which we 
may suppose it should be attended’, Doddridge had raised the question of whether an 
individual could have the truth of a revelation ‘immediately discovered to him by some 
divine agency on his mind’. Although Doddridge cautions that the immediate agency of 
the deity could be construed as ‘enthusiastical pretence’ by those who had never 
experienced it, he concedes that it is possible: ‘It cannot be denied, that such an 
immediate impulse on the mind of each individual is possible to divine power’.
201
 In 
Priestley’s view, however, an acceptance that the deity directs men towards good or evil, 
not by any immediate agency, but ‘by no other means than the natural influence of proper 
instructions and motives’ not only resolves the question, but penetrates ‘to the root of the 
grossest and most dangerous delusions that the christian world has, in all ages, been 
subject to’.
202
 Priestley enlists Hugo Grotius and ‘other divines and commentators of the 
greatest repute’ in support of his position.
203
 The sermon proceeds by drawing on two 
New Testament parables (Matt. 8: 3-10 and Luke 8: 6-9) to illustrate the point that ‘the 
nature of man is supposed to be a thing that is never operated upon by the divine power 
immediately, but always through the medium of certain means, without the mind, 
naturally adapted to that end’.
204
 Priestley emphasises the cautionary point raised in 
Doddridge’s lectures, stressing that he associates any claim for the immediate agency of 
the deity with religious enthusiasm. He rejects the possibility that ‘certain supernatural 
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impulses and feelings, of vague and uncertain description’ can have any possible relation 
to moral virtue.
205
  
As we shall see shortly, Priestley’s aversion to ‘impulses and feelings’ of a ‘vague 
and uncertain description’ would become more acutely focused when he came to engage 
with contemporary Scottish philosophy in the mid-1770s. It will be particularly important 
in considering these writings to note that, from the very beginning of his engagement 
with epistemological questions, the philosophical and theological implications of these 
ideas are inseparable.  
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2. Priestley and the Scottish ‘common sense’ philosophers (1774-1776) 
 
At least one reader of Priestley’s Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion was 
unimpressed. On 18 June 1774 Thomas Reid, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow, recorded after reading the work that ‘In this first part of the Being 
& Perfections of God the Author seems to be very superficial. There appears no such 
precision as to discover a Philosophical Acumen in abstract Reasoning’. Priestley’s 
attempt to speak to an audience of young students and yet to retain the voice of scholarly 
authority did little to impress Reid: ‘The work seems to be too abstract for the vulgar’, 
noted the latter, ‘and too shallow for the Learned’. Interestingly, Priestley’s description of 
the formation of the conscience by the process of association was one aspect of the work 
that particularly interested Reid. He correctly recognised that ‘The peculiarities of this 
Volume are chiefly taken from Dr Hartley’ and again recorded his unflattering opinion of 
the work: in Priestley’s ‘Analysis of the Principles of Action in the Human Mind’, Reid 
could discover ‘nothing distinct or precise’.
1
  
 The occasion for Reid’s encounter with Priestley’s work was a letter Priestley had 
sent to Reid on the publication of his Examination in April 1774.
2
 The Examination was 
an attempted refutation of three Scottish philosophers, Reid, James Beattie, and James 
Oswald, authors working largely independently of one another, but styled by Priestley as 
representatives of a ‘common sense’ school.
3
 Modern and eighteenth-century 
commentators have generally agreed that Priestley failed to appreciate the complexity of 
the arguments underlying Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s advocacy of ‘common sense’. 
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Reid in particular has been the subject of much interest on the part of historians of 
philosophy in recent years. This has contributed to a consensus that Priestley’s refutation 
of the position outlined in the Inquiry seriously underestimated the force of Reid’s 
argument.
4
 My aim in this chapter is not to engage in debates on the merits of Priestley’s 
work. Rather, I shall attempt to reconstruct the context in which the work was written in 
order to illustrate why Priestley reacted so forcibly to Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s 
common sense theories.  
 One essential factor to bear in mind in attempting to effect this reconstruction is 
that in the early 1770s Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s works had been exceptionally well 
received. The merits of Reid’s work were acknowledged by contemporaries as 
intellectually divergent as Hume and Price. Beattie’s success, as James A. Harris has 
argued convincingly, ought to be accounted for, less by his philosophical merits, than by 
‘the widespread belief in this period that there is no need to answer on their own terms 
the arguments of those who would undermine natural and instinctive beliefs in, for 
example, liberty and moral responsibility’.
5
 The same factor undoubtedly accounted for 
the success of Oswald’s work. One of my aims in this chapter is to demonstrate that this 
high estimation of Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s writings was shared by some rational 
dissenters in Priestley’s circle. As I have begun to explore in the previous chapter, some 
of these figures had strong connections with the Scottish universities. Their interest in 
and sympathy with the writings of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald ought to be understood in 
the context of these connections, and as part of a broader interest taken by English 
rational dissenters in the philosophy of Francis Hutcheson, and in lesser-known figures 
working in the Shaftesburian tradition such as James Harris (1709-1780), Shaftesbury’s 
nephew and principal English follower, and James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714-
1799). Through extending this picture of English and Scottish connections, this chapter 
develops a new context for understanding Priestley’s Examination. The work is best 
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understood when considered as being directed primarily towards this audience of English 
dissenters sympathetic to Scottish thought.  
 Priestley was not a sophisticated interpreter of the philosophy of his 
contemporaries. He saw in Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s writings an attempt to combat 
scepticism by recourse to a variety of the theory of innate ideas. Priestley tended to 
ignore the often subtle differences between moral sense, common sense, and even 
rationalist theories of mind. In addition to the strictures on Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, he 
included two appendices to his Examination on the rationalist Richard Price’s A Review 
of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758) and on the Shaftesburian 
James Harris’s Hermes, or, A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar 
(1751), texts which Priestley understood to be advancing essentially the same argument 
as Reid. Priestley’s understanding of what Reid, Beattie, and Oswald were attempting to 
do is further exemplified by his choice of a quotation for the title-page of the work. Both 
editions of the Examination are prefaced with a passage from William Gay’s preliminary 
dissertation to Edmund Law’s translation of William King’s Origin of Evil: 
 
As some men have imagined innate ideas, because they had forgot how they came by 
them; so others have set up almost as many distinct instincts as there are acquired 
principles of acting.
6
 
 
It is significant here that Gay, writing in 1731, is thinking primarily of Hutcheson’s 
concept of the moral sense. That Priestley could preface his own argument against Reid, 
Beattie, and Oswald with a quotation from Gay arguing against Hutcheson written over 
forty years earlier, suggests that he considered the issues at stake to be essentially the 
same.
7
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 For Priestley the theory of innate ideas was dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, it 
established the doctrines of natural religion on a precarious epistemological foundation, 
laying Christianity open to criticism from the attacks of unbelievers. Secondly, it could 
easily be made to validate recourse to arbitrary judgments in religious matters, such as 
subscriptions to human creeds and formularies. In his Examination Priestley was 
attempting to forge a philosophical position for the emergent rational dissenting 
movement in the tradition of Locke and Hartley. It was on the principles of these writers 
that Priestley felt that the tenets of natural religion could be most securely upheld. The 
fact that he was attempting to do this within an intellectual community with a strong 
interest in Scottish thought might, in part, account for the work’s polemical and even 
aggressive tone.  
 
Priestley on Reid, Beattie, and Oswald  
 
Crucial to understanding Priestley’s engagement with Reid, Beattie, and Oswald is an 
appreciation of the difference between the authors’ attitudes to the philosophy of David 
Hume. Reid, as he acknowledged in the dedication to his Inquiry, had fully accepted the 
sceptical conclusions reached by Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). Reid 
conceived of Hume’s scepticism as the inevitable consequence of Lockeian 
epistemology. In the Inquiry he refers at several points to the development of what he 
terms the ‘ideal system’, or the ‘doctrine of ideas’, which, beginning with Descartes, is 
refined through Locke, Malebranche, and Berkeley, and culminates in the scepticism of 
Hume’s Treatise. Reid holds that this ideal system – defined as the doctrine that ‘nothing 
is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it: That we do not really perceive 
things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the 
mind, which are called impressions and ideas’ – leads inevitably to scepticism on such 
fundamental articles of belief as the existence of the perceiving subject and our belief of 
an external world.
8
 He therefore concedes the necessity, either to fully accept Hume’s 
sceptical conclusions, or to call into question the whole system of the doctrine of ideas, 
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being the underlying principle upon which these conclusions are founded. Reid opts for 
the latter option: he concludes that the ideal system must contain some ‘defects and 
blemishes’, and thus sets about attempting to formulate a new model of the means by 
which the mind acquires knowledge of certain primary truths.
9
  
It is within this context that Reid has recourse to the faculty of ‘common sense’. 
‘Common sense’, for Reid, is a mode of cognition operating prior to reason by which 
certain first principles, such as our belief in the veracity of our senses and our belief in 
the existence of an external world, can be known independently of the data of sense 
perception. In this way, ‘common sense’ offers an explanation of the origin of certain 
ideas derived from neither of the two Lockeian faculties of sensation or reflection. 
Exactly how ‘common sense’ works is not entirely clear from the Inquiry. Reid (as 
Priestley was quick to recognise) often has recourse to figurative language and analogy in 
order to explain the faculty. In the course of a discussion of ‘natural signs’, for example, 
Reid writes that the thing signified is suggested or ‘conjure[d] […] up’, ‘as it were, by a 
natural kind of magic’.
10
 Neither is it always clear from the text exactly how ‘common 
sense’ modifies the ideal system. At a number of points Reid seems to attempt to 
dispense altogether with the doctrine of ideas: ‘they [ideas] are a mere fiction and 
hypothesis, contrived to solve the phaenomena of the human understanding’; at others, 
Reid, following Locke, uses the analogy of the linguistic signifier to explain the way that 
sensations lead the mind directly to a consideration of external things, so that the idea 
present to the mind becomes the sign of an external reality and not something to be 
considered in itself.
11
  
In his Inquiry Reid frequently appears to be straining to find a vocabulary to 
express a model of the mind different from the received hypothesis. In the introduction he 
writes: ‘It is hardly possible to make any innovation in our philosophy concerning the 
mind and its operations, without using new words and phrases, or giving a different 
meaning to those that are received’.
12
 At several points in the text, he struggles to 
redefine certain key terms. In the section ‘Of Smelling’, for example, Reid notes: 
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since our own language affords no other name for this sensation, we shall call it a smell 
or odour, carefully excluding from the meaning of those names every thing but the 
sensation itself, at least till we have examined it.
13
  
 
Later, attempting to define the term ‘suggestion’, he explains: ‘I beg leave to make use of 
the word suggestion because I know not one more proper, to express a power of mind 
which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers’.
14
 In this respect, it is 
worth noting that Reid never uses the phrase ‘innate ideas’.
15
 ‘Common sense’ accounts 
for what Reid variously defines as ‘original perceptions and notions of the mind’ or 
‘certain principles [...] which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe’.
16
 
Interestingly, Reid frequently has recourse to the expressions of ‘common 
language’ to uphold certain facts about the world, the notion that colour, for example, is a 
quality inherent in bodies. Reid hints towards the idea, although this is not something 
clearly developed in the Inquiry, that ‘common language’, particularly similarities 
between words or expressions across different languages, might reveal something about 
the structure of the mind.
17
 This is in marked contrast to Hartley and Priestley. Hartley, as 
we have seen in chapter 1, had identified an important distinction between what he had 
termed ‘popular language’ and ‘philosophical language’. Only the latter is a suitable 
medium for accurately discussing philosophical questions. Similarly for Priestley, 
philosophical questions such as the doctrine of necessity ‘oblige a man to depart from the 
common language’.
18
 Priestley’s observation towards the opening of his Examination 
that ‘Words are of great use in the business of thinking, but are not necessary to it’ 
reveals a subtle but important distinction between Priestley’s and Reid’s view of the 
relationship between language and the structure of the human mind.
19
 The occasional 
lack of clarity in Reid’s work is the result of his attempt to define ‘common sense’ as a 
faculty excluded from the system of philosophy he had inherited from Locke, Berkeley, 
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and Hume. What Reid was not attempting to do was to refute Hume’s conclusions by 
positing a number of ‘innate ideas’ in the sense in which the phrase had been defined 
through the writings of these authors.       
A shared concern at the conclusions reached by Hume is what most strongly 
united Reid with Beattie. In fact, Beattie went even further than Reid on this point and 
criticised the respect accorded to Hume by Reid and other members of the Aberdeen 
Philosophical Society.
20
 Beattie’s Essay on Truth is essentially an attempt to refute the 
danger posed by Humeian scepticism to morality and religion by a more forceful 
enunciation of the doctrine of ‘common sense’. Beattie self-consciously addresses his 
work to the widest possible audience. In the introduction he explains that:  
 
several subjects of intricate speculation are examined in this book: but I have 
endeavoured, by constant appeals to fact and experience, by illustrations and examples 
the most familiar I could think of, and by a plainness and perspicuity of expression which 
sometimes may appear too much affected, to examine them in such a way, as I hope 
cannot fail to render them intelligible, even to those who are not much conversant in 
studies of this kind.
21
  
  
Throughout the Essay, Beattie relies heavily on this rhetorical strategy of ‘plainness and 
perspicuity of expression’.
22
 He frequently opposes his own platitudes (‘Truth, like 
virtue, to be loved, needs only to be seen’) to the ‘paradoxes’, ‘ambiguous phrases’, and 
‘improprieties and errors’ of the ‘metaphysicians’, namely Berkeley and Hume and, to a 
lesser extent, Descartes, Locke, and Malebranche.
23
 He acknowledges that he is using the 
phrase ‘common sense’ in the way it had been defined by Reid and Claude Buffier (1661-
1737), yet he also attempts to find parallel concepts among the ancients, ‘that I may not 
be suspected of affecting either an uncommon doctrine, or uncommon modes of 
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expression’.
24
 ‘Common sense’, according to Beattie, ought to be properly distinguished 
from ‘reason’. ‘Reason’ is the ‘energy which unites a conclusion with a first principle by 
a gradual chain of intermediate relations’; ‘common sense’ is most explicitly defined as: 
 
that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive 
argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse; derived 
neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will, 
whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore properly 
called Sense; and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of 
mankind, and therefore properly called Common Sense.
25
 
 
Beattie thus introduces a number of terms, such as ‘instinct’ and ‘intuition’, not used by 
Reid in the Inquiry. ‘Instinct’ and ‘intuition’ become synonymous with ‘common sense’ 
at various points in the Essay.
26
 The knowledge of the veracity of our senses, for 
example, is obtained ‘not by reason, but by instinct, or common sense’.
27
 The power of 
‘intuition’ can distinguish the dictates of common sense from acquired prejudices.
28
 
Beattie extends the province of ‘common sense’ to make it account for moral 
judgements: ‘The performance of certain actions, and the indulgence of certain 
affectations, is attended with an agreeable feeling, of a peculiar kind, which I call moral 
approbation’.
29
 He here distances his own position from a rationalist understanding of 
ethical judgments:  
 
I cannot prove, in regard to my moral feelings, that they are conformable to any extrinsic 
and eternal relations of things; but I know that my constitution necessarily determines me 
to believe them just and genuine, even as it determines me to believe that I myself exist.
30
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‘Common sense’ further accounts for our belief in certain first principles of religion. 
Most importantly from Priestley’s point of view, Beattie attributes the certainty of the 
freedom of the will and our knowledge of an afterlife to ‘common sense’.
31
   
 As James Fieser has observed, Reid’s influence on Oswald ought not to be 
overstated.
32
 Oswald’s notion of ‘common sense’ probably owed more to Buffier’s Traité 
des premières véritez et de la source de nos jugements (1724) and Lord Kames’s Essays 
on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751) than to Reid’s Inquiry, which 
is mentioned only twice in passing in the first volume of the Appeal to Common Sense in 
Behalf of Religion (1766). Fieser argues that, for Oswald, common sense perceptions 
have a uniquely rational content, and that in this sense Oswald understands the concept of 
‘common sense’ in a much narrower way than Reid.
33
 Like Beattie, however, Oswald 
allows ‘common sense’ to account for our belief in numerous principles of morality and 
religion. Oswald’s Appeal also posits a similar trajectory of modern philosophy to that 
found in Reid and Beattie. According to Oswald’s narrative, in the philosophy of Locke 
‘Innate ideas were dismissed, and with them the primary truths of religion and virtue’.
34
 
From Locke’s mistake has arisen the lamentable inability of modern philosophers ‘to give 
satisfaction to the world concerning truths in which all mankind are concerned’.
35
 Only 
through recourse to ‘common sense’ can ‘the great truths of natural philosophy, theology, 
and ethics […] maintain their ground against all the attacks of the most subtile 
reasoning’. As in Beattie, ‘common sense’ is invoked as an antidote to what Oswald 
terms ‘universal scepticism’, encapsulated most forcibly in the writings of Hume.
36
           
 As Harris has observed, Priestley as a philosopher was ‘peculiarly insensitive to 
sceptical arguments of any kind’.
37
 Priestley did not appear to perceive any need to 
engage seriously with the more technical metaphysical aspects of Hume’s writings. In the 
preface to his Examination Priestley wrote that ‘Mr. Hume has been very ably answered, 
again and again, upon more solid principles than those of this new common sense’, 
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referring his readers to the first two volumes of his own Institutes.
38
 It is illustrative of the 
difference between Priestley and Reid that Priestley here singles out for attention the 
second volume of his Institutes ‘which relates to the evidences of christianity’.
39
 Whereas 
Reid had styled his own work as a response to Hume’s Treatise, Priestley placed a greater 
importance on a work which countered Hume’s criticisms of the evidence for miracles 
and the apostolic testimonies, which had first appeared nearly a decade later in Hume’s 
Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding (1748). In fact, in the course of 
his discussion of Beattie’s Essay in the Examination, Priestley claimed that he was ‘truly 
pleased with such publications as those of Mr. Hume’, as they have occasioned the 
subject of religion to be ‘more thoroughly canvassed, and consequently to be better 
understood than it was before’.
40
  
 For Priestley, Reid’s attempt to describe a capacity of the mind by which primary 
truths could be known independently of the Lockeian faculties of sensation and reflection 
was both unnecessary and obfuscatory. In Priestley’s understanding, developed largely 
from Hartley, all ideas could be traced to their source in sensations occasioned by the 
impressions of external stimuli. In this sense, Priestley even criticises Locke for his 
hastiness in concluding that there is ‘some other source of our ideas besides the external 
senses’.
41
 In the introductory observations to his Examination, Priestley singles out 
Reid’s contention that we necessarily believe in the existence of external objects as 
distinct from our ideas of them.
42
 For Priestley, such a contention is ungrounded: the 
mind derives all its knowledge from ideas generated by sense perception, and the external 
world ‘is nothing more than an hypothesis, to account for those ideas’.
43
 Priestley here 
acknowledges that Berkeley’s theory that ideas could be accounted for by the immediate 
agency of the deity, without the medium of external objects, is philosophically tenable. 
He holds only that it is ‘more natural’ to suppose that there really are such external 
objects, and that the simplicity of the theory recommends it.
44
 As had Reid, Beattie, and 
Oswald, Priestley refers to a trajectory stemming from Descartes to Locke. However, 
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whereas the Scots had claimed that this led directly to Humeian scepticism, Priestley 
identifies Hartley as the culmination of this tradition, his writings having ‘thrown more 
useful light upon the theory of the mind than Newton did upon the theory of the natural 
world’.
45
 Priestley characterises Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, as thinkers ‘of little and 
contracted minds’, who ‘instead of doing, or attempting to do anything themselves, are 
busily employed in watching the footsteps of others, and cavilling at every thing they 
do’.
46
 Priestley thus reverses the dichotomy established by Beattie and Oswald between 
their own rhetorical clarity and Hume’s and Berkeley’s obscurantism. He accuses Beattie 
of sheltering in ‘obscurity’ and Oswald of adopting an air of ‘mysticism’.
47
          
The core argument of Priestley’s work is that Hartley’s theory of the association 
of ideas is an adequate foundation on which to ground all complex ideas, including moral 
judgments and the principles of natural religion. His strategy in the Examination is to 
ridicule the theory of ‘common sense’ by pointing out the apparently arbitrary nature by 
which it posits certain axioms. Independently of its philosophical merits or demerits, 
Priestley’s work is, in this respect, reasonably effective as a polemical tract. He begins 
his examination of Reid’s Inquiry by drawing up a list of all of the ‘instinctive principles’ 
posited by Reid, supported by a long string of quotations from Reid’s work. Priestley’s 
point in cataloguing the various aspects of Reid’s ‘common sense’ in this way is to 
highlight the fact that the principles appear to be arbitrarily asserted. He later accuses 
Reid of founding his whole system on ‘relative truth’ arising solely from ‘his 
constitution’, and points to a discrepancy between the systems of Reid and Beattie on the 
one hand, and of Oswald on the other, in the last of which ‘common sense’ is conceived 
of as being founded, at least in part, on rational judgments.
48
 Priestley relies on this same 
argument in his response to all three authors. At the heart of his work is the charge that 
the notion of ‘common sense’ is both irrational and opens the door to relativism. Whereas 
in Locke, Priestley argues, axioms are grounded in ‘the perception of the agreement or 
disagreement of any ideas’, and therefore depend on ‘the necessary nature of things’ 
which is ‘absolute, unchangeable, and everlasting’, grounding these axioms in ‘common 
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sense’ makes them dependent on ‘some unaccountable instinctive persuasions, depending 
upon the arbitrary constitution of our nature’.
49
 According to Priestley, the system of 
‘common sense’ admits of no appeal to reason. He criticises all three authors for making 
fundamental axioms dependent on nothing more than a ‘feeling’, which if closely 
scrutinised ‘might appear to be a mere prejudice’.
50
         
The most interesting parts of Priestley’s work are the various points at which he is 
most explicit about why he perceived the doctrine of ‘common sense’ to be so dangerous. 
In the course of his discussion of Beattie’s Essay, Priestley argues that grounding moral 
obligation in ‘common sense’, as Beattie does, is problematic in that it makes moral 
obligation dependent on feeling. Feelings, Priestley points out, are necessarily subjective. 
The examples that Priestley subsequently uses to make his point are important: many 
people may genuinely feel remorse upon ‘the omission of a superstitious ceremony’, or 
may feel real satisfaction ‘after confessing to a priest, and having received his 
absolution’.
51
 The implication, of course, is that ‘common sense’ might as easily sanction 
the tenets of Catholicism as it might Beattie’s own Protestantism. Furthermore, it is 
significant that Priestley singles out the points where Beattie argues from the principles 
of ‘common sense’ for theological positions with which Priestley disagreed. Priestley 
particularly censures, for example, Beattie’s grounding of the doctrine of a future state on 
the evidence of ‘common sense’. In eschewing all reasoning about the fundamental 
principles of religion, Priestley claims, Beattie has made way for ‘all the extravagancies 
of credulity, enthusiasm, and mysticism’.
52
  
Priestley is most explicit on the implications of this in his discussion of Oswald. 
He re-emphasises his caution that the doctrinal tenets of any denomination could be 
justified by recourse to the principles of ‘common sense’, again using Catholicism as an 
example: ‘Papists may begin to avail themselves of them for the support of all those 
doctrines and maxims for which the powers of reason had proved insufficient’.
53
 Priestley 
then points to the danger in extending ‘common sense’, as Beattie and Oswald had done, 
beyond the confines of strictly metaphysical axioms. In the sphere of political 
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philosophy, for example, there is no reason why ‘common sense’ could not be appealed 
to in order to justify certain tenets: ‘politicians also, possessing themselves of this 
advantage, may venture once more to thunder out upon us their exploded doctrines of 
passive obedience and non-resistance’.
54
 As Priestley points out, Oswald was particularly 
susceptible to this charge. His Appeal had listed ‘obedience to the magistrate’ among the 
primary truths that could be derived from ‘common sense’. For a dissenter such as 
Priestley, it is obvious why this kind of thinking was inherently dangerous. Furthermore, 
as Priestley would have been aware, Oswald, as a minister of the Church of Scotland, and 
Beattie, as a professor at Marischal College, would have been under obligation to 
subscribe to the Westminster Confession of Faith.
55
 The Westminster Confession 
declared (chapter 20) that ‘they who, upon pretence of Christian liberty, shall oppose any 
lawful power, or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical, resist the 
ordinance of God’, and (chapter 23) that the civil magistrate retained the authority to 
suppress blasphemy and heresy.
56
 Thus, although he does not explicitly level the charge 
against the Scots, Priestley may well have thought of ‘common sense’ as a way of 
assigning epistemological status to the doctrines contained in a particular church creed – 
in this case one that advocated not only obedience to the magistrate but trinitarianism 
(chapter 2), free will (chapter 9), and original sin (chapter 6), all positions with which 
Priestley had come to disagree. Here, of course, Priestley is firmly in a Lockeian 
tradition. One argument against innate ideas advanced in Book I of Locke’s Essay is that:  
 
if different Men of different Sects should go about to give us a List of those innate 
practical Principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct Hypotheses, 
and were fit to support the Doctrines of their particular Schools or Churches.             
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In fact, Priestley probably had in mind Locke’s comment that ‘no body […] has ventured 
yet to give a Catalogue of them [innate Principles]’, when drawing up his own list of 
Reid’s ‘instinctive principles’.
57
 
 Priestley’s answer to the threats posed by Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s theories 
was his persistent advocacy of Hartley’s doctrine of association. In 1775, in an attempt to 
stem the spreading popularity of their writings, Priestley published his own edition of 
Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, on the Principle of the Association of Ideas; with 
Essays relating to the Subject of it. The aim of Priestley’s work was to facilitate the study 
of Hartley’s Observation on Man. The selections from Hartley were prefaced with three 
short essays written by Priestley, ‘A General View of the Doctrine of Vibrations’, ‘A 
General View of the Association of Ideas’, and ‘Of Complex and Abstract Ideas’. In the 
second essay Priestley once again emphasised his opposition to theories advocating 
innate instincts; he here appears to have had Reid, Beattie, and Oswald particularly in 
mind. Ascribing the development of all complex ideas to Hartley’s doctrine of 
association, Priestley wrote that: 
 
All is performed by the general disposition of the mind to conform to its circumstances, 
and to be modified by them, without that seemingly operose and inelegant contrivance, of 
different original, independent instincts adapted to a thousand different occasions and 
either implanted in us at different times, or contrived to lie dormant till they are wanted.
58
    
 
The reception of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald among English rational dissenters 
 
Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s works were immensely well received both north and 
south of the border in the 1770s. In 1773 Bennet Langton (1737-1801) wrote to James 
Boswell with news of the glowing reputation of Reid’s Inquiry in London: ‘You have to 
be sure looked into his [Reid’s] Enquiry; when I was in London I thought the Reputation 
of that work seemed to be high and likely to increase very fast’.
59
  Beattie’s Essay went 
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through six editions between 1770 and 1776; it was favourably reviewed in nearly all of 
the major periodicals, and earned its author honorary degrees from King’s College, 
Aberdeen and Oxford, an audience with King George III and Queen Charlotte, and a 
royal pension of £200 a year.
60
 In 1773 Joshua Reynolds painted a portrait of Beattie 
entitled ‘The Triumph of Truth’, depicting Beattie against an allegorical backdrop in 
which an angel representing ‘truth’ vanquishes ‘sophistry’, ‘scepticism’, and ‘infidelity’ 
representing Hume and Voltaire.
61
 Oswald’s Appeal was favourably noticed in the 
Monthly Review and the Critical Review.
62
  
 This admiration was shared by many English rational dissenters. The surviving 
evidence from Priestley’s and his circle’s correspondence suggests that Beattie’s Essay 
was generally well received among them. In September 1770 Lindsey wrote to Francis 
Hastings, tenth Earl of Huntingdon (1728-1789), with news that he had encountered 
Beattie’s Essay ‘During [his] travels in the north’. Lindsey evidently felt that the work 
would serve as an antidote to the popular sceptical opinions to which Hastings, who later 
abandoned Christianity altogether, was willing to give some credence. He continues: 
 
I could heartily wish to recommend the book to your Lordship’s perusal, who are no 
superficial reader of any thing. Forgive me saying, that I think it will help to correct some 
prejudices, not originally upon your mind, to my certain knowledge, but of late years 
taken up, and which, tho’ common with some little minds that I know, yet your great 
good sense is naturally above them.
63
      
  
Priestley first encountered Beattie’s Essay shortly after its publication in May 1770. In 
August he told Lindsey: ‘I shall soon read Beattie. Dr Leechman gave me a good account 
of it some time ago’.
64
 The fact that Priestley first heard about the work through 
Leechman points again to evidence of connections between the English dissenters and the 
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Scots.
65
 Priestley had evidently read the work by the end of the year and, like Lindsey, 
his first impression seems to have been favourable. The only aspect of the work with 
which Priestley appeared to disagree was Beattie’s libertarianism. On 8 December he 
wrote to Samuel Merivale (1715-1771), tutor at the dissenting academy at Exeter: ‘I like 
Beattie as you do, and am not afraid of its overturning the doctrine of necessity’, adding: 
‘Hartley has sufficiently shewn that it is a principle by no means peculiar to 
unbelievers’.
66
 In the preface to his Examination, Priestley confirmed that he had read 
Beattie’s Essay ‘at its first coming out’. He here reiterates that he initially concurred with 
Leechman’s, Merivale’s, and Lindsey’s favourable estimation of the work. Despite the 
fact that Beattie’s principles seemed to Priestley ‘to be very wrong’, he admitted to being 
‘much pleased with the good intention with which the book seemed to have been written, 
and with some of his lively strictures upon Mr. Hume’.
67
  
 Beattie also appears to have found favour among dissenters in the capital. When 
he visited London in 1773, at the height of the Essay’s popularity, he was introduced to 
Richard Price through Elizabeth Montague (1718-1800). He attended a meeting of the 
Royal Society, afterwards visiting a coffeehouse with Price and John Calder (1733-1815), 
deputy librarian at Dr Williams’s Library and a dissenting minister in London, who 
became well acquainted with Lindsey and preached on at least one occasion at Lindsey’s 
Essex Street chapel.
68
 On 24 May he dined at Newington Green with Price, noting in his 
diary that Andrew Kippis (1725-1795), minister of the Presbyterian congregation at 
Princes Street, Westminster, was present, and that the company discussed the affairs of 
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the petitioning clergy.
69
 Three years later, both Price and Calder subscribed to a quarto 
edition of Beattie’s Essay on Truth printed at Edinburgh in 1776.
70
  
 A similarly receptive attitude to Oswald’s Inquiry can be found in the writings of 
another rational dissenter close to Priestley, William Enfield. Enfield (1741-1797) had 
studied at Daventry in the late 1750s, and in 1770 became minister to the congregation of 
the Cairo Street Chapel, Warrington. In the same year he succeeded Priestley as tutor in 
belles-lettres at the Warrington Academy where he remained until the academy’s closure 
in 1783. In addition to works on geometry, natural philosophy, and elocution, Enfield 
was the author of an influential two-volume abridgement and translation of the Historia 
critica philosophiae by the German historian Johann Jakob Brucker (1696-1770).
71
 He 
received the degree of LLD from the University of Edinburgh in 1774. In 1770 Enfield 
published anonymously Remarks on Several Late Publications relative to the Dissenters; 
in a Letter to Dr. Priestley. The work was a moderate criticism of what Enfield perceived 
to be ‘a degree of precipitation’, an ‘inattention to real life’, and a ‘vehemence of temper’ 
characterising Priestley’s recently published works, which Enfield feared would weaken 
the dissenting cause.
72
 The Remarks also contained an unflattering account of the 
‘fruitless course of study’ pursued by students preparing for the ministry in the dissenting 
academies, in which Enfield criticised the overly-rationalistic bent of the divinity 
syllabus.
73
 Towards the conclusion of the Remarks, Enfield cautioned his readers against 
an absolute reliance on the reasoning powers in the pursuit of religious knowledge. With 
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the significant qualification that there are a number of ‘self-evident and primary truths, 
which the mind receives as soon as they are proposed’, Enfield warned: 
 
There is so much difficulty in taking a full and complete view of a subject, and in 
ascertaining the connection between the several steps of an argument; and consequently 
so much fallacy in human reasoning; that […] we must, after all our speculations, remain 
in some degree of doubt and uncertainty.
74
 
 
 Priestley replied to Enfield’s remarks in Letters to the Author of the Remarks on 
Several Late Publications relative to the Dissenters (1770). After responding to each of 
Enfield’s criticisms in turn, Priestley accused Enfield of laying ‘the foundation for 
universal scepticism’ through his assertion of the fallacious nature of human reasoning.
75
 
Priestley argues that the truths which the mind receives as soon as they are proposed are 
exceedingly few, and that fundamental religious doctrines – ‘the being and unity of God’, 
‘the foundation of virtue’, ‘the evidence of the mission of Christ’, and the ‘belief of a 
resurrection and a future life’ – should not be counted among them. Despite this, Priestley 
affirms that he has ‘not the least doubt, or uncertainty’ concerning the truth of these 
beliefs.
76
 In Enfield’s A Second Letter to the Rev. Dr. Priestley (1770) Enfield accused 
Priestley of misconstruing what he had written concerning ‘the uncertainty of human 
knowledge’.
77
 He continues to state that if Priestley had read ‘a late publication, entitled, 
“An Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of religion”’ then he would have understood that 
by ‘self evident and primary truths’ Enfield had meant ‘not merely such as are strictly 
speaking axioms, but such as are obvious deductions of reasoning’, under which ‘all the 
fundamental truths of religion and christianity may be comprised’.
78
 Enfield subsequently 
explains that he was using the phrase ‘self evident and primary truths’ in his first work in 
the sense in which it had been defined by Oswald: ‘It was my having just read this work, 
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which led me to express myself in this manner’.
79
 It was Enfield’s recommendation of 
Oswald’s Appeal which first brought the work to Priestley’s attention. In the introduction 
to the third volume of his Institutes (1774) Priestley noted that he had promised Enfield 
he would read the work.
80
 He comments here that Oswald’s Appeal had found favour 
among others, as well as Enfield, in his own circle: he apologises that his own opinion of 
the work should ‘differ so much from that of this ingenious writer [Enfield], and indeed 
from that of many other persons whom I much respect’.
81
         
 There is also some evidence that Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s works were 
incorporated into the philosophy syllabuses at the liberal dissenting academies. By 1775  
Reid’s Inquiry was among the collection in the library at the Warrington Academy.
82
 By 
1786, when the library was transferred to Manchester New College, Oswald’s Appeal and 
Beattie’s Essay on Truth had been added to the collection.
83
 Another catalogue, drawn up 
in the 1780s after the library had transferred to Manchester College, contains a record of 
additions made to the library in the last two decades of the century. The catalogue 
indicates that Beattie’s Evidences of the Christian Religion (1786) and Elements of Moral 
Science (1790) and Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays 
on the Active Powers of Man (1788) were later added to the library’s collection at some 
point between 1786 and 1803.
84
 Samuel Merivale used Beattie and Reid in his philosophy 
lectures in the early 1770s at the Exeter Academy. Merivale updated the references in 
Doddridge’s lectures, which, like most academy tutors, he had continued to use as his 
textbook, by adding references to sections of Beattie’s Essay on Truth and Reid’s 
Inquiry.
85
 When Andrew Kippis added his own extensive notes to his 1794 edition of 
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Doddridge’s lectures he included many references to Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s 
works.
86
    
 This receptive attitude to Reid, Beattie, and Oswald exemplified by some of the 
leading figures within rational dissent ought to be understood in the context of a wider 
interest on the part of English rational dissenters in Scottish authors, accountable for by 
the fact that many of them had been educated in the Scottish universities. George Walker 
(1734?-1807), for example, had followed the same course as John Seddon and Robert 
Andrews in progressing from Caleb Rotherham’s Kendal Academy to continue his 
studies in Scotland. For a short period from November 1751, Walker studied at 
Edinburgh, probably in order to pursue his mathematical interests under Matthew Stewart 
(1717-1785). However, his study was not confined to mathematics: in a letter to his uncle 
from Edinburgh, Walker wrote that ‘Morality, criticism, and some of the higher branches 
of mathematics, are the public classes in which I am engaged’.
87
 In 1752 Walker moved 
to Glasgow to attend William Leechman’s divinity lectures. Walker would have been at 
Glasgow too late to encounter Hutcheson in person. Yet during his time at the university 
he would certainly have met George Muirhead (1715-1773), Professor of Humanity 
(Latin), and James Moor (1712-1779), Professor of Greek, both of whom had studied 
moral philosophy under Hutcheson.
88
 Walker might also have attended the moral 
philosophy lectures of Adam Smith (1723-1790), who, as a student at Glasgow between 
1737 and 1740, had studied pneumatics and moral philosophy under Hutcheson. In 1751 
Smith became Professor of Logic at Glasgow and took over the chair of moral philosophy 
the following year.  
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 At Glasgow, Walker was a contemporary of the English dissenters Newcome 
Cappe (1733-1800) and Nicholas Clayton (1730-1797).
89
 All three men would go on to 
contribute significantly to late eighteenth-century rational dissent. Cappe, who had 
studied at Kibworth under Aikin in 1748 and at Northampton under Doddridge between 
1749 and 1752, became a dissenting minister at St Saviourgate Chapel, York. Clayton, 
who had also studied at Northampton under Doddridge, served as a dissenting minister at 
Boston, Lincolnshire and Liverpool, and went on to succeed Aikin as tutor in divinity at 
Warrington in 1781. Walker became a dissenting minister at Durham, Great Yarmouth, 
and Nottingham. He succeeded John Holt as tutor in mathematics at Warrington in 1772, 
and was appointed tutor in divinity at Manchester New College in 1798. During their 
time at Glasgow, Walker, Cappe, and Clayton forged intellectual links which would 
endure following their return south of the border. According to his wife and biographer 
Catherine Cappe (1744-1821), Cappe corresponded with Leechman and Adam Smith 
after his departure from Edinburgh in 1755.
90
 Cappe was evidently still in contact with 
Leechman as late as 1785; according to Thomas Belsham, Lindsey wrote to Cappe ‘early 
in the year 1785’ requesting Cappe to apply to Leechman for ‘some authentic account’ of 
Hutcheson.
91
 Catherine Cappe noted that Cappe was in touch with Smith until 1787, 
recounting a conversation between them in that year on ‘the interesting subject of 
Revelation’.
92
  
In light of his educational background and connections, it is no surprise that 
Walker was at least familiar with Hutcheson’s writings. This is evident from an essay 
‘On Imitation and Fashion’, published posthumously in 1809, but dateable to as early as 
the mid-1770s.
93
 In the essay, Walker refers to the ‘moral system of Hutcheson’ which 
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posits ‘only a greater number of instincts, and instincts of a higher order, in man than in 
his fellow-animals’.
94
 Furthermore, in an essay from the first volume of the collection, 
‘On Tragedy, and the Interest in Tragical Representations’, Walker suggests some 
affinity with Hutcheson’s and Smith’s writings on ethics. In a consideration of the effects 
of ‘the exhibition of tragic imitations’, Walker identifies ‘passion, or sympathy, in a more 
extended sense’ as ‘an acknowledged, and powerful, and highly valuable principle of our 
natures’.
95
 However, the essay ‘On Imitation and Fashion’ illustrates well Walker’s 
divergence from any theory of the moral sense derived from Hutcheson. In the essay, 
Walker criticises Locke for what he perceives to be an overly-simplistic attempt to 
deduce all human knowledge from the faculties of sensation and reflection.
96
 Defining 
sensation as either ‘touching’ or ‘the image or representation of the thing seen or felt’, 
and reflection as ‘the power of continuing or renewing the presence of the image or 
impression’, Walker holds that these two faculties alone are insufficient to explain the 
mind’s ability to make moral judgements: 
 
to step from the bare image to an intellectual or moral judgement; and because the 
representation of a thing is excited within us, to find by inference certain moral relations, 
which we bear to it, is to make but one stride from Earth to Heaven.
97
 
 
Walker thus concedes the necessity of ‘some original faculty in the human mind, which 
shall be sufficient to produce all this intellectual and moral furniture’.
98
 He identifies this, 
not, as Hartley and Priestley had done, as the principle of the association of ideas, nor by 
recourse to a Hutchesonian notion of a moral sense, but as the mind’s propensity to 
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imitation. Walker acknowledges his debt for the theory of the imitative faculty to James 
Burnett, Lord Monboddo, author of Of the Origin and Progress of Language (1773-92). 
Like Locke and Priestley, and as opposed to rationalists such as Price and Taylor, Walker 
advocates an historical and geographical relativism in his approach to morality: ‘There 
appears therefore to be nothing in the mind of man, which invites or rejects one 
intellectual idea rather than another’.
99
 His recourse to the theory of imitation means that 
this relativism is even more extreme than Priestley’s, the explanation of the mind’s 
method of forming moral judgements being more or less detached from any theological 
framework. Walker only has recourse to theology when attempting to answer the 
question of how ‘this stock of ideas, sentiments and determinations, which are 
transplanted from one mind to another, came originally to exist’.
100
 Walker here suggests 
that ‘the first progenitor of the human race was furnished ab origine, by the universal 
Mind, the great patron of all imitation, with a certain stock of intellectual and moral 
ideas’.
101
    
 According to Walker’s son and biographer, Walker and Priestley maintained a 
frequent correspondence beginning sometime in the 1760s during Walker’s time at Great 
Yarmouth.
102
 Unfortunately, none of these letters appear to have survived. However, 
from the extant extracts printed in Walker’s biography it is clear that philosophical topics 
formed a part of the discussion. In fact, one of Priestley’s clearest statements on his own 
understanding of the moral sense can be found in an extract from a letter to Walker, 
dateable to 1775, the year that Priestley published his edition of Hartley and a second 
edition of his Examination. In the letter, Priestley defines his own stance in opposition to 
the position he believed was shared by Walker and Hutcheson: 
 
As you have not studied Hartley, it would do to no purpose to write to you about 
metaphysics. I believe nothing of any original determination of the mind to the objects of 
morality, or to any other objects: and though you and Mr. Hutchinson [sic] say there must 
be such things, I do not see a shadow of proof for it. I do not expect however, that the 
reading of Hartley will convince you, any more than another reading of Hutchinson 
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would convince me. We are both too old, to adopt a new general system of 
metaphysics.
103
  
 
On the evidence of Walker’s essays, the implication of Priestley’s statement (that Walker 
followed Hutcheson in his ethical theory) would seem to be erroneous. The statement is 
probably illustrative of Priestley’s tendency to group together differing theories of an 
original determination of the mind to explain moral judgements in opposition to Hartley’s 
theory of association. Priestley’s assumption that Walker had not studied Hartley may 
also be incorrect. In another essay from the 1809 collection, ‘Probable Arguments in 
Favour of the Immateriality of the Soul’, Walker presumably had Hartley in mind when, 
in considering the question of whether the brain is the seat of the soul, he wrote that 
‘There is another illustration, which at least confers more dignity on the subject than any 
tale of vibrations or vibratiunculæ can do’.
104
 However, Walker’s precise opinions are 
less important than the fact that his writings point to evidence of a serious interest in 
Scottish philosophy by an English rational dissenter in Priestley’s circle of 
correspondents. I shall now turn to examine one of the fullest surviving bodies of letters 
written by Priestley’s dissenting contemporaries, which sheds even more light both on 
this intellectual transmission between Scotland and the English dissenters and on the 
reception of Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s writings and Priestley’s response to them.
105
 
 The correspondence of James Wodrow (1730-1810) and Samuel Kenrick (1728-
1810) is a particularly valuable source for investigating the exchange of ideas between 
the Scottish universities and the English dissenters.
106
 The letters provide a fascinating 
first hand account of the reception of the writings of a number of leading Scottish authors 
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by an educated and informed English dissenter, and a record of how Priestley’s works 
were received among Scottish Presbyterians. Kenrick, the son of a dissenting minister, 
entered Glasgow University in 1743 with the intention of training for the dissenting 
ministry.
107
 He was appointed to one of the Dr Williams’s Exhibitions in the university 
and was admitted to the degree of Master of Arts in 1747. After leaving Glasgow, 
Kenrick pursued a career as a private tutor. Between 1760 and 1763 he accompanied one 
of his pupils on a European tour where he met Voltaire and Rousseau. Some time around 
1765, he moved to Bewdley in Worcestershire, and by the 1770s had established himself 
as a prominent banker, the profession in which he remained until his retirement in 1810. 
During this time, he remained closely involved in the affairs of the English dissenters. He 
followed the fortunes of the dissenting academies (he declined the offer of a position as 
tutor in modern languages at Warrington) and kept abreast of doctrinal and political 
debates.
108
 He met Priestley in 1783, soon became an admirer of his theological writings, 
and subsequently visited him a number of times at Birmingham. Kenrick was one of the 
first members of the Western Unitarian Society founded by his nephew Timothy Kenrick 
(1759-1804) in 1792.
109
 In 1790 he acted as secretary to a delegate meeting of 
Worcestershire dissenters which had passed resolutions in support of the campaign for 
the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts.    
James Wodrow, the son of a Church of Scotland minister and historian from 
Eastwood, Renfrewshire, had also entered Glasgow University in the early 1740s.
110
 In 
1750 he graduated MA, and in the same year was appointed university librarian, a 
position that he held for five years, although actively for only three. At Glasgow, 
Wodrow was personally acquainted with Adam Smith, William Leechman, and a number 
of other professors at the university. Unlike Kenrick, Wodrow pursued his original 
intention to enter the ministry and was licensed as a preacher in 1753. In 1759 he 
transferred to the parish of Stevenston, in the presbytery of Irvine, where he settled for 
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life. Woodrow was awarded a doctorate of divinity by Glasgow University in 1786. He 
published two sermons under the title The Measures of Divine Providence towards Men 
and Nations in 1794. 
 At Glasgow, Wodrow and Kenrick would have been contemporaries of Robert 
Andrews and John Seddon. Both men would probably have known Walker and Clayton, 
and were certainly acquainted with Cappe, whom Kenrick visited at York in 1759.
111
 
Like Cappe, Andrews, and Seddon, Wodrow and Kenrick had studied theology under 
Leechman, for whom they both retained an immense admiration throughout their adult 
lives. Writing in 1786, Kenrick recalled the time in the late 1740s when ‘you & I & many 
more //scribbled// transcripts’ of Leechman’s theological lectures on composition and the 
evidences of Christianity.
112
 When Kenrick met Leechman at York Cathedral over a 
decade later in June 1759 he wrote to Wodrow that ‘[his] heart beat with joy at the 
sight’.
113
 Wodrow was later responsible for an edition of Leechman’s sermons published 
in 1789, to which he contributed a biographical account of the author drawing on his own 
recollections, and about which he corresponded extensively with Kenrick between 1786 
and 1790. Both men had also studied philosophy under Hutcheson. Writing to Wodrow in 
1769, Kenrick recollected ‘the milky philosophy we sucked in from the amiable 
Hutcheson’.
114
 In October 1784, Wodrow, expressing a desire to become more 
acquainted with the history of the debate concerning liberty and necessity, wrote to 
Kenrick that ‘I still remember & you will also how very full Professor Hutcheson was in 
his Lectures & have often wished since to be master of that History on which he spent 
two or three Lectures’.
115
  
 The letters testify at several points to the pervading influence of Hutchesonian 
moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow in the decades following Hutcheson’s 
death, and to the lasting effect which his teaching had on his former students. In January 
1752 Wodrow informed Kenrick that Adam Smith, who had taken over the chair of moral 
philosophy in that year, had ‘thrown out some contemptuous expressions of Mr 
Hutcheson’. He adds a cautionary note that ‘the young man’ should ‘take care to guard 
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against his censures’, as ‘there are some of Mr Hns scholars still about the college who 
will perhaps try to turn the mouths of the cannon against himself’.
116
 In 1760 Kenrick 
wrote to Wodrow from Utrecht with news of Archibald Maclaine (1722-1804), minister 
of the Scots Presbyterian church in The Hague, whom Kenrick and Wodrow had known 
at Glasgow in 1745. Kenrick wrote of Maclaine: ‘I take him to be the very picture of our 
amiable High priest in philosophy Mr Hutcheson’.
117
 In January of the next year, 
Wodrow referred to Maclaine as being ‘a warm Hutchesonian’, adding: ‘I am sure he will 
exert himself to defend Benevolence & the Moral Sense against that beautiful and refined 
system of Hobbism’.
118
 From the letters it is evident that both men valued Leechman’s 
and Hutcheson’s teaching for its tendency to promote theological liberalism and an 
eirenic approach to religious and philosophical questions. Lamenting the increase of 
faction among the Scottish clergy in 1784, Kenrick wrote to Wodrow: 
 
to think that the disciples of a Hutcheson and a Leechman should degenerate so soon: - 
when 40 years //ago// they seemed eagerly to imbibe the most liberal sentiments in 
philosophy & religion, at the fountain head, w
ch
 I expected long ere now, would have 
enriched w
th
 its streams the most distant corners of the country.
119
 
 
 After completing their studies, both men retained a keen interest in contemporary 
intellectual debate; among the many subjects touched upon in the correspondence 
Wodrow and Kenrick frequently discussed their reading of current philosophical and 
theological works. Many of these passages provide fascinating accounts of how 
contemporary works in philosophy were read and understood by educated but non-
specialised readers. In addition to a fairly detailed record of the two men’s reading of 
David Hume, to which I shall return in chapter 4, the letters contain descriptive accounts 
of the work of a number of significant eighteenth-century authors working in the 
Shaftesburian tradition. Kenrick’s and Wodrow’s keen interest in this subject is suggested 
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by the fact that several of these descriptions were written shortly after the works’ first 
publication. In 1752 Kenrick sent Wodrow a report of his reading of James Harris’s 
Hermes. Kenrick was an ardent admirer of the work: he prefaces his fairly substantial 
account of a chapter on ‘Time & the Times or tenses of verbs’ with his assertion that ‘I 
admire this acute Philosopher when he traces this barren uncultivated contemptible 
subject w
th
 the curious regular perspicuity of a profound Peripatetic’. Kenrick adds: ‘His 
former ingenious production [possibly a reference to Harris’s Three Treatises (1765)] 
engages my highest admiration by the sublimity & real importance of the subjects 
treated’.
120
 In July 1759 an account Kenrick had sent Wodrow of his travels around 
England occasioned Wodrow’s reflections on Adam’s Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759). Wodrow concisely summarises the argument of the work – ‘The 
whole of it stands upon the immaginary substitution of ourselves in the place of others 
which seems to be the foundation of his sympathy’ – and draws attention to the text’s 
stylistic merits: ‘the language is simple and beautiful; the Painting of the Passions & 
situation of men admirable’. He cautiously expresses his belief that the work’s approach 
to ethics is compatible with Christianity: ‘the author seems to have a strong detestation of 
vice & perhaps a regard for religion’. In this respect, he contrasts Smith’s ethical theory 
with Hume’s, although acknowledging his suspicion that the underlying principles of the 
two authors may not be dissimilar: ‘it does not appear to me that the book has any 
licentious tendency like the most part of David Hume’s writing on those subjects tho’ 
perhaps the principles are at bottom the same’.
121
  
 These two examples are fairly typical of Wodrow’s and Kenrick’s responses to 
the philosophical texts they encountered. Both men were drawn to comment on the 
particulars of a work’s style. However, whereas Kenrick’s comments are marked by an 
often playful and exuberant appreciation, Wodrow typically exhibits a more cautious 
approach. No doubt Wodrow’s profession as a minister in the Church of Scotland was 
behind his urge to assess each work’s compatibility, or incompatibility, with Christian 
doctrine. It was undoubtedly Wodrow’s theological orthodoxy that explained his cautious 
approach to the ethical theories of Hume and Smith. Interestingly, this is countered by his 
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enthusiastic account of the moral philosophy eventually developed by Reid. In July 1788 
Wodrow sent Kenrick an account of his reading of Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of 
Man (1788). The extract is significant in that demonstrates that by the late 1780s 
Wodrow was convinced by Reid’s ethical theory. He clearly valued Reid’s cautious 
approach in attempting to delineate the boundaries of human knowledge. The passage 
also shows that the word ‘intuitive’ had entered Wodrow’s vocabulary, presumably in the 
sense in which it had been defined by Reid in his Essay on Active Powers of Man (1788), 
and had come to denote what Wodrow thought of as a positive attribute of Reid’s work: 
 
I have read lately the greatest part of Dr. Reid’s last publication on the active powers of 
the human mind. Tho’ the subject is dry & beatten yet the book is entertaining & in my 
judgment the best I ever read on the theory of Ethicks there is perhaps too little practical 
what of this there is, is excellent. Dr. R. is a most Acute Metaphysician & sound 
Moralist. His knowledge is so clear that you would sometimes think it intuitive He gives 
up the point at once when it exceeds his faculties: & states with great modesty & 
precision the bounds of human knowledge on these deep subjects.
122
    
 
One more rational dissenter whose writings demonstrate an acquaintance with 
contemporary Scottish philosophy was William Rose, the principal reviewer of 
philosophical books at the Monthly Review. Founded by Ralph Griffiths (1720?-1803) in 
1749, the Monthly Review was the first journal to attempt to publish reviews of all printed 
books, except chapbooks.
123
 The Monthly Review covered nearly all of the most 
important works in religion and philosophy from the second half of the eighteenth 
century; the often extensive quotations from the works under review enabled readers to 
keep abreast of books which they might not have had access to.
124
 It quickly gained a 
reputation for promoting Whiggish political views and had strong connections with the 
rational dissenters, numbering Rose, Seddon, Aikin, Enfield, Abraham Rees, John Jebb, 
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Samuel Clark, and Samuel Badcock among its reviewers.
125
 Samuel Johnson famously 
stated that ‘The Monthly Reviewers […] are not Deists; but they are for pulling down all 
establishments’.
126
 Abraham Rees, writing in the Monthly Review in 1773, declared that 
‘We (Reviewers) are […] little friends to Priestcraft […]. How often have we poured 
down peals of thunder, from our aeriall heights, on the heads of ambitious and lordly 
ecclesiastics!’
127
 For its time, the Monthly Review had a wide readership. It is estimated 
that in 1776 the Monthly Review sold 3,500 copies, rising to between 6 and 7,000 in 
1783.
128
 Writing to William Turner (1761-1859) in 1783, Lindsey noted in the course of 
describing a hostile review of Priestley’s An History of the Corruptions of Christianity 
(1786) that ‘the Reviewer speaks to thousands every month’.
129
 The publication clearly 
had a prominent influence on contemporary opinion, to the extent that it could influence 
the sales of particular works. In August 1784 Lindsey informed William Tayleur (1712-
1796), a wealthy dissenting layman at Shrewsbury and a benefactor of Priestley and 
Lindsey, that ‘The malignity of the Monthly Reviewer has so far had its effect as to stop 
the sale of his [i.e. Priestley’s] late Publications’.
130
 Antonia Forster has pointed to 
‘plenty of evidence of a general belief that the public did listen to reviewers’.
131
 The fact 
that the Monthly Review numbered so many rational dissenters among its staff and was 
read by rational dissenters (Lindsey and Kenrick both followed the reviews carefully) 
suggest that this influence was particularly strong among rational dissenters.     
William Rose (1719-1786) was thus an influential voice on philosophical topics 
among rational dissenters in England. A dissenter and a Scot, Rose was the son of Hugh 
Rose of Birse, Aberdeenshire.
132
 He had studied at King’s College, Aberdeen between 
1736 and 1740 under the regents Daniel Bradfut and Thomas Gordon, and was awarded a 
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doctor of laws degree by the university in 1783.
133
 Some time between 1745 and 1746 
Rose worked as an assistant at Doddridge’s academy at Northampton. He married Sarah, 
the daughter of Doddridge’s mentor Samuel Clark, and the couple moved first to Kew 
and then to Chiswick where Rose ran a successful boarding school. He wrote numerous 
reviews of philosophical and theological works for the Monthly Review, from its 
inception in 1749 until his death in 1786.
134
 Rose was personally acquainted with Hume, 
who evidently thought highly of him. Hume wrote to William Strahan of his ‘great 
Regard’ for Rose and the letter suggests that Rose might have requested Hume’s services 
for the Monthly Review.
135
 He was also acquainted with Adam Smith and Reid.
136
 
Wodrow mentioned in a letter to Kenrick of 1786 that he had heard Thomas Reid and 
William Richardson (1743-1814), Professor of Humanity at Glasgow, ‘speak of him 
[Rose] in terms of high esteem’, adding that Richardson and Rose had maintained a 
correspondence.
137
 Rose helped Reid to find a publisher for his Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man (1785);
138
 an anecdote included in the London Review in 1775, possibly 
written by William Kenrick (1725-1799), accused Rose, ‘a friend and country man of the 
Author’s [i.e. Reid]’, of soliciting the office of reviewing Reid’s Inquiry ahead of a 
fellow reviewer who had written a critical appraisal of the work.
139
 Rose’s son Samuel 
was a student at Glasgow between 1783 and 1787, and on at least one occasion delivered 
papers from Reid to his father.
140
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Rose’s articles for the Monthly Review demonstrate a receptive attitude to Scottish 
philosophical works. Although his reviews, typically for those of the time, consist mainly 
of summaries accompanied by long quotations from the works under analysis, the 
occasional evaluative comments indicate an acute judgement and a perceptive 
understanding of the issues being discussed. In 1755 Rose had favourably reviewed 
Hutcheson’s A System of Moral Philosophy (1755). His review begins with a eulogy to 
the author and continues with a favourable account of Hutcheson’s epistemology, before 
providing a summary of Hutcheson’s theory of human nature, stressing the disinterested 
nature of the moral sense.
141
 A decade later, in May 1764, Rose reviewed Reid’s Inquiry 
for the Monthly Review. Although he refrains from pronouncing authoritatively on the 
success of the work (‘whether he has delineated it [the human mind] justly or not, we 
shall not take upon us to determine’), he is favourable in his estimation of Reid as a 
philosophical author, pointing to ‘many proofs of uncommon acuteness and 
penetration’.
142
 Rose’s review of Beattie’s Essay, published in the Monthly Review in 
1770, was equally positive. The review indicates that Rose, in line with eighteenth-
century attitudes, considered an attempt to defend religion and morality as meritorious in 
itself, irrespective of its philosophical merits. In this sense, he aligns himself 
intellectually with Beattie, who understood ‘religion’, ‘truth’, and ‘virtue’ as more or less 
synonymous, and in opposition to Hume and Priestley, who, in different ways, posited a 
distinction between these concepts.
143
 Rose’s evaluative comments focus less on the 
work’s intellectual merits than on Beattie’s ethical and aesthetic virtues.
144
 However, in 
the second part of the review published the following year, Rose appears more decisive in 
his estimation of the work’s intellectual value. He comments specifically on Beattie’s 
critique of Hume’s contention that ‘justice, genius, and bodily strength, are virtues of the 
same kind’, and commends Beattie’s demonstration that ‘this very important error hath 
arisen, either from inaccurate observation, or from Mr. Hume’s being imposed upon by 
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words not well understood, or rather from both causes’.
145
 He concludes the review by 
noting that ‘many Readers’ have taken great offence at Beattie’s manner of treating the 
‘modern sceptics’, before proceeding to justify Beattie’s work: ‘though we have the 
sincerest respect for Mr. Hume’s distinguished abilities, yet we cannot think that he is 
treated with any greater degree of freedom or severity than he deserves’.
146
 Rose’s review 
of Oswald’s Appeal was again largely favourable. In the course of his review of the first 
volume of the work, published in the Monthly Review for February 1767, Rose asserts his 
belief that common sense is an effective antidote to Humeian scepticism.
147
 In his 1772 
review of the second volume, Rose gives a favourable estimation of Oswald as an author 
and, with some qualification, of the Appeal as a work.
148
 These reviews are, perhaps, less 
interesting for their intellectual content than for the fact that they would all have been 
read by numerous rational dissenters. They thus provide another good indication of the 
generally favourable reception of Scottish moral philosophy among the intellectual 
community of rational dissent. 
 
The reception of Priestley’s Examination and Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind 
among English rational dissenters 
 
Contrary to this generally positive reception afforded to the writings of Reid, Beattie, and 
Oswald, Priestley’s Examination appears to have been somewhat coolly received among 
English dissenters. When the work was published in 1774 Priestley was out of the 
country on a continental tour with his patron Lord Shelburne. Writing to William Turner 
on 6 October 1774, Lindsey related a report from Priestley’s London bookseller Joseph 
Johnson (1738-1809) that ‘Dr. Priestley’s [reply] to the Northern Philosophers sells well’. 
However, the optimistic report of the work’s sales is tempered by Lindsey’s subsequent 
remark that ‘[they] complain of the uncourteousness of some parts.’
149
 Priestley was back 
in England by the beginning of the next month. Lindsey wrote again to Turner on 17 
November that ‘I find that all (all, at least, I know) like much his book ag
st
 y
e
 Scotch 
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philosophers, though they disapprove the manner of some parts.’ In the same letter he 
related an anecdote he had received from John Lee (1733-1793), the eminent dissenting 
attorney, that a  
 
Mr. Macdonald, a young counsellor of Lincoln’s Inn, just come from Edinburgh, had 
been with Dr. [William] Robertson and Hume at the time they had just read our friend’s 
book, and they both declared that the manner of the work was proper, as the argument 
was unanswerable.’
150
  
 
The ‘Mr. Macdonald’ to whom Lindsey referred was probably Sir Archibald Macdonald 
(1747-1826) who had entered Lincoln’s Inn in 1765 and been called to the bar in 1770.
151
 
Priestley’s Examination certainly did come to Hume’s attention: Adam Smith wrote to 
Hume from London in May 1775 with the news that ‘Your friends here have been all 
much diverted with Priestley’s answer to Beattie’.
152
 Yet it is impossible to corroborate 
the story, and the statement should probably be taken with a degree of scepticism. 
Although Hume is unlikely to have disapproved of an attack on Reid, Beattie, and 
Oswald (he wrote to William Strahan in October 1775 of ‘Dr Reid’ and ‘that bigoted silly 
Fellow, Beattie’), his purported praise of Priestley’s work is less plausible.
153
 To judge by 
Lord Kames’s response, Priestley’s work was received north of the border with a note of 
mirth and contempt. Kames wrote to William Creech in October of 1774 that ‘Dr Reid is 
here [at Blairdrummond] whom I employ’d to read passages out of Priestley for the 
amusement of us all’.
154
 On Priestley’s edition of Hartley, Lindsey was typically 
enthusiastic. Writing to Turner on 6 October 1774 he noted that he was correcting a proof 
sheet of the second of the three dissertations, and informed Turner that ‘The dissertations 
are masterly, [and] will recommend the work to which they are prefaced’.
155
 However, 
even among Lindsey’s circle of correspondents praise for the work was not unanimous: 
Francis Blackburne wrote to Lindsey from Richmond on 13 October 1775 with the news 
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that ‘I have just had a glimpse of a page or two of Dr. P.’s operations on David Hartley, 
whom he seems not to have understood as I do’.
156
 
 Rose too was much more critical of Priestley’s attack of the Scots. In his 1775 
review of the Examination for the Monthly Review he had little to say on the argument of 
the work, yet was scathing in his condemnation of Priestley’s pugnacious tone: ‘the 
petulant, illiberal, and contemptuous manner, in which he treats his adversaries in the 
work now before us, is disgraceful to him as a gentleman, as a philosopher, and as a 
christian’.
157
 The review also hints at the widespread disapproval of Priestley’s work 
among his own circle on the grounds of its intemperance: 
 
Some of his warmest friends and admirers, persons, of whose abilities and virtues he is 
known to entertain the highest opinion, instead of thinking him very temperate, we know 
with certainty, think him very intemperate, and have expressed their dissatisfaction with 
his manner of writing, in the strongest terms.
158
   
 
Yet it is in the Monthly Review article covering Priestley’s edition of Hartley’s Theory of 
the Human Mind (1775) that the most forceful criticism of Priestley’s intellectual position 
is voiced. Fascinatingly, although this review is listed as being by Rose in Benjamin 
Nangle’s index of contributors to the Monthly Review, it is now known to have been 
largely the work of Reid. The article published in the Monthly Review is an adaptation of 
a longer manuscript written by Reid entitled ‘Miscellaneous Reflections on Priestley’s 
Account of Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind’.
159
 It is not possible to determine 
whether Reid requested the office of reviewing Priestley’s edition, or whether Rose (or 
Griffiths) asked Reid to write it. The fact that Nangle identified Rose as the author 
suggests that it was edited by Rose for inclusion in the Monthly Review.
160
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 In its criticisms of Priestley’s introductory essays the printed review closely 
follows Reid’s manuscript. Reid’s text draws attention to Priestley’s failure to accurately 
define what he understands by ‘instincts’, criticises his neglect of the history of the 
doctrine of association, and points out his inaccurate understanding of the philosophy of 
Locke. At points, Rose appears to have toned down Reid’s criticisms. Rose omitted from 
the printed review Reid’s exclamation: ‘I am weary of Pursuing the incoherent & absurd 
Notions of this flimsy writer, who surely mistook his Talent when he attempted to write 
upon abstract subjects’.
161
 However, the article in the Monthly Review also contains a 
number of criticisms of Priestley’s position which were not part of Reid’s original text. It 
can only be assumed that these passages were added by Rose. Rose added an extra 
paragraph pointing out the incoherence of Priestley’s argument that ideas could continue 
independently of the mind’s conceptions in which he noted that ‘Dr. Priestley does not 
understand the doctrine which he has taken to elucidate’.
162
 The second part of the review 
assessing Priestley’s editorial abilities is only loosely based on Reid’s manuscript. Rose 
omitted a fairly substantial part of Reid’s text in which Reid had criticised Hartley for 
combining conjectural propositions with propositions that had been adequately proved 
without distinguishing between the two.
163
 Rose added an extra paragraph criticising 
Priestley’s practical editorial abilities, emphasising the fact that many of the references to 
preceding propositions in Priestley’s edition were incorrect due to the ‘hurry and 
inattention’ with which the work had evidently been prepared.
164
 Rose’s most substantial 
addition to Reid’s manuscript comprises a concluding observation on the similarity 
between the epistemological systems of Hartley and Hume: 
 
Dr. Priestley in his examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry, &c. has treated Mr. Hume’s 
philosophy with great contempt, as being both superficial, yet in what relates to the 
principles of the understanding, there is a remarkable coincidence of sentiments, in 
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almost every thing material, between that Author and Dr. Hartley; who is considered by 
our own Editor as the greatest of all uninspired writers.
165
 
 
The passage is presumably modelled on an observation in Reid’s manuscript that ‘Mr 
Hume in his Treatise of human Nature, printed ten years before Dr Hartley’s 
Observations on Man, grounds almost his whole System of human Mind upon the Laws 
of Association’.
166
 Reid subsequently observes that ‘There is indeed a remarkable 
agreement in the Systems of Hobbs of Hume & of Hartley with regard to the Faculties of 
the human Mind; however widely the last may differ from the others in his Religious 
Principles’.
167
 In the conclusion to the printed review, Rose developed this observation, 
making explicit the irony that this similarity in the epistemological theories of Hume and 
Hartley should lead to such divergent conclusions: 
 
It may seem strange, however, that if the fundamental principles of the two Systems are 
so much the same, the conclusions should be so different. Hume’s is made a foundation 
of universal pyrrhonism; Hartley’s, on the contrary, of a sort of religious system, 
comprehending revealed as well as natural religion.
168
   
 
This review is interesting in that, perhaps more than any of Rose’s other articles for the 
Monthly Review, it provides an insight into his own philosophical ideas. Not only does 
the fact that Rose allowed Reid to write a critical review of Priestley’s work suggest a 
loose affinity between the two men’s positions, but the fact that Rose developed some of 
Reid’s criticisms against Priestley’s and Hartley’s philosophy demonstrates that they 
shared a critical opinion of these ideas.    
 Wodrow’s and Kenrick’s respective attitudes to Priestley reflect the general strain 
of their criticism: Kenrick’s enthusiasm is matched by Wodrow’s more cautious 
approach. Writing to Wodrow in 1781, shortly after Priestley’s arrival at Birmingham, 
Kenrick referred to Priestley as ‘this wonderful man, who writes and does so much’.
169
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He commented approvingly on Priestley’s first sermon preached at Birmingham and on 
his Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1780), conjecturing optimistically that ‘by 
means of his & other such free writings, the world will be enlightened’.
170
 Shortly after 
his first meeting with Priestley at Birmingham, Kenrick wrote that ‘I shall never tire of 
defending him – I love and admire him so much’.
171
 The correspondence suggests that 
Priestley’s writings were not always easily available at Glasgow. In 1791, for example, 
Wodrow noted that few of Priestley’s works reached Scotland, conjecturing: ‘there is 
scarcely a copy of his letter to Burke but mine in the kingdom’.
172
 The letters of the 
1780s contain a number of records of Kenrick sending copies of Priestley’s works, or his 
own summaries of them, to Glasgow for Wodrow to read.
173
  
However, Wodrow’s responses to these works are most often marked by caution. 
Despite commenting approvingly on Priestley’s Address to the Serious and Candid 
Professors of Christianity (1771) and Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, the ‘elegant 
& handsome encomium’ which Wodrow paid Priestley in 1784 was tempered by the 
observation (much to Kenrick’s amusement) that Priestley clearly had ‘a Bee in his 
bonnet’. Although the letter from Wodrow has not survived, Kenrick referred to ‘a 
certain want of judgment & prudence’ with which his friend had charged Priestley.
174
 
Wodrow was evidently less susceptible to Priestley’s controversial style: promising to 
send Wodrow a copy of Priestley’s second letter to Samuel Horsley, Kenrick warned his 
friend that ‘Your meek spirit will not relish’ the work.
175
 In a letter of January 1784, 
Wodrow included a long quotation from a letter he had received from the Church of 
Scotland minister William M’Gill (1732-1807), containing a detailed critical appraisal of 
Priestley’s character and writings. Although M’Gill claimed to ‘admire the variety & the 
vigour of his talents’ and to ‘believe with Mr Kenrick that he love[d] truth’, he expressed 
his concern that Priestley: 
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does not seem to look at her [truth] with that respect & modesty which becomes one who 
sees but ‘thro a glass darkly’; on the contrary he pushes boldly forward into her most 
secret recesses, & I fear often hugs an illusion in place of her. Many of his nostrums both 
in Philosophy & Theology are too hastily taken up, and set forth in too peremptory and 
dogmatical a way.
176
    
 
Despite Wodrow’s comment that M’Gill’s ‘prejudices against the worthy Dr’ are 
‘stronger than my own’, there is certainly a sense in the letters that Wodrow shared 
something of his colleague’s reservations about Kenrick’s intellectual hero.  
 A similar attitude is reflected in Wodrow’s and Kenrick’s recorded responses to 
Priestley’s philosophical works. Although both men wrote enthusiastically of Priestley’s 
response to Hume (see chapter 4), Wodrow’s account of Priestley’s writings on necessity 
(see chapter 3) developed a perceptive criticism of Priestley’s necessitarianism. 
Interestingly, however, one point of agreement between Wodrow and Kenrick on the 
subject of Priestley’s philosophical writings is their respective attitudes to his response to 
Reid, Beattie, and Oswald. Although neither Wodrow nor Kenrick mentioned Reid’s 
Inquiry, Beattie’s Essay, or Oswald’s Appeal at the time of their publication, it is clear 
from later comments that they were certainly familiar with Reid’s and (in Kenrick’s case) 
Beattie’s works. Kenrick’s response to Priestley’s Examination comprises one of the only 
critical comments he makes on Priestley or his works in the correspondence. In 1781 
Kenrick noted that Priestley’s response to Hume was addressed ‘w
th
 a good deal more 
civility, & good manners, than 3 or 4 years ago when he brandished his tawmahaw 
against the celebrated Oswald, Reid, & Beattie’.
177
 Three years later, in September 1784, 
Kenrick again recalled Priestley’s attack on the Scottish authors, writing to Wodrow:  
 
I confess there was a time that I highly blamed his furious attack on your harmless 
threefold Doctors – to treat the amiable Beattie w
th
 such severity shocked me & I thought 
the modest industrious Reid much too roughly handled.
178
 
 
                                                 
176
 Wodrow to Kenrick, 3 January 1784, DWL MS 24.157 (87). 
177
 Kenrick to Wodrow, 15 August 1781, DWL MS 24.157 (72). 
178
 Kenrick to Wodrow, 28 September 1784, DWL MS 24.157 (83). 
 103 
Similarly, in June 1787, Wodrow qualified his admiration of Priestley’s Letters to a 
Philosophical Unbeliever with a comparison between Priestley and Reid. Commenting 
that Priestley’s  work was ‘too metaphysical’, and that he was not ‘perfectly satisfied of 
the soundness of his and Hartley’s Philosophy’, Wodrow asserted his preference for the 
work of the Scottish author: ‘I think Dr Reid’s more intelligible more founded in fact & 
feeling and more likely to prevail even in this sceptical age’.
179
  
  
Joseph Berington’s response to Priestley 
 
Another author critical of Priestley’s Examination and edition of Hartley’s Theory of the 
Human Mind, and one no less perceptive than Rose, Reid, Wodrow, or Kenrick, was the 
Roman Catholic priest Joseph Berington, who published his Letters on Materialism and 
Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind anonymously in 1776. As a Catholic, Berington 
(1743-1827) had come from a very different educational background to the rational 
dissenters in Priestley’s circle. After receiving his preparatory education at Esquerchin, 
Berington had entered the English college at Douai on 12 August 1756.
180
 Douai had 
been established in 1568 as the first of several colleges on the continent specifically 
designed for the training of Roman Catholic priests to work in England. Probably under 
the tutor William Wilkinson (1722-1780), Berington would have attended the two-year 
philosophy course prefatory to the four-year syllabus in divinity. At least according to the 
printed syllabus, the philosophy course at Douai was heavily influenced by Thomism and 
largely confined to the study of Aristotelian logic, physics, and metaphysics.
181
 However, 
there is some evidence that tutors did not strictly adhere to these guidelines.
182
 The extant 
details of Berington’s career suggest that at Douai he encountered a number of modern 
European philosophical works. Following his ordination into the Roman Catholic 
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priesthood in 1770, Berington was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Douai. His 
professorial thesis evinced a strong interest in the philosophy of Locke and in the 
psychology of the Swiss naturalist and philosopher Charles Bonnet (1720-1793).
183
 In an 
important and controversial passage of his thesis, Berington maintained a connection 
between ideas and sensations occasioned by the action of external objects on the senses, 
referred to the mind as being ‘united to the body’, and concluded, contentiously, that 
Locke and Bonnet ‘teach the truth’.
184
 His comments infuriated the Bishop of Arras, who 
charged Berington with anti-scholasticism and with advocating ‘doctrines of a dangerous 
aspect, from whence Deists may draw conclusions favourable to their tenets’.
185
 The 
Bishop wrote to Alban Butler (1709-1773), Berington’s colleague at Douai, demanding 
that Berington be suspended from teaching immediately. Butler subsequently wrote to the 
President of the college, Henry Tichbourne Blount, imploring him to remove Berington 
from the institution in order to avoid a scandal.
186
 The following year, Berington returned 
to England, and after some years at Wolverhampton took charge of the small mission at 
Oscott, in Staffordshire, where he became close friends with the Quaker businessman at 
Barr, Samuel Galton (1720-1779). It was during this period that he probably first met 
Priestley through meetings of the Lunar Society, a group of Birmingham entrepreneurs 
who met monthly to discuss their scientific interests.
187
  
 Priestley and Berington came into contact with one another at several points over 
the next two decades in relation to their shared theological and political interests.
188
 In 
their philosophical opinions they occupied very different positions. In letter VI of 
Berington’s Letters on Materialism, ‘The doctrine of instinctive principles reviewed and 
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contrasted with Hartley’s Theory’, Berington responded specifically to Priestley’s 
Examination. He begins by declaring himself to be no admirer of Reid’s, Beattie’s, and 
Oswald’s theory of ‘common sense’. However, Berington is sceptical as to whether 
Priestley’s advocacy of Hartley’s theory of association is a sufficient retort. Whereas 
Rose and Reid had attempted to undermine Priestley’s position by drawing attention to 
the similarity between Hartley’s and Hume’s psychology, Berington stressed the 
essentially similar claims of ‘common sense’ and ‘association’. Both, according to 
Berington, are ‘equally necessary, and equally infallible in their operations’.
189
 Both 
locate the source of knowledge in the bodily organs (in Hartley’s case the ‘nervous 
vibrations’ and in Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s cases the ‘constitutional propensities’), 
and both hold that ideas are generated independently of the will, and according to pre-
established laws.  
 Berington goes on to identify what he saw as a central paradox in Priestley’s 
position. Whilst Priestley was claiming to refute the recourse to ‘instinct’ or ‘intuition’ 
advocated by the Scots by reaffirming the importance of ‘reason’, his claim that 
association could ultimately account for all complex ideas left as little room for the role 
of reason as did ‘common sense’. By defining the ‘judgment’ as a ‘complex feeling of the 
coincidence of ideas’, rather than, as in Locke, an idea of reflection, essentially different 
from ideas derived directly from sensation, Hartley was equally open to the charge that 
he had made the judgment of truth and falsehood dependent on an impulsive and 
instantaneous feeling. Berington singles out specifically Priestley’s claim in his 
Examination that ‘the faculty by which we perceive truth, is the farthest possible from 
any thing, that resembles a sense’. For Berington, nothing could be closer to a sense than 
the ‘internal feeling, which judgment, assent, and dissent, are by Dr. Hartley defined to 
be’.
190
 In this analysis, the doctrine of association ‘will be found to make as bold 
encroachments on the province of reason, as that execrable common sense’.
191
     
  Through his criticism of Priestley’s response to Reid, Beattie, and Oswald 
Berington struck at the heart of what Priestley was attempting to achieve: a rational 
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system of epistemology on which to ground his theology. Berington evidently shared 
Priestley’s concern that the epistemological doctrine outlined by Reid, Beattie, and 
Oswald was an unstable foundation for a rational theological system. Referring to 
‘instinctive principles’, he wrote that ‘They open wide the door to fanaticism and every 
enthusiastic conceit, erecting an instinctive feeling into the universal judge of truth, in 
every branch of morality and religion’.
192
 Yet in a key passage, he argues that Hartley’s 
theory, at least in his reading of it, is equally susceptible to the charge that it validates 
arbitrary judgments as is the common sense theory of the Scots: 
 
Also is your notion equally favourable to fanaticism and bigotry: for the man, who is 
taught to believe, that all is conducted by a train of mechanical impulse, will think 
himself as much necessitated to pursue each warm impression, as he who trusts his 
conscience to the infallible guidance of instinct or interior lights. He may be either that 
poor priest-ridden mortal, whose blindness you so pathetically lament; or he may be 
obliged to subscribe the Scotch confession of faith; or, which is not the less 
extraordinary, he may perceive himself rather inclined to dismember his native creed, 
and to dissent from almost every article of the Christian belief.
193
 
 
The implication, of course, is that Hartley’s theory of the association of ideas could 
equally serve as a foundation for the theology of Catholicism, Anglicanism, or for the 
Calvinist Presbyterianism of the Church of Scotland, as it could for Priestley’s own 
Socinianism.          
 In the remaining sections of the work, Berington criticises various other aspects of 
Priestley’s and Hartley’s system. In letter IV, ‘Objections to the union system answered; 
and man’s future existence demonstrated’, Berington argues against Priestley on 
theological grounds. His objection here is to Priestley’s insistence that man’s hope of a 
future existence derives not from his knowledge of an immaterial soul deduced by reason 
(which Priestley denies), but solely from the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the 
dead contained in the Scriptures. For Berington, such a view assigns too much to 
revelation and weakens the arguments for natural religion. He claims that on this point 
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Priestley again falls prey to the paradox that whereas on the one hand he is claiming to be 
exalting reason above ‘instinct, bigotry and enthusiasm’, on the other hand he is 
undermining the claims of reason by denying that man could naturally arrive at the 
knowledge of his own immortality.
194
 Berington’s position is that man’s knowledge of a 
future state is a tenet of natural, as well as of revealed religion. He holds that ‘reason can 
itself point to man an hereafter’, and identifies the demonstration of this point as the 
principal concern of his own work.
195
 
 Berington’s Letters on Materialism was also one of the first responses to 
Priestley’s (at this point still nascent) materialist theory. In the first of the prefatory 
essays to his edition of Hartley, Priestley had made a controversial suggestion. Whereas 
Hartley had retained a vestigial dualism, upholding an essential difference between 
‘matter’ and ‘spirit’, Priestley suggested that the doctrine of vibrations rendered the need 
for any non-material substance to explain the mind’s operations obsolete, cautiously 
conjecturing:  
 
I am rather inclined to think that though the subject is beyond our comprehension at 
present, man does not consist of two principles, so essentially different from one another 
as matter and spirit […] I rather think the whole man is of some uniform composition, 
and that the property of perception, as well as the other powers that are termed mental, is 
the result (whether necessary or not) of such an organical structure as that of the brain.
196
      
 
Against this suggestion, Berington advanced what were essentially the same objections 
made by Samuel Clarke to Anthony Collins.
197
 For Berington, the power of perception is 
incompatible with the composition of parts. Whereas particular feelings could be 
conceived to arise in distinct nervous points, if the brain were the seat of all affections 
then there would be as many individual percipient beings as there were affections.
198
 The 
unity of consciousness necessary for the faculties of judgment, or for the perception of 
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harmony or proportion, cannot be accounted for by the individual parts of the brain. 
Berington could not accept Priestley’s (and Collins’s) argument that consciousness could 
be a property of systems of matter, without being a property of that system’s parts. For 
Berington ‘Organization alone can never give a capacity to the component elements of 
the brain or body, of which, in their unorganized state, they were totally void’.
199
 The 
only way out of this for the materialist is that each individual element of matter must be 
endued with the capacity of perception, and Berington demonstrates the absurdity of 
following through this supposition whether matter be thought of as indivisible monads or 
as compounded and infinitely divisible.
200
  
 In letter VIII, ‘Remarks on the doctrine of Necessity as stated by Doctor Hartley’, 
Berington addresses Hartley’s and Priestley’s advocacy of philosophical necessity. By 
this stage in the text, the tone of his language has become markedly more pugnacious. He 
opens the letter with the comment that: 
 
Dr. Hartley’s theory is not only reprehensible from its coincidence with the doctrine of 
instinct, and from its insufficiency to explain all the affections of the mind, but far more 
so for being productive of a consequence, big with fatal evils to the interests of morality 
and religion.
201
   
 
Berington here reveals his debt to Wollaston. He rejects Hartley’s theory that motives are 
the mechanical causes of our actions by positing a distinction between ‘moral’ and 
‘physical’ modes of operation.
202
 Motives are ‘moral causes’, that is, although they do 
have a physical effect on us, they do not in themselves produce our actions. Rather, 
motives act on the mind which then determines itself to act by the free exertion of its own 
innate powers.
203
 In response to Hartley’s contention that philosophical free will is 
inconsistent with the prescience of the deity, Berington restates Wollaston’s argument 
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from The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722): ‘God foresees, or rather sees the actions 
of free agents, because they will be, not that they will be because he foresees them’. 
God’s foreknowledge of an action ought not to be misunderstood as being the cause of 
that action; an agent’s choice is thus consistent with God’s foreknowledge.
204
 
 In letter IX Berington sketches an outline of his own philosophical system, which 
draws together some of the various points made in the course of his criticisms. In 
opposition to Priestley and Hartley, Berington upholds an uncompromising dualism: 
‘Man is a mixed being, a compound of two substances essentially different, matter and 
soul’.
205
 Yet Berington rejects Priestley’s assertion that matter and spirit are always 
described as having no common properties by which they can affect or act upon one 
another. He allows that matter is possessed of a limited ‘active force’. The human brain 
ought to be conceived of as an instrument endowed with the greatest energetic powers of 
which matter is susceptible, and as such as ‘a fit habitation for a substance, simple and 
highly active, as is the soul’.
206
 He advocates what he terms the ‘doctrine of physical 
influence’: the soul can be ‘roused into action’ by the impulses of the body; ‘the various 
mental powers [will] be progressively brought into action, and man will feel, will 
perceive, will think, and will reason, just as the respective operative causes exert their 
influence’.
207
 In this way, Berington concedes a large part of Hartley’s epistemological 
system. He concludes the first part of letter IX with the statement: ‘I agree then with you 
and Dr. Hartley in adopting the doctrine of vibrations, and the consequent generation and 
association of ideas, as far as ideas may be taken for the immediate objects of the mind in 
thinking’.
208
 However, Berington subsequently reasserts his opinion that the faculties of 
‘perceiving’, ‘liking or disliking’, ‘distinguishing’, and ‘attending’ cannot be the direct 
effects of any nervous vibrations.
209
 These faculties Berington holds, in a sense, to be 
innate. They are ‘certain primary maxims’ which the mind infers rationally, 
independently of sense perception.
210
 Berington rejects Hartley’s and Priestley’s 
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contention that the mind is purely passive in its reception of sensations. For Berington, 
the mind is active: just as external stimuli act upon the mind, so the mind, in turn, acts 
upon the physical brain. In a state of attention the mind ‘reacts upon the moving fibres, 
heightens their vibrations, and the mental effects are thus rendered more intense’.
211
 
Berington might have derived at least part of his own position from Bonnet; among the 
influences he cites are Robert Whytt, the Scottish physician and natural philosopher, and 
Locke. In fact, Berington claimed that his own system was none other ‘than the original 
doctrine of Mr. Locke, exhibited, perhaps in a more striking and less complex point of 
view’.
212
 However, Berington pursues Locke’s ideas in a very different direction from 
Hartley and Priestley: the primary maxims ‘by a kind of native light flash upon the mind’. 
Describing the action of the mind upon the brain Berington writes: ‘Here the mind for a 
time chuses to dwell: we feel a kind of expansive energy unfold itself, and the ideal 
colouring becomes more glowing and expressive’.
213
   
 In his approach to ethics Berington also moves away from a Lockeian position, at 
least as it had been developed by Hartley and Priestley. Among the primary maxims 
known independently of experience, Berington lists the knowledge of morality. Although 
he concedes that Hartley’s and Priestley’s theory of the formation of the moral sense is a 
useful explanation of the diversity of moral sentiments, he accepts the rationalist thesis 
that the morality of actions is founded on the ‘eternal reasons and relations of things’.
214
 
He thus cannot accept Hartley’s and Priestley’s contention that the knowledge of morality 
is in no sense innate. Although the doctrine of association can account for differences of 
sentiment occasioned by different ‘modes of education’, ‘difference of age’, ‘prevailing 
fashions’, and the ‘influence of climate’, to insist that ‘the whole work of morality’ is due 
to the association of ideas is to be ‘far too sanguine and precipitate’.
215
 Berington holds 
that ‘an all-wise being must have provided some principle, innate to our very 
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constitutions, whereby the charms of truth and virtue might be felt, and their respective 
rights immoveably fixed, in opposition to error and vice’. He identifies ‘the grand moral 
principle, do as you would be done by’ as an ethical truth transcending any particular 
historical or geographical circumstance’.
216
 
 It is difficult to ascertain what impression, if any, Berington’s philosophical work 
made on his contemporaries.
217
 Priestley was clearly unimpressed: he later wrote in the 
preface to the second edition his Disquisitions (1782) of Berington as being ‘a man of a 
truly liberal turn of mind, and cultivated understanding’ but ‘warped, as I think him to be, 
by his education’.
218
 However, as we shall see in chapter 3, Berington’s criticisms were 
to be an important stimulus for the development of Priestley’s ideas. His work is also 
interesting in that, although he occupied a very different theological position to that of the 
English rational dissenters, he can be listed with Rose, Enfield, Kenrick, and Walker 
among those in Priestley’s circle who, although from different perspectives, were critical 
of the direction in which Priestley’s philosophy was developing. These divergent 
philosophical positions within the rational dissenting movement would come to a head in 
the late 1770s and early 1780s when Priestley developed at length his materialist and 
necessitarian theories. 
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3. Priestley on materialism and philosophical necessity (1777-1782) 
 
In 1777 Priestley published the most important of his philosophical works: Disquisitions 
relating to Matter and Spirit, with its appendix The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity 
illustrated. These two volumes contain most of the key elements of Priestley’s mature 
philosophical system; in them he attempted to prove conclusively his theories of 
materialism and philosophical necessity and to illustrate the compatibility of these 
theories with his Socinian theology. The publication of the Disquisitions initiated intense 
debate from the late 1770s until well into the 1790s. It occasioned a number of book-
length responses, which, in turn, prompted Priestley to reply to his critics in separate 
tracts and in letters printed as appendices to the second edition of the work; discussion of 
the book and its ideas filled the letters pages of the literary journals. The most common 
charge levelled against Priestley was that his ideas led directly to atheism. Although 
Priestley had attempted to stress the compatibility of his materialist and necessitarian 
theories with Christian doctrine, his bold assertion that man had no soul distinct from his 
body was widely regarded as a rejection of the whole system of Christianity. As Samuel 
Badcock, one of the more perceptive contemporary commentators on the debate, 
observed, Priestley, in this respect, ‘had the misfortune of being misunderstood, or 
misrepresented beyond any other writer of rank and character in the literary world’. His 
enemies, of whom, as Badcock noted, ‘as a Presbyterian he ha[d] many, and as a 
Socinian more’, clambered over one another to refute what they saw as Priestley’s 
dangerous and absurd doctrines.
1
 
 I begin this chapter by considering in some detail Priestley’s theories of 
materialism and philosophical necessity. A fairly substantial body of criticism has been 
produced on these two subjects and I here attempt to position my own account in relation 
to this work. My particular concern is to emphasise two important contexts for 
understanding Priestley’s writings. Firstly, I situate Priestley’s philosophical ideas within 
the theological context in which they developed; an understanding of this context will 
prove essential when moving on to consider the reaction of Priestley’s contemporaries to 
his controversial theories. This theological context of Priestley’s ideas has tended to be 
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overlooked by recent commentators, and my own account will go some way towards 
redressing this. Secondly, I show that Priestley’s ideas developed through a process of 
collaboration within his circle of correspondents. Following this analysis, I examine some 
of the responses to Priestley’s work, focusing specifically on how Priestley’s doctrines of 
materialism and philosophical necessity were discussed within the intellectual culture of 
rational dissent. Subsequently, I turn to the most significant response to Priestley’s ideas 
to emerge from within this culture, that of Richard Price. I briefly outline Price’s 
intellectual development in order to show how he came to arrive at almost antithetical 
conclusions to Priestley on the subjects of moral philosophy, materialism, and the 
freedom of the will. I then turn to Price’s and Priestley’s A Free Discussion of the 
Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity. Once again, I locate this analysis 
in relation to the links between the rational dissenters and the Scots by exploring some of 
Price’s connections with a number of important Scottish thinkers, namely, Hume, Reid, 
and Lord Monboddo. Exploring these connections will extend the picture of intellectual 
exchange between the Scots and the English rational dissenters developed in the previous 
two chapters. Finally, I examine three responses to Priestley’s ideas from different 
denominational perspectives, each of which attempted, in various ways, to challenge 
Priestley’s claim to have laid a rational, philosophical foundation for Christian theology. 
  
Priestley’s materialism 
 
Much of the argument of the Disquisitions rests on a fundamental contention concerning 
the nature of matter. Priestley’s starting point is to affirm the primacy of force over 
substance as the foundation of the phenomenal world.
2
 In the opening section of the work 
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Priestley argues that matter has traditionally been defined as a solid and impenetrable 
substance, incapable of initiating motion until it is acted upon by a foreign power.
3
 
However, to define solidity and impenetrability as properties inherent in the nature of 
matter is, according to Priestley, a philosophical error. The idea of impenetrability is 
derived solely from resistance. Empirical observation has revealed that resistance is not 
occasioned by solid matter, but by a power of repulsion acting at a distance from the 
body itself.
4
 Impenetrability is thus not an essential property of matter, but rather an 
effect resulting from an prior repulsive force. Similarly, solidity ought to be understood 
as the effect of the force of attraction. Without this attractive force, there is no way of 
explaining the cohesion of atoms in bulk materials; without an infinitely strong power of 
attraction there is no way of conceiving how individual atoms retain any determinate 
form. The idea of solidity, and even of form itself, is thus meaningless without a prior 
power of attraction upon which it depends.  
 This new way of thinking about matter inevitably raises the question of what 
matter is if not a solid and impenetrable substance. To this Priestley responds that the 
only strictly philosophical answer is that any substance can only be said to possess such 
properties as appearances prove it to be possessed of. In adherence to this method (which 
Priestley claims to have inherited from Newton) he asserts that matter is possessed only 
of the property of extension and of the powers of attraction and repulsion, these qualities 
being all that can be necessarily inferred from appearances.
5
 To the charge that matter, 
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thus defined, is little different to spirit, Priestley replies that ‘it no way concerns me […] 
to maintain that there is any such difference between them as has been hitherto 
supposed’.
6
 In fact, since matter has no properties but those of attraction and repulsion, ‘it 
ought to rise in our esteem, as making a nearer approach to the nature of spiritual and 
immaterial beings, as we have been taught to call those which are opposed to gross 
matter’.
7
 
 Priestley claimed to have derived his theory of matter from the writings of the 
natural philosopher John Michell (1724-93), whom Priestley knew personally, and the 
mathematician, philosopher, and Jesuit priest Roger Joseph Boscovich (1711-1787).
8
 He 
had first encountered the point theory of matter developed in Boscovich’s Theoria 
Philosophiæ Naturalis (1758) whilst working on his History of Vision, Light, and 
Colours (1772) in the early 1770s.
9
 In the Disquisitions he quotes a long passage from his 
earlier work describing Boscovich’s and Michell’s ideas. It was Boscovich who, for 
Priestley, had shown that  
 
matter is not impenetrable, as before him it had been universally taken for granted; but 
that it consists of physical points only, endued with powers of attraction and repulsion, 
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taking place at different distances, that is, surrounded with various spheres of attraction 
and repulsion.
10
  
 
However, as John G. McEvoy has argued, Priestley, in accordance with his empiricist 
epistemology, avoided committing himself definitively to any thesis on the internal 
structure of matter.
11
 In confining himself to what could be demonstrated from 
appearances, Priestley only speculatively adopts Boscovich’s theory of point atomism. 
His most important contention is a negative one: that there is not sufficient evidence to 
conclude that matter is possessed of the properties of solidity and impenetrability. In this 
respect, the significance of Boscovich’s ideas ought not, perhaps, to be over 
emphasised.
12
 For Priestley the internal structure of matter remains ultimately 
unknowable. It is on this point that McEvoy and McGuire criticise Priestley’s approach 
as inadequate. They argue that Priestley failed to see that ‘the fundamental properties of 
matter cannot be established by observation alone’ and that Priestley neglected to offer 
the more expedient conceptual analysis of the logical dependence of terms such as 
solidity and impenetrability on the concept of repulsion.
13
 However, in sections of the 
text Priestley does go some way towards doing this, and here he owes as much to Locke 
as he does to Newton, Boscovich, or Michell.  
 In section IX of the Disquisitions, Priestley is far more explicit on the 
philosophical contention underpinning his argument on the nature of matter. Priestley 
argues here that our ideas of ‘substance’ and ‘essence’, whether we are thinking of 
material or immaterial substances, are merely linguistic expressions which are of little 
help in accurately describing the phenomenal world or our conceptions of it. In fact, 
Priestley argues, ‘we can have no proper idea of any essence whatever’.
14
 Although we 
cannot but speak of the powers of attraction and repulsion as being powers ‘residing in 
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some thing, substance, or essence’, our ideas cannot go beyond the powers of which a 
thing is possessed.
15
 If we insist on defining matter as a substance then it is ‘as 
immaterial a one as any person can wish for’; however, this is effectively beyond the 
realm of any meaningful conception as it can suggest no idea whatsoever.
16
 Priestley’s 
point here develops an idea which he probably first encountered in Locke’s Essay. In 
Book I of the Essay, Locke had argued that the idea of substance cannot be derived from 
either of the two categories of sensation or reflection. These being the only two sources 
from which ideas are derived,  
 
We can have no such clear Idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word 
Substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; (i.e. of something 
whereof we have no particular distinct positive Idea), which we take to be the 
substratum, or support, of those Ideas we do know.
17
   
 
In Book II Locke considers the same question in more detail. He here argues that the idea 
of substance is nothing but an unknown and purely conjectural support of qualities which 
we find existing. The substance of matter can thus only accurately be defined as 
‘something wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist’.
18
 
If anyone were asked to define what this something was that the qualities of, for example, 
solidity and extension cohered in, then he would, according to Locke,  
 
Not be in a much better case, than the Indian before mentioned; who, saying that the 
World was supported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to 
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which his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave 
support to the broad-back’d Tortoise, replied something, he knew not what.
19
    
 
As Schofield has pointed out, Priestley would have encountered a direct precedent, 
derived from Locke, for his own position in Doddridge’s lectures.
20
 In Part I, ‘On the 
Powers and Faculties of the Human Mind’, Doddridge stated in a corollary to definition 
3: ‘We can have no conception of any such substance distinct from all the properties of 
the being in which they inhere; for this would imply that the being itself inheres, and so 
on to infinity’.
21
 The references direct the students to the two passages in Locke’s Essay 
referred to above. Thus, although (as Priestley readily acknowledged) Locke tends to 
assume in the Essay that solidity is essential to matter, his interrogation of the idea of 
substance opened the way for Priestley to dismantle the conceptual framework within 
which a traditional distinction between matter and spirit was understood. In fact, Priestley 
probably alludes directly to the passage on substance in Locke’s Essay when explaining 
Michell’s insight occasioned by studying Andrew Baxter’s theory of matter.
22
 In Baxter’s 
theory, particles of matter are bound together by an immaterial force. These particles 
consist of smaller particles bound by the same immaterial force and so on ad infinitum, so 
that if the particles have any existence at all they are indiscernible, every effect being 
produced by the immaterial force. Thus Michell,   
 
Instead, therefore, of placing the world upon the giant, the giant upon the tortoise, and 
the tortoise upon he could tell not what, […] placed the world at once upon itself; and 
finding it still necessary, in order to solve the appearances of nature, to admit of 
extended and penetrable immaterial substance, if he maintained the impenetrability of 
matter; and observing farther, that all we perceive by contact, &c. is this penetrable 
immaterial substance, and not the impenetrable one; […] began to think that he might 
as well admit of penetrable material, as penetrable immaterial substance; especially as 
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we know nothing more of the nature of substance than that it is something which 
supports properties.
23
       
  
Although Priestley does not fully develop the idea, and falls back on a notion of 
substance in other sections of the work, he is philosophically at his most interesting at the 
points where he extends Locke’s nominalism to suggest that his own prioritising of forces 
over atoms necessitates a conceptual framework where empirically observed qualities 
have come to replace substances. 
 In stripping matter of its traditional properties and by attributing to it only the 
quality of extension and the powers of attraction and repulsion, Priestley recognised that 
he had blurred the boundary between matter and the operations of the deity. On this 
question of the relationship of the deity to the physical universe, Priestley’s position in 
the Disquisitions is not entirely clear. In fact, Priestley appears to have changed his 
opinion between 1777 and 1782 when he published a second edition of the text. In 
section I of the first edition he is keen to stress that he is not arguing that the powers of 
attraction and repulsion are self-existent in matter: 
 
All that my argument amounts to, is, that from whatever source these powers are derived, 
or by whatever being they are communicated, matter cannot exist without them; and if that 
superior power, or being, withdraw its influence, the substance itself necessarily ceases to 
exist, or is annihilated.
24
  
 
This is presumably in order to preserve a distinction between matter and the operations of 
the deity, and to avoid eliminating either matter or the deity from the universe 
completely. Priestley accuses Baxter of the former position. According to Priestley, in 
Baxter’s theory the powers of resistance and cohesion are essential to matter; given that 
these powers are the immediate agency of the deity himself,  Baxter is effectively arguing 
that ‘there is not in nature any such thing as matter distinct from the Deity, and his 
operations’.
25
 However, in the second edition of 1782, Priestley seems to distance 
                                                 
23
 Disquisitions, 22.  
24
 Disquisitions, 7. 
25
 Disquisitions, 8. 
 120 
himself from this initial assertion. In section III of the second edition he writes that the 
question of whether the forces of attraction and repulsion inhere in matter or not lies 
beyond the scope of his enquiry:   
 
how far the powers which we ascribe to it [matter] may be said to inhere in, or belong to 
it, or how far they are the effect of a foreign power, viz. that of the deity, concerns not my 
system in particular.
26
  
 
Yet Priestley goes on to say, in defence of the implications of the theory outlined by 
Boscovich, that if, in a Newtonian conception of the universe, everything is understood to 
be the result of the divine agency acting upon matter, it makes little difference to say that 
everything is the divine agency.
27
 In order to resolve the point, Priestley states his own 
position thus: ‘On this hypothesis every thing is the divine power; but still, strictly 
speaking, every thing is not the Deity himself’.
28
 The centres of attraction and repulsion 
are fixed by God and all action is his action, but neither the centres of attraction nor solid 
matter are in any way part of God himself. In this way, Priestley defends himself against 
the accusation of pantheism; he differentiates his own position from being ‘any thing like 
the opinion of Spinoza’ on the grounds that he maintains a distinction between the deity 
and his creation, holding ‘every inferior intelligent being’ to have ‘a consciousness 
distinct from that of the supreme intelligence’.
29
  
 However, Priestley’s redefinition of materialism inevitably leads him to speculate, 
albeit tentatively, that the divine being itself may be material. Yet all that Priestley is 
willing to positively assert here is that the divine being exists in space, and that he has the 
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power of acting upon matter.
30
 In support of the first point, Priestley appeals to the 
testimony of the Scriptures. In section XIV Priestley provides a list of biblical images 
describing the deity, not as immaterial – as the word is understood by contemporary 
metaphysicians – but as something filling or penetrating all things. From this he 
concludes that: 
 
If our modern metaphysicians would attend a little to such passages of scripture as these, 
and consider what must have been the sentiments of the writers, and of those who were 
present at the scenes described in them […] they would not be so much alarmed as they 
now are, or affect to be, at every thing like materiality ascribed even to the Divine 
Being.
31
    
 
He cites the opinions of the Church Fathers Tertullian (c. 160-220), and Clement of 
Alexandria (c. 150-215), which Priestley derived from the French historian Isaac de 
Beausobre (1659-1738), as evidence that this was the idea of the deity held by the earliest 
philosophical Christians.
32
 According to Priestley, these early commentators held the 
deity to be material, and would have been unable to conceive of the concept of 
immaterial substance employed by modern metaphysicians.   
 Having established these arguments on the nature of matter, Priestley proceeds to 
the next point of the Disquisitions. This is largely a restatement of the argument he had 
suggested two years earlier in his prefatory essay to Hartley: that man is composed of a 
uniform substance and that the mental powers are the result of the physical structure of 
the brain. Priestley’s theory of matter gives an added force to this argument. It was 
largely the fact that the properties of inertness and solidity were thought to be 
incompatible with the powers of sensation, perception, and thought that had proved the 
strongest argument against the contention that consciousness could be a property of an 
organised system of matter. Now that matter has been redefined, with the powers of 
attraction and repulsion substituted for the properties of inertness and solidity, this 
objection largely disappears. Drawing again on the authority of his Newtonian method, 
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Priestley argues that, as the powers of sensation, perception, and thought have always 
been found in conjunction with a certain organised system of matter, then we can only 
conclude that those powers depend upon the system, at least until it can be proved that 
the powers are incompatible with other known properties of the same substance.
33
 
Priestley points to the writings of the dissenting minister Joseph Hallet (1692-1744), 
especially Hallet’s discourse ‘Of the Soul’ (1729), as a precedent for his own position. 
However, although Hallet had argued that the immortality of the soul could not be 
deduced from nature, he had accepted the doctrine on the authority of revealed religion.
34
 
Priestley sets out to show that there is no evidence in the Scriptures to support the 
doctrine. This dual reliance on the evidence of Scripture and natural philosophy is in line 
with the method employed by Priestley throughout the Disquisitions. For Priestley, the 
testimony of the Scriptures is of equal authority to the results of the observation of the 
natural world; both the text of the Bible and the investigation of nature reveal accurate 
information about human nature and the nature of the universe. In this way the seemingly 
confusing manner in which Priestley shifts between experimental physics and scriptural 
exegesis is completely consistent with his epistemological framework. In section X 
Priestley thus quotes extensively from the Old and New Testaments in order to prove that 
there is no separate soul and that the thinking powers are the necessary result of the life 
of the body.
35
          
 Priestley continues to refute a number of particular objections to his materialist 
system. Most of his argument here is structured around the seemingly contradictory 
assumption of the immaterialist system that two substances which have no properties in 
common can inexplicably act upon one another. Priestley traces the source of this 
problem to Descartes, the founder of the modern immaterial system, and then dismisses 
some of the ideas suggested by Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz to account for the 
interaction of mind and matter.
36
 What is perhaps most interesting here is that, exactly as 
he had in his refutation of the Scottish ‘common sense’ philosophy, Priestley maintains a 
link between erroneous philosophical notions and the mysteries of orthodox theological 
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doctrine. The inexplicable interaction of two essentially different substances, for 
example, Priestley compares to the theological doctrines of ‘the bread and the wine in the 
Lord’s supper becoming the real body and blood of Christ’ and ‘each of the three persons 
in the Trinity being equally God, and yet there being no more Gods than one’, 
significantly linking the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation with the Protestant (and 
Catholic) doctrine of the Trinity.
37
   
 Priestley continues to defend his thesis against the objections to materialism 
raised by an earlier generation of influential authors, all of whom had featured 
prominently in the philosophical sections of Doddridge’s lecture course. In section VIII, 
for example, Priestley briefly outlines the objections of William Wollaston (objections 
VIII-XI) and Andrew Baxter (objections XII-XIV), followed by his own positions.
38
 This 
is interesting, in that it shows Priestley’s ideas developing in dialogue with thinkers well 
known within the intellectual culture of rational dissent. Yet Priestley also refers 
specifically to some of the objections to his materialism that had been raised by his 
contemporaries, notably Berington.
39
 Most of Priestley’s defences against Berington’s 
criticisms are unclear and only partially developed. However, they seem to rest on the 
assumption that consciousness can be the result of an organised system of parts, without, 
as Berington would hold, necessarily being a property of each part of the system.  
Priestley criticises Berington’s attempt to argue for a physical influence between the body 
and the mind whilst maintaining an essential difference between matter and spirit. For 
Priestley, this hypothesis confounds the two substances, and ‘lays the foundation for the 
grossest materialism’.
40
 In response to Berington’s point that, pursued to its conclusion, 
materialism implies that every separate particle of the brain must be conscious, Priestley 
draws on Hartley’s theory of vibrations to show that, if consciousness depends on a very 
complex vibration, then it ‘cannot possibly belong to a single atom, but must belong to a 
vibrating system, of some extent’.
41
 To Berington’s objection that materialism is 
incompatible with the faculty of judgment, or with any faculty of the mind which 
depends upon comparison, Priestley argues that if, as Berington concedes, there are no 
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ideas in the mind which have not resulted from the state of the brain, then it is 
inconsistent to maintain that certain faculties cannot be traced to their origin in material 
sensations.
42
 However, Priestley subsequently argues, somewhat confusingly, that there is 
no reason to suppose that the brain does not have a super-added percipient or sentient 
power, in addition to its vibrating power, to account for these faculties.
43
 These passages 
are primarily interesting in that the number of references to Berington’s work in the 
Disquisitions suggests that his criticisms had a significant effect on Priestley’s attempts to 
clarify his materialist system.        
 From Priestley’s theses on materialism and the uniform composition of man 
follow a number of secondary, but no less important, theological contentions. It is here 
that one key intention of the Disquisitions becomes most explicit: Priestley’s rejection of 
dualism clears the way for a rational interpretation (by which Priestley means both 
systematic and free from inexplicable mysteries) of the Bible. His materialist system 
provides Priestley with the epistemological and ontological foundation for his Socinian 
theology. In section VI Priestley argues that on his system all kinds of problematic 
questions haunting orthodox theology – what happens to the soul during sleep, whether 
the soul unites with the body at birth or during copulation, whether animals have 
immortal souls – simply disappear. More importantly, Priestley attributes to the system of 
immaterialism the development of a number of false theological doctrines, among them 
the Catholic ideas of purgatory and the worship of the dead, the Gnostic idea of the pre-
existence of human souls, and the modern idea, derived from this, of the pre-existence of 
Christ, all of which have obscured the scriptural doctrine of Unitarian Christianity. All of 
these false doctrines are swept away by Priestley’s materialist system. To the refutation 
of this last point (the pre-existence of Christ) Priestley devotes a number of sections of 
the work. The interpolation of the doctrine into Christianity is, according to Priestley, 
perhaps ‘the greatest disservice that the introduction of philosophy [into Christianity] 
ever did’.
44
  
 The argument that man is wholly material is also consistent with Priestley’s ideas 
on the resurrection. Priestley’s mortalist thesis, essentially a fusion of his materialist 
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epistemology with a literalist reading of the New Testament, held that the whole man dies 
and is resurrected by God by a miraculous intervention at a designated future time. This 
is largely a development of Edmund Law’s and Francis Blackburne’s idea of the sleep of 
the soul.
45
 However, the key point for Priestley is that the soul is not naturally immortal. 
In section XIII Priestley argues that death ought to be understood as a decomposition of 
physical parts resulting in the extinction, but not the annihilation, of the whole man.
46
 At 
the resurrection the deity recomposes these physical parts so that the same body, or what 
Priestley (following Bonnet) calls ‘the germ of the organical body’, rises again.
47
 This, 
Priestley argues, is consistent with the doctrine of the resurrection as described by St Paul 
in 1 Corinthians 15. In the second half of the work, Priestley constructs an elaborate 
historical argument developing the idea that immaterialism and the resulting theological 
doctrines relating to a separate and immortal soul were accretions into early Christianity 
stemming from the Alexandrine Church Fathers’ synthesis of Christian doctrine and the 
Oriental philosophy which they had inherited from the Greeks.
48
 In this respect, Priestley 
is following in a number of intellectual traditions, including that of early eighteenth-
century free-thinkers such as John Toland (1670-1722), whose Letters to Serena (1704) 
he quotes, and that of the dissenting minister and academy tutor Theophilus Gale (1628-
1679), whose Philosophia Generalis (1676) Priestley quotes in the Disquisitions.
49
 Much 
of the historical argument Priestley derived from the Continental ecclesiastical historians 
Beausobre, Louis Ellies Dupin (1657-1719), Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1694-1755), 
and Jacques Basnage (1653-1723). 
 It is important to remember that although these theological points appear to follow 
secondarily from the principal philosophical contentions, Priestley himself understood 
them as an important, if not the most important, part of the work. This is well illustrated 
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by a letter which Priestley wrote to Joshua Toulmin (1740-1815), dissenting minister at 
Mary Street General Baptist Chapel, Taunton, in December 1776. In the letter Priestley 
informed Toulmin of the recent publication of the Disquisitions. His subsequent comment 
shows that he conceived of the argument of the book in both philosophical and 
theological terms; from the thesis that man is a wholly material being it immediately 
follows that the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ is false: ‘You will easily guess the 
principal design of it [the Disquisitions]’, Priestley told Toulmin, 
 
but it has rather a greater extent than the title speaks […] You will not easily imagine the 
connexion; but one great object of the book is to combat the doctrine of pre-existence, 
and especially that of our Saviour.
50
 
           
This understanding of the book as a theological work is reflected in other comments in 
the letters of Priestley’s circle. Toulmin subsequently told Joseph Bretland (1742-1819) 
that Priestley himself had claimed the work would throw ‘great light on the Socinian 
controversy’.
51
 Lindsey evidently understood the theological aspect of the book to be 
paramount: he wrote to William Turner in September 1776, referring to the Disquisitions 
as ‘a tract on the mortality of the soul’.
52
 As we shall see, this theological aspect of the 
work remained at the forefront of discussions of the book among Priestley’s 
acquaintances. Before examining some of these letters in more detail, however, it is 
necessary to consider one further aspect of Priestley’s ideas.   
  
Priestley on philosophical necessity 
 
In an appendix to the Disquisitions, which essentially constitutes a second volume, 
Priestley outlined at length his theory of philosophical necessity. For Priestley, this 
followed as the direct consequence of the propositions established in the former work: 
‘the doctrine of necessity’ is ‘the immediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of 
                                                 
50
 Rutt, I, i, 296.  
51
 Rutt, I, i, 306.  
52
 Ditchfield, 230. 
 127 
man; for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism’.
53
 In Priestley’s mind, 
both his materialism and his necessitarianism were fully consistent with his Socianian 
theology, and all three could be proved from the observation of the natural world and a 
rational interpretation of the Scriptures.
54
  
 Priestley’s use of the term ‘mechanism’ belies his debt to Hartley; his definition 
of philosophical necessity does not differ significantly from Hartley’s account of the 
‘Mechanism or Necessity of human actions’ as described in chapter 1.
55
 The defining 
features of Priestley’s necessitarianism can be conveniently summarised in three points.
56
 
Firstly, Priestley argues that the will, as do all other powers of the human mind, operates 
according to some fixed law of nature. In this way, he is continuing Hartley’s project, as 
he understood it, to apply the method pioneered by Newton for the study of the natural 
world to the analysis of the human mind. Secondly, Priestley holds that motives influence 
the mind in a definite and invariable manner so that volitions are always determined by a 
preceding motive in exactly the same way in which effects are always preceded by causes 
in the operations of the natural world. Thirdly, Priestley argues that the whole chain of 
necessity can be traced to a first cause, the Deity, who sets the entire process in motion in 
accord with his benevolent intentions for humanity. In defence of this necessitarian 
position, Priestley argues, against the libertarians, that the only sense of liberty which he 
denies is the liberty of choosing between two or more different courses of action whilst 
the previous circumstances (which Priestley defines as the agent’s ‘state of mind’ and 
‘views of things’) remain the same.
57
  
 The argument in support of necessitarianism upon which Priestley places most 
emphasis is that of cause and effect. In fact, Priestley argues that the whole doctrine of 
necessity can be proved solely on this point.
58
 His argument here depends on the 
continuity he assumes between the operations of the intellectual and natural worlds.
59
 He 
charges the libertarian with holding that effects can occur without preceding causes, a 
position ultimately destructive of all reasoning, firstly, because it inevitably leads to the 
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conclusion that no fixed laws operate in the mental sphere and, secondly, because it 
undermines the only argument for the being of a God.
60
 Priestley’s insistence that a 
universal law governs both body and mind leads him to ignore the distinction, 
fundamental to many eighteenth-century libertarians (including Berington and Price), 
between ‘moral’ and ‘physical’ necessity. To Berington’s argument, for example, that the 
‘moral influence of motives is as certain, though not as necessitating as is the physical 
cause’, Priestley replies that this distinction is ‘merely verbal’; as long as the mind acts 
‘certainly’, ‘invariably’, or ‘constantly’ in relation to motives then the necessitarian 
argument holds good.
61
 
 Most of the second half of Priestley’s work is concerned with defending the moral 
consequences of his necessitarian doctrine. In sections VII and VIII, Priestley attempts to 
show that only the doctrine of necessity provides a stable foundation for the propriety of 
administering rewards and punishments or praise and blame.
62
 The purpose of both 
reward and punishment being to encourage habits and dispositions of mind conducive to 
virtuous action, the function of both becomes obsolete if, as in the libertarian scheme, an 
agent can act independently of all motives. If, Priestley argues, the power of self-
determination is capable of counteracting all dispositions or habits then it effectively 
loses its relation to morality.
63
 To the criticism that the theory of necessity leads to 
fatalism, Priestley replies, somewhat opaquely, that our own actions and determinations 
are necessary links in the causal chain.
64
 In section IX, Priestley follows Hartley in 
arguing that virtue is only further encouraged by the conviction that God is the sole cause 
of all things.
65
 In the necessitarian scheme, ‘we see God in every thing, and may be said 
to see every thing in God’; this naturally produces humility and annihilates the tendency 
to bear ill-will towards others.
66
 To the necessitarian, ‘the idea of real absolute evil 
wholly disappears’ since all apparent evils are recognised as contributory to ‘the greater 
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good’, being necessary links in a divinely ordained system.
67
 Priestley does not flinch 
from the fact that this makes God the author of sin.
68
 However, he maintains the moral 
goodness of God on the grounds that God’s intentions are benevolent. For Priestley, even  
apparent evil perpetuated by God is morally justified as long as the consequence is 
happiness: ‘Whatever terminates in good, philosophically speaking, is good’.
69
 On these 
grounds, Priestley defends the moral consequences of the necessitarian scheme against 
Hume (who, Priestley claims, indicts God with moral turpitude) and Hobbes (who 
justifies the divine conduct on account of power, rather than benevolence).
70
 
Furthermore, Priestley refutes any potential objections to his thesis by claiming that any 
scheme which acknowledges the divine prescience unavoidably makes God the author of 
sin. He refuses to acknowledge the distinction advanced by Wollaston, and repeated by 
Berington, between God’s foreseeing an event and God’s being the cause of that event.
71
  
 Priestley is here explicit on the position he had reached on the question of the 
foundation of virtue. In an important passage, he writes that: ‘the proper foundation, or 
rather the ultimate object, of virtue is general utility, since it consists of such conduct, as 
tends to make intelligent creatures the most truly happy’.
72
 What is interesting about this 
statement is that, from the very outset, Priestley can effectively eschew the question 
concerning the ‘foundation’ of virtue and focus instead on its ‘object’. Priestley’s 
empiricism commits him to abandoning the possibility that an a priori conception of 
God’s nature – as opposed to an active idea of God’s will as manifested in the physical 
universe – could act as the foundation of moral action.
73
 Having established, from a 
reasoned analysis of the natural world and from Scripture, that the deity is concerned 
with promoting the happiness of his creatures, it follows that to act virtuously is simply to 
act in accordance with the will of the deity, that is to act in a way which produces the 
greatest amount of happiness both for oneself and for others. 
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 As was the case in relation to his materialism, Priestley is at pains to stress that 
his necessitarianism is sanctioned by the doctrine of the Scriptures. In section XI he lists 
several passages from the Old and New Testaments to show that God was considered by 
the sacred writers as the author of the works of men, both good and evil. Even the death 
of Christ is always spoken of in the gospel accounts as being ‘most expressly decreed’ 
and ‘appointed by God’.
74
 Priestley is also keen to stress that such events are most often 
represented as coming to pass, not by divine intervention, but in the common course of 
providence.
75
 Although this does not prove that the sacred writers were necessitarians, in 
the sense in which Priestley has defined the term, it does illustrate that they regarded God 
as the ultimate cause of all events. 
 In the final section of the work, Priestley attempts to distinguish his own 
philosophical necessity from the doctrine of predestination held by the Calvinists. 
Although the two schemes may be ostensibly similar in some respects, the only genuine 
point of comparison between them is that both hold that the future happiness or misery of 
all men is foreknown by the Deity.
76
 According to Priestley, the essential difference 
between them concerns their respective attitudes to man’s role within this scheme; the 
doctrine of philosophical necessity assigns a more active part to the agent than Calvinist 
doctrine. Whereas in the necessitarian system man’s actions and dispositions are ‘the 
necessary and sole means of his present and future happiness’, in the Calvinist scheme 
man, being in his nature sinful and unregenerate, is wholly passive in the act of 
regeneration.
77
 The difference is that necessitarianism allows for the gradual education 
and perfectibility of man as he strives towards his own happiness by conforming his 
actions to the will of God, whereas Calvinism allows only for the passive reception of 
God’s grace through a wholly arbitrary act of divine intervention. Priestley’s principal 
focus here is on the moral effects which each doctrine is likely to have on its adherents. 
Whereas the Calvinist is unlikely to give any attention to his moral conduct, his personal 
happiness being wholly dependent on the arbitrary will of the deity, the necessitarian will 
exert himself to the utmost, as he knows that his exertions directly and necessarily 
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determine his happiness. The necessitarian, as defined by Priestley, further rejects the 
doctrines of original sin and atonement. Calvinism rejects the popular sense of free will, 
i.e. the power of doing as we please, and in this sense cannot be reconciled with the 
doctrine of Scripture. Priestley thus identifies the true doctrine of philosophical necessity 
as a relatively recent development, and credits Thomas Hobbes with its first clear 
expression.
78
 Among the Calvinists only the American Congregationalist Jonathan 
Edwards (1703-1758) and the Church of England clergyman Augustus Toplady (1740-
1778) have come close to expressing the true philosophical doctrine of necessity, and yet 
their own systems, Priestley argues, would be virtually unrecognisable to most 
Calvinists.
79
  
 
Philosophical debate in Priestley’s and his circle’s correspondence 
 
Priestley’s decision to clarify the distinction between his own system and the 
predestination of the Calvinists was most likely prompted by a letter he had received 
from Augustus Toplady following the publication of his Examination.
80
 Toplady strongly 
commended Priestley’s refutation, as he saw it, of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, but rebuked 
him for his occasional criticisms of the Calvinists, who, he advised Priestley, ‘so far as 
concerns the article of necessity, are your actual friends and allies’.
81
 Priestley 
subsequently sent Toplady a copy of the Disquisitions, requesting his correspondent’s 
opinion of the work. Toplady replied that he agreed wholeheartedly with Priestley’s 
necessitarianism but found his materialism ‘equally absurd in itself, and Atheistical in its 
tendency’.
82
 Toplady was particularly critical of Priestley’s attempt to find scriptural 
support for his materialist thesis: ‘if we take scripture into account’, observed Toplady, 
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‘not all the subtlety, nor all the violence of criticism, will ever be able to establish your 
system on that ground’.
83
               
 In fact, Priestley’s letters reveal many more interesting details concerning the 
immediate responses to, and the composition of, the Disquisitions. In the previous 
chapter, I depicted Priestley, in his development of Hartleian sensationalism and in his 
polemical rejection of Scottish common sense theories, as pursuing a somewhat isolated 
intellectual trajectory within rational dissent. Yet Priestley’s and his circle’s surviving 
correspondence from the late 1770s and early 1780s indicates that his radical ideas on 
materialism and philosophical necessity were being developed within a small network of 
likeminded dissenting ministers. A number of these figures played an important 
collaborative role, corresponding with Priestley on particular aspects of the work. In 1778 
Priestley prepared a selection of ‘Illustrations of some Particulars in the Disquisitions on 
Matter and Spirit’ in response to remarks he had received on copies of his work 
circulated among his acquaintances prior to its publication. In the ‘Illustrations’ he noted 
that he had ‘put copies of the work [i.e. the Disquisitions], after it was printed off, into 
the hands of several of my friends, both well and ill affected to my general system, that I 
might have the benefit of their remarks, and take advantage of them’.
84
 These 
‘Illustrations’ themselves were then circulated among Priestley’s acquaintances who had 
read the Disquisitions.
85
 
 One of the most important of these correspondents was Newcome Cappe. The 
extant details of Cappe’s biography suggest that he had followed a similar intellectual 
trajectory to Priestley, developing his system of Christianity in response to the criticisms 
of unbelievers. At Northampton under Doddridge, Cappe had carefully studied the 
English and French Deists, concluding that their strictures were levelled only at the false 
accretions to Christianity.
86
 Despite his time at Glasgow and connections with Leechman 
and Smith, he does not appear to have been drawn to Hutcheson’s moral sense theory or, 
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unlike Walker, Kenrick, or Wodrow, to have had much interest in Scottish philosophy.
87
 
According to his wife, Cappe, like Priestley, studied Hartley’s Observations closely, 
leaving among his papers extensive shorthand notes on Hartley’s theory; he thought ‘very 
highly’ of the work and even intended to produce a new edition.
88
 Between the years 
1761 and 1785 Cappe corresponded ‘very frequently’ with Priestley.
89
 What has survived 
of these letters testifies not only to shared intellectual concerns between them, but also to 
active collaboration on Priestley’s theological and philosophical works dating back to the 
early 1770s.  
 One particular example of this collaboration concerns the manuscript of a set of 
theological lectures which later became the first printed volume of Priestley’s Institutes, 
published in 1772.
90
 In December 1770 Priestley was in the process of preparing the 
manuscript to be sent to the printers. In a letter to Lindsey of the same month, he 
expressed his hope that Lindsey had seen the lectures, subsequently instructing him to 
forward them to Cappe at York, who, he wrote, ‘is to peruse them before they come back 
to me’.
91
 By January of the next year, the manuscript was back in Priestley’s possession. 
A number of later comments by Priestley suggest that Cappe’s suggestions had a 
significant influence on the final text.
92
 The second volume of the Institutes evidently 
passed through this same process of collaborative revision. Priestley wrote to Cappe in 
February 1772 asking him to read the work.
93
 Cappe evidently agreed: Priestley wrote to 
Lindsey in May requesting him to ‘look into’ what he had written of the second volume 
of the Institutes, noting that ‘The papers are at present in Mr Cappe’s hands’.
94
 Cappe’s 
suggestions were delayed for over two years as a result of problems he was experiencing 
with his eyesight.
95
 In March 1774 Priestley told Cappe that he valued his remarks so 
much that he would rather wait for half a year than proceed without them. He assured 
Cappe: 
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I am so truly sensible of your superior judgment in these things, that there is hardly a hint 
that you have suggested which I have not adopted in what is yet printed of the 
Institutes.
96
 
 
 Following his return from the continent in January 1775, Priestley wrote to Cappe 
with news of the publication of his edition of Hartley. Priestley told Cappe on this 
occasion that he would have done ‘nothing in the metaphysical way’ without seeking 
Cappe’s advice, were it not for Cappe’s continuing health problems. He continued: ‘there 
is none of my acquaintance that I could expect to enter into my views so much as 
yourself, and who is at the same time so capable of assisting me’, and assured Cappe that 
he would send him manuscript drafts of all of his future publications.
97
 In April 1777 
Priestley wrote informing Cappe of his progress on the Disquisitions. The letter indicates 
that Cappe, although accepting the doctrine of necessity, was not willing to follow 
Priestley in developing Hartley’s associationism into a complete theory of materialism: 
 
I have now in the press a pretty large metaphysical work, as mentioned in the list of my 
books in the volume on Air. It is written with great freedom, and I flatter myself you will 
not dislike the latter part of it, which contains my illustrations of the doctrine of 
necessity, though you will hardly go with me through the other, in which I endeavour to 
prove that man has no soul besides his brain; yet Mr Lindsey and Mr. Jebb, who have 
seen the whole work, agree with me in every thing. I mean to have it printed some time 
before it be published, and shall send you one of the first copies, to have the benefit of 
your remarks.
98
      
 
Five months later, Priestley wrote to Cappe requesting him to proof-read the work, and 
emphasising again the potential differences in their opinions.
99
 Notwithstanding these 
differences, however, Priestley’s comments suggest that Cappe’s criticisms and 
suggestions had a significant influence on the development of his ideas. A number of the 
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passages in the ‘Illustrations’ clarifying Priestley’s materialist system were most likely 
responses to some of the points raised by Cappe.  
 Priestley’s surviving letters to Joseph Bretland, dissenting minister at Exeter, also 
indicate that the correspondence between them included a substantial discussion of 
philosophical topics.
100
 Bretland had studied at the second dissenting academy at Exeter 
under Micaijah Towgood (1700-1792), Samuel Merivale (1715-1771), and John Hogg;
101
 
he later became a dissenting minister at the Mint Meeting House where he adopted 
Unitarian principles, denying the Trinity and affirming the humanity of Christ. In 1773 
Bretland wrote to Priestley outlining his objections to the doctrine of the penetrability of 
matter, a summary of which he had most likely read in Priestley’s History of Vision, 
Light, and Colours.
102
 Unfortunately, Bretland’s original letter does not appear to have 
survived, yet it is possible to glean something of his opinions from two extant replies 
from Priestley. On 7 March, Priestley wrote to Bretland, noting that ‘The objections you 
make to the hypothesis of the penetrability of matter are very ingenious, and not easily 
answered’.
103
 Priestley responded to Bretland’s objections by explaining the nominalism 
informing Michell’s theory of matter: 
 
Mr. Michell supposes that wherever the properties or powers of any substance are, there 
is the substance itself, something that we call substance being necessary to the support of 
any properties; but what any substance is, devoid of all properties, we cannot, from the 
nature of the thing, have any idea whatever; since all the notices that we receive of any 
substance are communicated to us by means of its properties, and such as bear some 
relation to our senses, which are the inlets to all our knowledge. And any property may be 
ascribed to any substance that does not suppose the absence of some other property.
104
 
  
Bretland, like Cappe, was clearly an admirer of Hartley’s philosophy. Priestley wrote to 
Bretland again in December 1777, noting that ‘of all my acquaintance, I consider you as 
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most likely to enter deeply into Hartley’s theory, and contribute to the farther 
investigation of that important subject’. Bretland had evidently written to Priestley 
previously explaining his understanding of Hartley’s theory; Priestley continues, in a 
rather pedagogical tone: ‘I am satisfied from what you say that you clearly understand his 
theory, which few do, and are apprised of the very extensive application of it’. Despite 
his concerns over the force theory of matter, Bretland, presumably under the influence of 
Hartley, had, at least to Priestley’s mind, adopted the necessitarian scheme. Priestley told 
Bretland to expect copies of the Disquisitions and Philosophical Necessity through his 
bookseller Joseph Johnson, predicting that, although the work would ‘rather shock and 
offend many of [his] friends’, Bretland might be more receptive to its arguments: ‘Many’, 
wrote Priestley, ‘cannot be reconciled to the doctrine of Necessity; but thus, if I mistake 
not, you have long been with me’.
105
 Bretland subsequently read and drafted a series of 
remarks on the Disquisitions which he then sent to Priestley. In June 1778, Priestley 
wrote to Bretland thanking him for these remarks, noting that they were ‘very ingenious’, 
and promising to use them when he revised the work.
106
  Bretland was not the only of 
Priestley’s correspondents to raise questions concerning Michell’s and Boscovich’s 
theories. ‘Almost every body’, Priestley told Bretland in the same letter, ‘smiles at my 
notion of matter’.
107
 In a set of ‘Additional Illustrations’ Priestley recorded that ‘Several 
of my friends have proposed to me queries concerning the physical indivisible points, of 
which I have sometimes supposed matter to consist’.
108
 The long passage on the nature of 
matter in this section is almost certainly Priestley’s reply to the queries raised by Bretland 
and others on this topic.
109
 Priestley’s surviving correspondence with Bretland and Cappe 
thus provides a glimpse into the way in which his ideas on materialism and philosophical 
necessity were developed in dialogue with other rational dissenters in his circle.   
 Beyond Priestley’s immediate circle of correspondents his ideas on materialism 
and philosophical necessity generated lively debate. Among those to whom Priestley sent 
a copy of the Disquisitions was Joshua Toulmin. A letter from Toulmin to Bretland of 30 
December 1777 demonstrates that Toulmin was, at first, equivocal in his endorsement of 
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Priestley’s ideas.
110
 The letter illustrates that Toulmin was concerned that Priestley had 
not done enough to disassociate necessitarianism from infidelity. The practical 
application of the doctrine of philosophical necessity, Toulmin felt, could be problematic: 
he enquired of Bretland ‘what answer [Priestley] would give to a drunkard, or any other 
vicious character, whom he was tenderly admonishing, that should allege the plea of 
necessity to extenuate his guilt’.
111
 Eight months later, however, Toulmin had evidently 
become more receptive to Priestley’s ideas. On 19 August 1778 he admitted to John 
Sturch (d. 1794), minister to the Pyle Street congregation, Newport, that Priestley’s 
argument for philosophical necessity had made him ‘more than half a convert to his 
scheme’. Concerning the doctrine of materialism, Toulmin felt that ‘the Phenomena of 
human nature appears to me to give, at least, great support to [Priestley’s] Idea of the 
human constitution’. Toulmin subsequently commented that ‘[t]he Historical part of [the] 
book on Spirit relative to the rise of the notion of X’s pre-existence’ seemed ‘particularly 
to merit the attention & consideration of those who embrace that sentiment’, despite his 
opinion that the historical sections of the book were ‘independent of the truth or 
falsehood of [the] general theory concerning Matter and Spirit’.
112
 There is some further 
evidence that Priestley’s ideas were well received among Unitarians in the south-west. In 
July 1779 Priestley travelled to Lympstone near Exeter to preach his sermon The 
Doctrine of Divine Influence on the Human Mind at the ordination of Thomas Jervis. As I 
have shown in chapter 1, the sermon attempted to illustrate Hartley’s theory of the 
mechanistic nature of the mind through an analysis of two New Testament parables.
113
 
Priestley recorded in a letter to Lindsey that he had ‘found many steady Socinians and 
several Materialists’ in the region.
114
 Others, however, were more resistant to Priestley’s 
ideas: Micaijah Towgood, minister of George’s Meeting in Exeter and an Arian, who had 
been present at Jervis’s ordination, withdrew his original request to print the ordination 
sermon as he imagined it was ‘intended to support the doctrine of Necessity’.
115
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 Lindsey served as something of a publicist for Priestley, keeping a network of 
correspondents across the country informed of Priestley’s literary activities. In December 
1777 Lindsey wrote to Tayleur recommending Priestley’s Disquisitions.
116
 Tayleur 
subsequently read the work, but whether he was convinced by Priestley’s arguments is 
unclear. In his reply to Lindsey he predicted, correctly, that Priestley’s materialism would 
meet with forceful resistance as a result of its theological implications:  
 
They who admit the true scriptural doctrine concerning death and the resurrection of the 
dead, and who attend to common appearances, would perhaps easily allow the probability 
of Dr. Priestley’s hypothesis with respect to the nature of man, did it not strike at the root 
of the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ.  
 
On Priestley’s doctrine of philosophical necessity, Tayleur was more overtly sceptical: ‘I 
do not expect to see the subject cleared’, he admitted to Lindsey, ‘till learned men agree 
about the words will, volition, willing, &c. Dr. P. commends so highly Collins’s tract, that 
I wonder he takes no notice of Dr. Clarke’s answer to it’.
117
  
 A more detailed response to Priestley’s necessitarianism and its theological 
implications can be found in a letter from James Wodrow to Samuel Kenrick.
118
 On 22 
October 1784 Wodrow informed Kenrick that he had ‘been reading last week D
r 
Priestley’s book on Necessity which is a very clear & strong book on that side of the 
Question’. Wodrow had presumably not encountered any of the published responses to 
Priestley’s argument; he told Kenrick of his surprise that ‘nobody has answered it in 
England’, conjecturing that ‘the learned think the subject exhausted’. Wodrow had 
studied the history of the debate over the freedom of the will as a philosophy student 
under Hutcheson in the 1740s. He complained to Kenrick that he had found very little of 
novelty in Priestley’s arguments, excepting the way in which Priestley had attempted to 
connect his necessitarianism with a mechanistic theory of the mind; in this respect, 
Wodrow told Kenrick, Priestley had ‘added something to those who have gone before 
him & exhibited a more consistent and complete System than any other necessitarian’. 
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Wodrow was inclined towards libertarianism. Although he had inherited a necessitarian 
position from Hutcheson, he had subsequently changed his mind (in the opposite 
direction to Priestley) to embrace the doctrine of philosophical liberty. Wodrow admitted, 
however, to being ‘apt sometimes to look upon it as a metaphysical nicety about which 
both sides are agreed if they understood one another or a Question out of the reach of the 
human mind which can never be decided’. Interestingly, Wodrow found Priestley’s 
attempt to anchor his necessitarian theory within a theological framework the most 
compelling aspect of the work; he told Kenrick that ‘D
r
. P
r
. chap
r
. on Prescience & his 
connecting his necessity with religion & Piety pleased me better than //perhaps// any 
other part of the book’. However, Wodrow subsequently raises the problematic point that 
Priestley’s necessitarianism excludes any particular agency of the deity from the 
workings of the universe. He questions whether Priestley’s view that the divine being is 
the only agent in nature is, in effect, any different from conflating nature and the deity, 
whether Priestley’s God is any different from ‘the Nature about which the Atheists speak 
so much’. ‘If there really be an absolute invariable irresistible fatality’, Wodrow asked 
Kenrick, ‘what sort of Providence, care or agency continues to be exercised about the 
Universe by its maker?’ Woodrow continues: 
 
His work //of Providence// is over & was from all eternity The machine once set a going 
can never go wrong & he seems to remain not as the supreme director & governor but[?] 
spectator of its invariable motions.
119
  
 
Wodrow proceeds to quote a passage from Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura describing the 
separation between man and the deity.
120
 The point he is making is, presumably, that 
Priestley’s theory, although intended to reconcile philosophy and revelation, could as 
                                                 
119
 Wodrow to Kenrick, 22 October 1784, DWL MS 24.157 (84). Samuel Badcock had made a very similar 
point four years earlier, see Badcock, A Slight Sketch, 27-8. For a modern account of Priestley’s 
materialism in the context of Epicureanism see Matthew Niblett, ‘Man, Morals, and Matter: Epicurus and 
Materialist Thought in England from John Toland to Joseph Priestley’, in Epicureanism in the 
Enlightenment, ed. Neven Leddy and Avi Lifschitz (Oxford, forthcoming, 2009), 43-60, esp. 56-60. 
120
 The passage that Wodrow quotes is from De Rerum Natura, II, ll. 646-65. It reads, in the Loeb 
translation, ‘For the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far 
removed and separated from our troubles; for without any pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own 
resources, needing us not at all, it is neither propitiated with services nor touched by wrath’, Lucretius, De 
Rerum Natura, II, ll. 646-65, Loeb edn, trans. W. H. D. Rouse (London, 1924), 131. 
 140 
easily lead to a form of philosophical deism, or even to atheism. In the final part of 
Wodrow’s letter, he reflected on Priestley’s attempt to distinguish his own theory from 
that of the Calvinists. Wodrow was here unimpressed: ‘In the chapter on the Difference 
between his own Oppinion and Predestination I am afraid he scarce does justice to the 
poor Calvinists’. He criticised Priestley for introducing the Calvinist positions on original 
sin, despite the fact that these were, strictly speaking, irrelevant to their defence of 
philosophical necessity. Like Toplady, Wodrow evidently thought little of Priestley’s 
recourse to scriptural arguments; the arguments from Scripture in support of his own 
theory, Wodrow observed, Priestley ‘very wisely neglects or gives up’.
121
     
 However, Lindsey’s letters in particular do suggest that Priestley’s ideas, 
particularly his theory of philosophical necessity, were, in the months following the 
publication of the Disquisitions, gaining converts among rational dissenters. In the letter 
to Tayleur, Lindsey continues to describe Priestley’s necessitarianism as ‘a doctrine to 
w
h
. D
r
 Hartley’s work has inclined many’.
122
 Priestley himself, in October 1778, observed 
that a ‘great majority of the more intelligent, serious, and virtuous, of my acquaintance 
among men of letters, are necessarians’.
123
 In April of the same year, he told the 
dissenting minister at Kendal, Caleb Rotheram (1738-1796), who thought differently to 
Priestley on materialism and necessity, that he had ‘many respectable abettors’.
124
 Early 
in 1778 Lindsey wrote again to Tayleur informing him that, at least according to Joseph 
Johnson, ‘D
r
 Priestley’s Disquisitions and Appendix have sold very well’.
125
 Four months 
later in May 1778 Lindsey told William Turner that the Disquisitions ‘continue to sell 
well, and are generally well received, much better than was expected’.
126
  
 However, one very significant rational dissenter in Priestley’s circle was not won 
over by Priestley’s arguments. Both the most voluminous and the most critical of 
Priestley’s correspondents was the dissenting minister Richard Price. Between May and 
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October of 1778 Price and Priestley exchanged a number of letters on the Disquisitions 
which were later published, along with the ‘Illustrations’ and three letters by Priestley to 
others of his antagonists Samuel Kenrick, John Whitehead, and Samuel Horsley, as A 
Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism, and Philosophical Necessity (1778). 
Before turning to these letters themselves, however, it is necessary to consider in some 
detail the prior development of Price’s own philosophical system.     
 
Richard Price, Priestley, and the Scots  
 
The philosophical work of Richard Price, although little studied by recent historians of 
philosophy, has received substantial critical attention.
127
 In the following section I shall 
confine myself to two aspects of Price’s thought: firstly, I will show how Price developed 
a position fundamentally opposed to Priestley on the subjects of moral philosophy, the 
freedom of the will, and materialism, and then explain how these differences informed 
the debate between them in the 1778 correspondence; secondly, I will explore Price’s 
connections with the Scots in order to extend the picture of intellectual links between the 
Scots and the English rational dissenters developed in the previous two chapters. 
 Price’s principal contribution to eighteenth-century philosophy was A Review of 
the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758).
128
 The starting point for 
Price’s work on ethics is his opposition to Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, and here, at 
                                                 
127
 David Fate Norton and Manfred Kuehn refer briefly and dismissively to Price’s ‘dogmatic and 
outmoded platonism’ in their chapter, ‘The Foundations of Morality’, in Haakonssen (2006), vol. II, 941-
86, 971. Much academic study of Price in the twentieth century was stimulated by the work of D. D. 
Raphael, who edited a reprint of the third edition of Price’s Review in 1948. A new impression of this 
edition was published in 1974. Raphael’s introduction provides a good summary of Price’s philosophical 
system: see Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, ed. D. D. Raphael (Oxford, 
1974), xiv-lii. The second impression contains a fairly extensive bibliography of secondary sources on 
Price published prior to 1974. The most important commentaries on Price’s philosophy since 1974 are D. 
O. Thomas, The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price (Oxford, 1977), especially chapters 
2-4 which consider the theological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of Price’s philosophy; Rivers, vol. 
II, 227-37. See also John Stephens, ‘The Epistemological Strategy of Price’s Review of Morals’, E&D, 5 
(1986), 39-50; ‘Conscience and the Epistemology of Morals: Richard Price’s Debt to Joseph Butler’, E&D, 
19 (2000), 133-46; Nicholas Hunt-Bull, ‘Richard Price and Francis Hutcheson: Does a Moral Sense Theory 
make Ethics Arbitrary?’, E&D, 23 (2004-7), 24-44; Niblett, ‘Moral Philosophy, Republican Thought, and 
the Intellectual Culture of Liberal Dissent in England’, 58-94.  
128
 A corrected second edition of the work appeared in 1769 and a third edition, with further corrections and 
an Appendix containing additional notes and a ‘Dissertation on the Deity’, in 1787. The third edition 
omitted the words ‘and Difficulties’ from the title. Quotations here will be from Raphael’s 1977 edition, 
unless otherwise stated. 
 142 
least, Price and Priestley are on common ground. Like Priestley, Price objects to 
Hutcheson’s theory because it grounds morality on a sense, and thus makes our 
knowledge of right and wrong dependent on ‘an implanted and arbitrary principle’.
129
 
However, whereas Priestley was never explicitly clear, in any philosophical sense, about 
why he objected to an innate moral sense, Price explains his aversion to the theory in 
some detail. His problem is that grounding our ideas of right and wrong in a moral sense 
makes moral rectitude signify nothing in the objects themselves but only certain effects 
produced in us by the contemplation of particular actions. This makes virtue arbitrary in 
the sense that the opposite actions might have excited the same effects if God had only 
chosen to form us one way rather than another. For Price, this makes Hutcheson’s theory 
wholly unsatisfactory. Rejecting the idea of the moral sense, therefore, he poses the 
question: ‘What is the power within us that perceives the distinctions of right and 
wrong?’, to which Price’s own solution is ‘the UNDERSTANDING’.
130
 Here, again, it 
may seem as though Price and Priestley are pursuing a similar project in that they are 
both attempting to formulate a rational explanation of moral judgments in opposition to 
explanations grounded on a moral sense. However, it soon becomes clear that the way 
they go about this is radically different. 
 Whereas Priestley had attempted to refute the moral sense theory by placing a 
greater emphasis on the process of sense perception and by providing a rational and 
theologically grounded explanation of the workings of this process through his adoption 
of Hartley’s theory of association, Price had attempted to break the link between morality 
and sense perception altogether, aligning moral judgments more closely with the rational 
processes of the mind itself. In the first chapter of the Review, Price develops his own 
concept of the understanding, which essentially constitutes a criticism of the whole 
Lockeian system of epistemology. At the outset of his work, Price defines the 
understanding as ‘the faculty within us that discerns truth, and that compares all the 
objects of thought, and judges of them’.
131
 However, the understanding, for Price, has a 
more extensive role than that of merely reasoning, in the sense of compounding, dividing, 
abstracting, or enlarging ideas previously in the mind. The understanding is capable of 
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generating wholly new ideas, and in this sense is distinct from either of the two Lockeian 
faculties of sensation or reflection. Price contends that many of our most important 
simple ideas – among them he lists notions used in physics including substance, duration, 
space, infinity, contingency, and causation – are perceived intuitively by the 
understanding.
132
 He follows Hume in arguing that by observation we can infer only the 
constant conjunction of events, not a necessary connection between them; however, Price 
goes on to assert that an intuitive perception of the understanding leads us to the certainty 
that one event is the cause of another.
133
 Similarly, for Price, sense experience can only 
discover the accidents and sensible qualities of things; it is only through an intuition of 
the understanding that we can discover the distinction between substance and accident. A 
good indication of the difference between Price and Priestley here is the way in which 
they respectively appeal to Newton’s laws in support of their different epistemological 
systems. Priestley, as we have seen, constantly appeals to Newton to sanction his own 
empirical method. For Price, Newton’s three laws of motion owe very little to experience, 
for no one has ever observed any portion of matter devoid of gravity, or any body that 
would acquire motion after the impressing of a new force upon it without any 
discoverable cause. Newton’s laws must thus be attributed to a wholly different faculty, 
and one vastly superior to the faculty of sense.
134
      
 To the power of the understanding Price also attributes our ideas of moral right 
and wrong. These are, in Price’s scheme, simple ideas, perceived immediately by the 
mind, and for which no reason can be given. This is, of course, the antithesis of 
Priestley’s own position. Whereas Priestley, as we have seen, traced the development of 
the conscience, or the moral sense, down to the experiences of pleasure and pain 
occasioned by sensations (and thus made moral ideas to be complex),
135
 Price holds that 
our ideas of moral rectitude are intuitions of the understanding into the natures of the 
actions themselves, and thus that they have very little to do with sense perception. For 
Price, ideas arising from the powers of sensation and ideas arising from our intuition of 
the nature of things are of distinctly different kinds, and Price make a clear value 
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judgment about these two different kinds of knowledge. Although Price concedes that 
sensations of pleasure and pain accompany perceptions of vice and virtue, it is important 
to recognise that these are merely effects and not the perceptions themselves. If our ideas 
of right and wrong originate in the effects of sensation, then it is absurd, according to 
Price, to apply them to actions, these being of an essentially different nature to ‘modes of 
consciousness’ or the ‘feelings of a sentient being’, in exactly the same way that the idea 
of colour (being a secondary quality) is essentially different to the idea of body (being a 
primary quality).
136
 Locating the source of moral rectitude in the effects produced in the 
agent thus leads to the conclusion that actions in themselves are indifferent to morality. 
This is certainly how Price would have thought of Priestley’s rejection of ‘real absolute 
evil’, since in Priestley’s scheme the rectitude of an action is subordinate to the happiness 
it produces in an agent. For Price it is undoubtedly true that, as Priestley holds, human 
beings desire happiness; however, this is not in itself enough to explain why humans 
approve or disapprove of certain actions. There must be something in the nature of the 
action, as opposed to something in its effect, which necessitates our approval or 
disapproval of it as rational beings. Furthermore, Price holds that if all actions are ‘in 
themselves indifferent’ it follows that the deity, who perceives this, cannot approve or 
disapprove of any of his own actions or of the actions of his creatures.
137
 It is 
incongruous to presume, as Priestley does, that the deity pursues universal happiness as 
his end if there is nothing in the nature of that end which would engage any being to 
choose it. In other words, Priestley’s scheme makes the deity act irrationally (or, as Price 
terms it towards the end of the Review, ‘contrary to his understanding’) by pursuing 
universal happiness even though there is strictly speaking no reason why he should do 
so.
138
  
 Price and Priestley had been acquainted with one another since 1766 when Price 
took Priestley as a guest to a meeting of the Royal Society in London.
139
 The two men 
subsequently became friends and Price helped Priestley to gain membership of the Royal 
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Society. They maintained a frequent correspondence which, in its early stages, focused 
largely on their shared interests in experimental science: Priestley sent Price detailed 
accounts of his experiments, and Price assisted Priestley with his scientific histories by 
acquiring materials for him and by reading drafts of the works.
140
 Over time, the personal 
relationship between them deepened: in 1772 Price advised Priestley on his employment 
prospects with the Earl of Shelburne, with whom Price was well acquainted.
141
 Over the 
years of their friendship they came to share many common interests, including a 
commitment to the political principles of rational dissent. When Priestley read Price’s A 
Discourse on the Love of our Country in 1789 he told Lindsey that he was ‘moved even 
to tears’.
142
 The two also discussed theological questions: in 1772 Priestley requested 
Price to read a copy of the second volume of his Institutes prior to the work’s 
publication.
143
 However, whereas they were united by a concern to establish a rational 
basis for Christian belief, Price’s and Priestley’s theological and philosophical ideas 
diverged significantly. Price did not think very highly of Hartley’s mechanistic 
psychology and did not follow Priestley in embracing Socinianism.
144
 Price’s own 
theological position he described in a letter to William Adams (1706-89), master of 
Pembroke College, Oxford, as ‘a middle ground between it [Socinianism] and the 
Trinitarian and Calvinistic schemes’.
145
 In the same letter he told Adams that he and 
Priestley ‘differ[ed] much in Metaphysics and Divinity, but with perfect respect for one 
another’.
146
 
 This mixture of disagreement and yet mutual respect characterises well the 
relationship between Price and Priestley. Priestley had pointed out his differences with 
Price regarding the origin of our ideas in the first appendix to his Examination in 1774.
147
 
The first and second editions of Price’s Review were published before any of Priestley’s 
works in philosophy. However, in the third edition of 1787, to which Price added an 
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appendix criticising new developments in ethical theory, he chose not to refer to any of 
Priestley’s works. Price, though, had largely developed his own argument on ethics in 
opposition to two general positions, both of which could be ascribed to Priestley. The 
first of these is epistemological and relates to Price’s criticism of empiricism. Price 
explicitly rejects Hume’s idea that all our ideas are either impressions or copies of 
impressions; this Price considers ultimately destructive of all truth and subversive of our 
intellectual faculties.
148
 Through his extensive footnotes to the Review, Price compares 
the debate between the empiricists and the rationalists of the eighteenth century to that 
between Protagoras and Socrates as depicted in Plato’s Theaetetus. At the end of chapter 
I, he claims that the notion that our ideas concerning morality are derived from sense is 
by no means new to philosophy; he implicitly compares the ideas of Hume and other 
philosophers who attribute all our ideas to sense perception (among whom Hartley and 
Priestley ought to be included) with the relativism of Protagoras, who held that sense 
accounted for all science and thus denied any absolute and immutable truth. For Price, 
this position leads unavoidably to atheism since, if there is nothing permanent in the 
nature of things, nothing necessarily true, then the very idea of a mind or knowledge, and 
hence of the deity itself, is impossible.  
 The second position pertains to Price’s objection to voluntarism. As D. O. 
Thomas has shown, Price inherited from Cudworth and Clarke an aversion to legislative 
or voluntarist ethics, the view that moral principles are grounded in an act of will 
(whether human or divine), and are thus external to the moral agent.
149
 For Cudworth this 
had meant arguing against Ockhamite and Calvinist positions; Price was concerned with 
refuting the voluntarist theories of his own times, primarily those developed by Richard 
Cumberland, Locke, and, later in the century, William Paley. Early on in the Review, 
Price rejects Locke’s idea that rectitude signifies merely the conformity of actions to ‘the 
will of God, the decrees of the magistrate, or the fashion of the country’.
150
 The key point 
for Price concerns the nature of obligation. Whereas for Locke the divine will and the 
human desire for happiness are what obliges an agent to act morally, for Price the nature 
of this obligation is strictly rational. This point leads Price into a theological discussion. 
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In Price’s scheme the moral law exists independently of, and is even binding on, the 
divine will. Price counters any theological objections to his position by differentiating, as 
had Doddridge, between God’s will and God’s nature.
151
 Rectitude is synonymous with 
the latter: ‘the obligations ascribed to the Deity arise entirely from and exist in his own 
nature’, so that ‘the eternal, unchangeable LAW, by which it has been said, he is directed 
in all his actions, is no other than HIMSELF; his own infinite, eternal, all perfect 
understanding’.
152
 Having established this point, Price holds that virtue ‘has a real 
obligatory power antecedently to all positive laws, and independently of all will’.
153
 Right 
actions are obligatory independently of their influence on the happiness of an agent; 
wrong actions are forbidden irrespective of whether they are enjoined or not by any 
positive law.
154
 Price’s problem with deriving obligation from the divine will is thus that 
it entirely undermines the rational basis of virtue. He states that those who ground 
obligation in the will of God generally attribute the power to oblige to the attendant 
rewards and punishments. This is, of course, exactly Priestley’s position. However, for 
Price, this subverts the independent nature of moral good and evil, as it implies that 
nothing can oblige except the prospect of pleasure to be obtained, or pain to be 
avoided.
155
 This means that vice is, strictly speaking, merely a synonym for 
‘imprudence’: that nothing is right or wrong any further than as it affects self interest.   
 In the first edition of the Review, Price defined his own ideas on the concept of 
obligation in opposition to those of the seventeenth-century moralist Richard Cumberland 
(1632-1718). In a footnote to the first edition, Price quoted at length from Cumberland’s 
A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, as well as the translator John Maxwell’s critical 
observations on the text.
156
 Price attributes to Cumberland (arguably mistakenly) the view 
that ‘obligation’ signifies merely ‘the necessity of doing a thing in order to be happy’.
157
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Yet in the appendix attached to the third edition of 1787 Price added a note on a 
contemporary articulation of ethical voluntarism, William Paley’s Lectures on the 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785). 
 Interestingly, in the Principles Paley had characterised the moral sense in 
language very similar to that used by Priestley.
158
 Those who maintain the existence of a 
moral sense, according to Paley, rely on ‘innate maxims’, ‘a natural conscience’, or hold 
that ‘the love of virtue and hatred of vice are instinctive’ or ‘the perception of right and 
wrong intuitive’.
159
 For Paley, as for Priestley, this is highly problematic in that it allows 
‘prejudices and habits’ to be mistakenly identified as ‘instincts of nature’. Paley cites 
Aristotle’s ‘fundamental and self-evident maxim’ that nature intended barbarians to be 
slaves as an example of the pernicious consequences of allowing prejudices to assume the 
status of self-evident truths.
160
 Instead, Paley attributes the development of our moral 
ideas to ‘the process of association’.
161
 Ideas of morality develop when an agent (acting 
from what is largely defined as a purely self-serving motivation) associates a mode of 
conduct beneficial to himself with ‘a sentiment of approbation’.
162
 When the idea of the 
same conduct again arises in the mind the moral approbation will be fixed to it even in 
circumstances when this will occasion no private advantage. Paley is largely concerned to 
formulate an ethical system applicable to practical circumstances and as such he has little 
time for the kind of abstract reasoning favoured by Price. For Paley, human beings very 
rarely engage in ‘any thing like a regular enquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of 
what we are about to do’, but are motivated to act more by habit than reflection. The 
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exercise of virtue thus signifies, less the performance of particular actions in particular 
circumstances, than the ‘forming and contracting’ of certain habits.
163
 
 In his discussion of moral obligation Paley attempts to formulate a synthesis of 
what he saw to be the three principal ethical positions: the rationalist (what is right is 
agreeable to reason and nature), the voluntarist (what is right is required by the will of 
God), and the utilitarian (what is right promotes the public good). He does this, in a 
similar way to Priestley, by subordinating rational criteria to the tendency of any 
particular course of action to promote happiness. In Paley’s definition: 
 
The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness; the nature of things means 
that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions, for 
example, produce happiness, and others misery; reason is the principle by which we 
discover or judge of this constitution; truth is this judgement expressed or drawn out into 
propositions. So that it necessarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public 
happiness, or happiness upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to 
reason, and to truth.
164
  
  
Paley’s subsequent definition of obligation is expressly voluntarist: ‘wherever the motive 
is violent enough, and coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or the will of a 
superior, there I take it, we always consider ourselves to be obliged’.
165
 The ‘motive’ 
Paley identifies as ‘private happiness’; agents act according to egoistic motivations to 
promote their own happiness.
166
 The practice of virtue is sanctioned by the promise of a 
proportional accession of happiness in the afterlife. The ‘rule’ for right action is the will 
of God; the deity ‘wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures’, so that to act in such a 
way as to occasion our own happiness is to act in conformity with the will of God.
167
 
Ultimately, Paley comes to identify virtue, as had Priestley, with utility:  
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Actions are to be estimated by their tendency to promote happiness. – Whatever is 
expedient is right. – It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the 
obligation to it.
168
 
 
This ethical system is theologically sanctioned by a benevolent deity whose will can be 
deciphered, both from the Scriptures, and from the ‘predominant tendency of the 
contrivances’ of the natural world.
169
 Paley’s account is here very similar to Priestley’s.  
 It might, at first, seem surprising that Paley and Priestley should arrive at such 
similar positions on ethics. Paley, despite being perceived by many within the Church as 
a dangerous latitudinarian (it was rumoured that Paley’s heterodoxy was the cause of his 
failure to obtain a bishopric), was, in other respects, a pillar of the establishment: 
Archdeacon of Carlisle, a senior Dean at Christ’s College, Cambridge, and, eventually, a 
defender of clerical subscription.
170
 However, the similarity is partly explicable by 
Paley’s and Priestley’s shared intellectual influences. In his lectures on metaphysics at 
Christ’s College in the 1770s, Paley used Locke’s Essay concerning Human 
Understanding; in his lectures on the Greek New Testament he referred his students to 
Locke’s The Reasonableness of Christianity.
171
 At Cambridge Paley was on close terms 
with John Jebb, the future Unitarian, and, like Jebb, was a protégé of Edmund Law, then 
master of Peterhouse College and Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy.
172
 In 
1769 Paley was appointed chaplain to Law on the latter’s elevation to the bishopric of 
Carlisle; in 1774 he defended Law’s views on clerical subscription in the anonymously 
published A Defence of the ‘Considerations on the Propriety of requiring a Subscription 
to Articles of Faith’.
173
 In 1776 Paley’s ‘Observations upon the Character and Example of 
Christ, with an Appendix on the Morality of the Gospel’ was printed privately and bound 
together with Law’s ‘Reflections on the Life and Character of Christ’ and distributed 
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among the students at Cambridge.
174
 Paley wrote a short biography of Law on the latter’s 
death in 1787.
175
  
 Paley’s Principles was dedicated to Law, whose writings clearly exerted a strong 
influence over the work. Paley’s definition of virtue (‘the doing of good to mankind, in 
obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness’) is a quotation 
from Law’s essay ‘On Morality and Religion’ prefixed to the fourth edition of William 
King’s An Essay on the Origin of Evil (1758).
176
 Law also thought highly of Paley’s 
work, and through his connections with rational dissenters acted as an intellectual link 
between Paley and Priestley’s circle. In 1783 Lindsey wrote to Tayleur with the news of a 
letter he had received from ‘the old B
p
 of Carlisle’.
177
 According to Lindsey’s account, 
Law had noted in a postscript that ‘Mr Paley’s Lectures are growing on his hands, but he 
promises to get it out next winter, and I trust will be of considerable us[e] in turning the 
thoughts of the young men of our university to serious subjects’.
178
 The influence of 
Hartley and Gay is also clearly discernible in the Principles, particularly in the sections 
on the formation of the moral sense through the process of association. Paley was also 
familiar with at least some of Priestley’s works: in his ‘On the Morality of the Gospel’ he 
cited the second volume of Priestley’s Institutes in support of the moral turpitude of the 
heathen philosophers.
179
 Priestley appears to have thought fairly highly of Paley’s 
writings. Although Priestley was unsurprisingly concerned about Paley’s justification of 
clerical subscription in the Principles, he referred to Paley, shortly after the publication of 
the Principles, as an ‘able’ writer ‘whose work is, in several respects, very justly admired 
in the Universities’.
180
 Priestley referred to Paley’s work of scriptural analysis, Horæ 
Paulinæ (1790), as ‘that truly masterly piece of criticism’; in a later work, Observations 
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on the Increase of Infidelity (1796), he commended ‘such rational and excellent defences 
of Christianity as Mr. Paley’s’.
181
 Lindsey also thought very highly of Paley’s work, and 
evidently understood him as advocating a similar theology to himself and Priestley. In the 
letter to Tayleur, Lindsey described Paley as ‘a sincere Christian, and most compleat 
Unitarian, and of the first abilities and a very worthy man’, despite his thoughts on 
subscription.
182
 
 Price, however, unsurprisingly, did not think as highly as Lindsey and Priestley 
did of Paley’s theological and ethical system. He read the Principles on its publication in 
1785 and told William Adams: ‘I have never read a book which has disappointed me 
more’.
183
 He decided immediately to add a note to the third edition of the Review 
expressing his low opinion of Paley’s work. In ‘Note F’ of the 1787 appendix Price 
provided his readers with a summary of Paley’s moral philosophy. According to Price, 
Paley, dismissing both the rationalist and moral sense theories, had made our notions of 
moral distinctions to be ‘a kind of habits of thinking (or prejudices) which we derive 
from education and the circumstances in which we grow up to mature life’. For Price, 
Paley’s theory can be summarised by two propositions: ‘God’s command is the measure 
and standard of all duty’, and ‘the duty itself of obeying his command is the necessity of 
obeying it in order to avoid punishment’. As Price points out, this makes speaking of 
God’s will as righteous a tautology, since ‘to say that his will is a righteous will, is the 
same with saying that his will is his will’. Price was again explicit on his strong 
disapproval of Paley’s ethical system: ‘Never indeed have I met with a theory of morals 
which has appeared to me more exceptionable’.
184
 It is almost certain that Price would 
have recognised in Priestley’s writings, particularly the Institutes and The Doctrine of 
Philosophical Necessity illustrated, a very similar system of ethics to that developed by 
Paley.  
 In late 1787 Price sent Priestley a copy of the third edition of his Review, which 
included the comments on Paley’s theory. Priestley wrote to Price from Birmingham on 4 
December 1787 thanking him for the work, and noting particularly the addition of ‘the 
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argument à priori’, presumably a reference to Price’s appendix ‘A Dissertation on the 
Being and Attributes of the Deity’. Priestley was characteristically frank in confessing his 
lack of sympathy with Price’s ideas: ‘you know it [the argument a priori] does not give 
me satisfaction’.
185
 However, any explicit acknowledgement of the fundamental 
differences between their approaches is conspicuously missing. It seems somewhat 
remarkable that Price’s clear aversion to Priestley’s whole ethical system passes largely 
unmentioned in the correspondence between them. It was most likely Price’s high regard 
for Priestley’s personal character and abilities as a minister, scientist, and commentator 
on contemporary politics which prevented him from speaking about Priestley’s ethical 
system with as much freedom as he had on Paley’s writings. The similarly high esteem in 
which Priestley held Price presumably prevented him from discussing Price’s ideas in the 
contemptuous manner he had reserved for the writings of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald. 
Badcock captured this paradoxical situation particularly well: ‘In the partial eye of 
friendship’, Price was, to Priestley, ‘one of the wisest philosophers, though his 
philosophy is irrational; and the best of Christians, though his Christianity is absurd’.
186
  
 Returning then to the 1778 correspondence between Price and Priestley, it is 
important to recognise that a fundamental epistemological difference lies behind Price’s 
criticisms of Priestley’s ideas and Priestley’s responses to these criticisms. In chapter I 
section II of his Review Price had attributed the ideas of solidity and impenetrability to 
the faculty of the understanding. Price conceded (like Priestley) that actual experience 
yields very little evidence of the impenetrability of matter. However, for Price, this is not 
hugely important as experience is an inadequate foundation on which to ground absolute 
assurance. Even if it could be demonstrated by experiment that one body could not 
penetrate another, this would not prove it to be impossible; in fact, even if the experiment 
were performed a million times ‘all that would appear to the senses in such experiments, 
would be the conjunction of two events, not their necessary connexion’. For Price, we 
arrive at the idea of impenetrability by strictly rational means. It is logically impossible 
that two atoms of matter ‘continuing distinct and without the annihilation of either, may 
occupy the same space’, and we are thus led necessarily to the idea of impenetrability. 
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Similarly, Price holds that our knowledge of the ‘vis inertiae’ or ‘inactivity of matter’ 
owes little to sense perception. The vis inertiae is ‘rather a perception of reason, than an 
idea conveyed to the mind by sense’.
187
 Price here points again to Newton’s three laws of 
motion which, as we have seen, he regarded as intuitions of the understanding, rather 
than as facts derived from experience.  
 This same line of reasoning runs throughout Price’s letters to Priestley, despite the 
fact that it is never clearly brought to the fore of the discussion. In the first 
communication, Price notes that Newton’s three laws of motion ‘appear to be self-evident 
truths’.
188
 In the second communication, he acknowledges his opinion that ‘we derive our 
ideas of the solidity of bodies, not so much from experience, as from another more 
important inlet of ideas, which I have endeavoured to show in the first chapter of my 
Treatise on Morals’.
189
 Yet despite the importance of Price’s epistemological system to 
the whole of his philosophical thought, Priestley only very briefly responds to this aspect 
of Price’s ideas. In the first set of ‘Illustrations’, Priestley argues against the charge that 
to deny the vis inertiae overturns Newton’s three laws of motion, that the former is by no 
means essential to the latter; Newton’s laws are not self-evident truths, but are ‘founded 
on certain facts’ which could be shown to result as easily from Priestley’s hypothesis 
concerning matter as from the traditional one.
190
 Only in his ‘Additional Illustrations’ 
does Priestley explicitly acknowledge Price’s claim that the idea of solidity is derived 
from ‘another origin’.
191
 In response, he refers his readers to the third of his prefatory 
essays to Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind. Priestley had here argued that Hartley’s 
theory had demonstrated how ‘our external senses furnish the materials of all the ideas of 
which we are ever possessed’, thus modifying Locke’s contention that sensible ideas ‘do 
not properly constitute’ ideas of reflection such as judgment, power, duration, and 
space.
192
 In the course of the essay, Priestley refers specifically to Price’s opinion that the 
ideas of solidity and impenetrability are derived from the understanding. Against this, 
Priestley appears to argue, although his point is unclear, that the idea of impenetrability is 
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derived from experience: it is easy to conceive how a child, for example, may be led to 
the idea of impenetrability by pressing against any body that does not give way to him, or 
by observing bodies impinging against one another without ever coalescing into one. 
Priestley subsequently refers to the work of Boscovich and Michell to show that the 
impenetrability of matter has been disputed. Against the charge that the vis inertiae is 
essential to matter, Priestley argues that it is easy to conceive of matter with this power 
omitted.
193
 
 The failure of the 1787 correspondence to explicitly acknowledge this 
fundamental difference between Price’s and Priestley’s epistemology must, in part, 
account for the repetitive and circular nature of the debate. This said, Price does 
effectively point out many of the weak points of Priestley’s system. He highlights, for 
example, how Priestley is equivocal in his ascription of extension to matter, arguing that 
Priestley’s contention that matter consists of nothing but powers is inconsistent with the 
position (at other points advocated by Priestley) that matter possesses the attribute of 
extension.
194
 Price later points out that if, as Priestley holds, matter can only be defined in 
terms of force, then it follows ‘not that we have no souls distinct from our bodies, but that 
we have no bodies distinct from our souls’, in short, ‘that all in nature is Spirit’.
195
 In his 
second communication, Price observes that if matter possesses the powers of attraction 
and repulsion, then it must be capable of moving itself. This, however, Priestley cannot 
allow.
196
 Price is also particularly critical of Priestley’s materialist explanation of the 
doctrine of the resurrection. Price here argues that either Priestley must acknowledge that 
death does not naturally destroy the soul, and that what happens to it is no more than ‘a 
suspension of the exercise of its faculties’, or he is arguing, not for a resurrection, but for 
‘a creation of a new set of beings’.
197
 The difference, for Price, is between the doctrines 
of the ‘the sleep’ and the ‘non-existence’ of the soul after death, and there is ‘no less than 
an infinite difference between the two’.
198
 One key point to which Price frequently 
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returns is that he could not (with Berington) accept that consciousness could be the result 
of an organised system of non-conscious parts: 
 
It is inconceivable to me how any person can think that many substances united can be 
one substance or that all the parts of a system can perceive, and yet no part be a 
percipient being.
199
 
 
Priestley counters this objection only with the superficial response that a system, ‘though 
consisting of many beings or things, is nevertheless but one system’.
200
 Behind Price’s 
criticisms lay his fear that Priestley’s materialism was only one step away from outright 
atheism. Explaining his controversy with Priestley to Adams in February 1778, Price 
noted that Priestley had ‘got on very dangerous ground’.
201
 For Price the assertion that 
the mental powers are no more than the brain and the nerves is analogous to saying that 
the deity may be no more than ‘the mass of corporeal substances which we call the 
world’.
202
 Price shows how easily Priestley’s method of reasoning could be adapted to 
support the atheism of the philosophes: 
 
The laws of nature seem to terminate in matter. But is it philosophical, in order to avoid 
multiplying causes, to conclude they have no other cause than matter itself; and with the 
French philosophers, to make nature the only Deity?
203
                     
  
However, despite Price’s ability to perceive some of the problems and contradictions 
inherent in Priestley’s materialism, the discussion did not prompt Priestley to advance 
any arguments significantly different to those outlined in the Disquisitions. In fact, many 
of the passages in the ‘Illustrations’ are reproductions verbatim from the original work.  
 The same could be said with regard to the discussion of free will and necessity. 
Again, Price’s emphasis on the intuitive capacity of the understanding underlies much of 
his reasoning on this point. Philosophical liberty is largely proved by the fact that ‘[we] 
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are conscious of it in ourselves’; Price admits that he can ‘say nothing to convince a 
person who will declare that he believes his determinations do not originate with himself, 
or that he has no power of moving or determining himself’.
204
 Contrary to Priestley’s 
assertion that an agent is always determined by motives, Price holds that an agent 
determines himself, albeit with a regard to motives; whatever certainty there is that a 
particular determination will follow from a particular motive, the determination is always 
the ‘self-determination of the mind’. Price upholds the distinction (which he attributes to 
Clarke) between ‘the operation of physical causes’ and ‘the influence of moral 
reasons’.
205
 Price thus attempts to reformulate the question at the centre of the debate: 
what ought to be considered is not whether ‘the views or ideas of being influence their 
actions’ but ‘what the nature of that influence is’. Whereas motives undoubtedly 
influence actions this influence is in no way ‘mechanical or physical’.
206
   
 Despite Priestley’s repeated attempts to demonstrate the moral benefits of the 
necessitarian scheme, Price concludes that if man is not free, philosophically speaking, 
then ‘there is an end of all moral obligation and accountableness’.
207
 Given Price’s 
aversion to voluntarism, it is easy to see why Price would have objected so strongly to 
Priestley’s attempt to show that virtue and vice are not absolute qualities of actions, and 
that to act virtuously, philosophically speaking, means no more than to act according to 
the dictates of benevolence and the will of God. Price’s language here, it is worth noting, 
is as forceful as it had been in describing Paley’s ethical system: Priestley’s 
necessitarianism Price describes as a ‘deadly potion’.
208
 Price himself, however, appears 
to have been acutely aware of the failure of his correspondence with Priestley to generate 
any original discussion on either of the topics of materialism or the freedom of the will. 
He apologises to Priestley for the fact that ‘my desire to explain myself fully has led me 
to a redundancy of expression and many repetitions’.
209
 Later, Price admits to feeling 
‘some pain’ on reflecting that ‘much of this discussion is little more than a repetition of 
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Mr. Collins’s objections on one side, and Dr. Clarke’s Replies on the other’.
210
 Even 
Lindsey, always the most enthusiastic promoter of Priestley’s works, was less than 
adulatory when it came to the Free Discussion. Lindsey wrote to Tayleur in June 1778 
with news that ‘D
r
 Price and D
r
 Priestley’s correspondence on D
r
 Priestley’s late work’ 
was soon to be published, but that ‘a friend who has seen it, tells me he thinks it will be 
of too metaphysical a nature either to amuse or to edify the public very much’.
211
 Over 
three decades later, Price’s biographer passed a very similar judgment: ‘The subjects of 
this controversy (in their nature abstruse and unsatisfactory) do not in general either 
engage the attention or interest the feelings of the public’.
212
 
 Before turning, in conclusion, to consider some of the wider responses to 
Priestley’s controversial ideas it will be of interest to consider one further aspect of 
Price’s intellectual world: his connections with Scottish thinkers. Since the publication of 
the Review in 1758, Price had been in contact with some of the leading philosophical and 
theological authors in Scotland. Price probably first met David Hume at a dinner at the 
home of the London based bookseller Thomas Cadell; Hume thereafter visited Price at 
Newington Green on at least one occasion.
213
 In 1767 Hume wrote to Price in reply to a 
note Price had sent Hume, along with a copy of his Four Dissertations (1767), 
apologising for some censorious remarks he had made on Hume’s comments on belief in 
miracles in the Enquiry. The letter testifies to the high esteem in which Hume held 
Price’s philosophical talents: ‘you, like a true Philosopher’, wrote Hume, ‘overwhelm me 
with the Weight of your Arguments’.
214
  
 Price was also a correspondent of Thomas Reid. An extant letter from Reid to 
Price dateable to between 1772 and 1773 demonstrates that Price, like many of the 
English rational dissenters, was acquainted with the Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, 
William Leechman, who, Reid noted, thought very highly of Price.
215
 In April 1775, 
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following the publication of Priestley’s Examination, Reid wrote to Price from Glasgow. 
Reid was, at this point, presumably unaware of the close friendship between Price and 
Priestley, judging at least by the candour with which he spoke on Priestley’s recent work: 
‘I confess’, wrote Reid, ‘that in his late examination he seems to me very lame as a 
Metaphysician as well as in some other Qualities of more estimation’.
216
 Reid continued 
to criticise what he perceived to be Priestley’s misapprehension of basic epistemological 
concepts, most likely under the assumption that Price would have shared in his low 
estimation of Priestley’s abilities: 
 
What Light with regard to the powers of the Mind is to be expected from a Man who has 
not yet Learned to distinguish Vibrations from Ideas nor Motion from Sensation, nor 
simple Ideas from complex nor necessary truths from contingent.
217
     
 
The same letter testifies to Reid’s high opinion of Price’s talents as a metaphysician; Reid 
begins with the admission that ‘I wish often to have the benefits of your Sentiments on 
abstract Subjects that occur to my thoughts’. The comments on Priestley are prefaced by 
a long passage in which Reid considers the metaphysical axiom that ‘whatever we can 
distinctly perceive is possible’. As Reid correctly points out, this axiom is assumed by 
Price at several points in his Review. Reid, however, had a strong suspicion that it was 
fallacious ‘owing to the ambiguity of the Word Conceive’.
218
 According to Reid, all that 
can be properly meant by ‘conceive’ is to understand the meaning of a particular 
proposition, and we can certainly understand the meaning of a proposition that is false. If 
we mean by ‘conceiving a proposition’ something more specific, that is, ‘conceiving a 
proposition to be true’, then it follows that we can only mean ‘judging it to be true’. Since 
judgment admits of degrees, the axiom ought to be restated as ‘everything that appears to 
us to have any degree of probability however small is certainly possible’, which, Reid 
says, is clearly false.
219
 Reid subsequently appeals to Price’s experience as a 
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mathematician: mathematics affords many instances of ‘impossibilities in the nature of 
things’ which we may, at first, have conceived to be true ‘untill they were discovered by 
accurrate and subtile Reasoning’. Thus, Reid infers, ‘although we are apt to conclude 
every thing possible which we don’t perceive to be impossible […] in this we may be 
greatly deceived’.
220
  
 Reid requested Price’s thoughts on this matter, yet no letter in reply from Price 
has survived. However, Price certainly considered the point at some length. ‘Note A’ 
from the appendix subjoined to the 1787 edition of the Review begins with a reflection on 
a passage from the first edition of the work: ‘In every idea is implied the possibility of the 
existence of its object, nothing being clearer than that there can be no idea of an 
impossibility, or conception of what cannot exist’.
221
 Price continues to explain that ‘DR. 
REID, in his very valuable work on the intellectual powers of man, contests this 
assertion’. However, Price continues to maintain the distinction between ‘supposing’ and 
‘conceiving’ in refutation of Reid’s assertion that ‘conceiving’ is no different from 
‘judging’: ‘There is no absurdity which I may not be directed to suppose’, says Price, ‘but 
it does not follow from hence, that there is no absurdity which I may not conceive’. Price 
also rejects outright Reid’s first premise, that to conceive of something means only to 
understand the meaning of a proposition. Price insists upon differentiating between ‘the 
understanding of propositions’ and ‘the conception of objects’; whereas it is certainly 
possible to understand a proposition which expresses an impossibility, it is impossible to 
have any real conception of this.
222
 Conceptions, for Price, are concerned with objective 
states of affairs, and a conception of an impossibility is a conception of nothing.  
 This is not the only instance of Price refining his own philosophy in dialogue with 
Reid. A number of hasty alterations Price made to the texts of the second and third 
editions of the Review suggest that he came to call into question his original 
representative theory of perception under Reid’s influence.
223
 In section II, ‘Of the Origin 
of our Ideas in General’, for example, a passage in both the first edition of 1758 and the 
second edition of 1769 reads:  
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If then we indeed have such ideas, and if, besides, they have a foundation in truth, and 
represent somewhat really existing correspondent to them, what difficulty can there be in 
granting they may be apprehended by that faculty, whose natural object is truth.
224
  
 
In the third edition of 1789 the word ‘represent’ is replaced with the words ‘are ideas 
of’.
225
 Towards the end of the same section, a passage in the 1758 edition reads: ‘’Tis 
obvious, that the ideas now meant, presuppose certain subjects of contemplation, whose 
natures, connexions, and qualities they represent’.
226
 In the 1769 and 1787 editions the 
word ‘represent’ is again replaced with the words ‘are perceptions’.
227
 In section III, ‘Of 
the Origin of our Ideas of Moral Right and Wrong’, the assertion, in the 1758 edition, 
that the mind perceives ‘resemblances of [the] distinct and independent reality in things’ 
is replaced, in the 1769 edition, with the statement that the mind perceives ‘any distinct 
and independent reality’. The expression is omitted entirely from the 1787 edition. As I 
have shown in the previous chapter, it was exactly this kind of representative theory, 
what Reid had referred to variously as the ‘ideal system’ or the ‘doctrine of ideas’ – the 
theory ‘that we do not really perceive things that are external, but only certain images and 
pictures of them imprinted upon the mind, which are called impressions and ideas’ – 
which Reid had set out to refute in his Inquiry.
228
 That these changes to the Review were 
influenced by Price’s reading of Reid is clear from a note that Price added to the 1769 
edition. A footnote in which Price attempts to distinguish between ‘ideas’ and 
‘sensations’ is succeeded by the following comment: 
 
It should be observed that I have all along endeavoured to avoid speaking of an idea as an 
image in the mind of the object we think of. It is difficult not to fall sometimes into 
language of this kind; but it may be misunderstood and abused. A writer of deep reflexion 
and great merit has charged it with laying the foundation of all modern scepticism.
229
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The reader is subsequently directed to Reid’s Inquiry.  
 Price returned to the same point in ‘Note C’ to the 1789 appendix. He here 
reprints the above note followed by the comment: ‘I am always mortified when I find, 
that my sentiments are different from those of the writer to whom I have just referred’.
230
 
However, Price then goes on to charge Reid with annihilating all perception by claiming 
that there is no object of the mind. In order to challenge Reid’s belief, as Price understood 
it, that the representative theory inevitably leads to scepticism, Price subsequently turns 
his attention to Hume. He accuses Hume of making a linguistic error in mistakenly 
defining an idea as the object itself, rather than the apprehension or conception of an 
object. According to Price, there is thus no need to dispense with the representative 
theory altogether. To the charge that, on this theory, we can have no certain knowledge of 
the external world, Price replies that ‘[all] ideas imply the possibility of the existence of 
correspondent objects’. He then follows Reid in arguing that ‘our belief of the actual 
existence of the objects of sense, we may resolve […] into impressions on our sense 
forcing belief at the moment of the impression, in a manner we cannot explain’.
231
 In the 
final sentence, however, Price appears to argue for a kind of occasionalism.
232
 He here 
suggests that ‘the just answer to this enquiry’ implies ‘a presence of the Deity with us and 
dependence upon him more close and constant and necessary, than we are apt to suspect 
or can easily believe’.
233
 Price’s final position thus remains somewhat inconclusive. 
However, his attempts to reformulate his ideas in the light of a close engagement with 
Reid’s work is an interesting example of intellectual exchange between the two men, 
pointing again to the strong connections between the rational dissenters and the Scots. 
 One final example of this connection between Price and the Scots is a series of 
letters exchanged in the early 1780s between Price and James Burnett, Lord Monboddo. 
On 11 July 1780 Monboddo wrote to Price from Edinburgh. Like Hume and Reid, 
                                                 
230
 Review, 280. 
231
 Review, 280. 
232
 I use the term in the sense in which it is defined by Stephen Nadler, that is, the doctrine that ‘any 
complete explanation of a natural phenomenon must refer not just to its material antecedent conditions 
(matter and motion), but, more importantly, to the only being which can truly be called a ‘cause’ – God’. 
See Stephen Nadler, ‘Doctrines of Explanation in Late Scholasticism and in the Mechanical Philosophy’, in 
The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers,  2 vols 
(Cambridge, 1998), vol. I, 513-52, esp. 536-42. See also Nadler, ‘Occasionalism and the Mind-Body 
Problem’, in Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. M. A. Stewart, 75-95. 
233
 Review, 280. 
 163 
Monboddo evidently held Price’s abilities in high regard, and (like Reid) thought little of 
Priestley’s ideas: ‘You have combated very well’, Monboddo told Price, ‘Dr. Priestley’s 
strange system of Philosophy, and stranger still of Christianity’.
234
 The ten extant letters 
between Price and Monboddo detail their subsequent discussion, over a period of four 
years, which covered the subjects of the soul, the nature of space and duration, liberty and 
necessity, the philosophical opinions of the ancients, and Newton’s laws of motion. 
Monboddo sent Price copies of the early volumes of his Antient Metaphysics (1779-1799) 
through Thomas Cadell, which Price read and responded to in his letters.
235
 Price, in 
return, sent Monboddo a copy of his Review. During the course of the correspondence, 
Price alluded to his acquaintance with William Robertson (1721-1793), Principal of the 
University of Edinburgh, Adam Smith, and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), Professor of 
Mathematics, and subsequently of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh.
236
 These connections 
demonstrate that Price, like his friend George Walker, was familiar with the most 
important contemporary developments in Scottish philosophy.      
 In the discussion between them, Price and Monboddo frequently allude to 
Priestley’s opinions. In his first letter to Price, Monboddo listed a series of questions to 
Priestley to which he requested Price to procure an answer. In his reply, Price took the 
liberty to respond on Priestley’s behalf, stressing the differences between his own and 
Priestley’s sentiments: ‘no two persons’, he told Monboddo, ‘can differ much more on 
most Theological and Metaphysical subjects, and yet we respect and love one another’.
237
 
In his subsequent reply, Monboddo told Price that, although he did ‘not reckon the 
Doctor an Atheist’, he was concerned that ‘his Opinions have a dangerous tendency that 
way’.
238
 In response to Price’s statement that ‘the machine’ which Priestley had called 
man is not motivated by matter itself, but ‘by the constant operation of the Deity whom 
he makes the only agent in nature’, Monboddo admitted his surprise and inability to 
‘reconcile it to the Doctor’s Words or Arguments’.
239
 In a somewhat convoluted 
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metaphor, Monboddo attempted to unravel the implications of Priestley’s ascription of 
any real agency solely to the deity: 
 
if our machine of Intellect does not go on of itself when once set agoing like a Clock, but 
is carried on by the immediate agency of God, then I think it is not properly a Machine, 
or if you will call it so, it is a Machine such as a Pipe upon which a Musician plays; and 
we can be no more answerable for our thoughts and actions, nor indeed are they ours any 
more than the Time is the Pipe’s and not the Musician’s.
240
    
 
In this way, Monboddo extended Price’s criticism that Priestley had reasoned away any 
meaningful idea of matter, to claim that, in Priestley’s world, there is nothing that can 
meaningfully be called man. If even consciousness – in Priestley’s system, the 
‘superstructure upon that part of us by which we breathe, and our Blood Circulates’ – is 
‘likewise a kind of Pipe, which is played upon by the Supreme Being’, then, argued 
Monboddo, ‘God is literally speaking All in all, and there is properly speaking neither 
Man, nor Brute, nor Vegetable in this world’.
241
 To this, Price replied that Priestley did 
‘indeed assert that the Deity is the only agent in nature’ and concurred with Monboddo’s 
opinion that Priestley was essentially arguing  
 
that we are not properly responsible for our actions, that they are not really ours, and that 
the machine called man is only a kind of pipe […] which is play’d upon by an invisible 
hand, his actions being no more his own than the tune is the pipe’s.
242
           
 
Notwithstanding the esteem in which Price was held by Hume, Reid, and 
Monboddo, however, his rationalist philosophy did not find many adherents among 
English rational dissenters in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Although none of 
these Scottish thinkers thought very highly of Priestley, it was Priestley’s associationist 
ethical system, materialism, and necessitarianism which were fast becoming the 
predominant intellectual positions within rational dissent. The decline of rationalist 
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systems such as Price’s and Taylor’s coincided with the decline of Arianism as a viable 
theological position among the English rational dissenters.
243
 The most important centre 
for Arianism in late eighteenth-century England was probably Cross Street Chapel, 
Manchester, where Thomas Barnes (1747-1810) and Ralph Harrison (1748-1810) 
continued to preach the doctrine until the first decade of the nineteenth century.
244
 
However, when Barnes and Harrison opened Manchester New College in 1786 it is 
unlikely that they taught much philosophy there.
245
 Price’s ‘intuitionist’ ethics would 
have to wait until the late nineteenth century before it was taken seriously by anyone 
within rational dissent.
246
   
 
Three responses to Priestley: Palmer, Dawson, and Berington 
 
In the English literary world at large Priestley’s Disquisitions elicited a constant stream 
of mostly hostile responses from its publication in 1777 until the early years of the 1790s. 
These took the form of published philosophical works, letters to periodicals, and even a 
number of extensively annotated satirical poems.
247
 A selection of these works has been 
analysed and evaluated by John Yolton, who has drawn attention to some of the more 
philosophically sophisticated, many of which were ignored by Priestley himself.
248
 
Yolton’s account evaluates the merit of Priestley’s respective antagonists by assessing the 
extent to which they recognised and engaged with Priestley’s redefinition of the 
traditional concept of matter. By this criterion, most of the responses fail to take into 
account the central issue at stake: that Priestley had fundamentally altered the nature of 
materialism by redefining matter as force rather than as solid particles. Yolton’s narrative 
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is primarily useful in that it brings to light a number of neglected works. He outlines, for 
example, the argument of John Rotheram’s An Essay on the Distinction between the Soul 
and the Body of Man (1781), and shows how Rotheram raises the important argument 
against Priestley that the theory of vibrations is unable to fully account for cognitive 
representation by explaining how vibrations come to refer to objects in the external 
world.
249
 However, Yolton does not take into account the denominational affiliations of 
Priestley’s antagonists, or question how these affiliations affected their authors’ 
philosophical views. The fact that Rotheram (1725-1789), Richard Shepherd (1731/2-
1809), Richard Gifford (1724/5-1807), and John Caulfield were all clergymen of the 
Church of England is essential to understanding their commitment to refuting Priestley’s 
materialism. Shepherd, who later became Archdeacon of Bedford, for example, was 
primarily concerned with exposing the errors in Priestley’s materialist philosophy as a 
means to disproving his ideas on the pre-existence of Christ.
250
 Caulfield, Archdeacon of 
Kilmore between 1776 and 1801, devotes almost as much space to refuting Priestley’s 
ideas from the evidence of Scripture as he does by recourse to more strictly philosophical 
arguments.
251
 An analysis of Priestley’s orthodox antagonists along denominational lines 
would be fruitful and would illuminate the complexities of the theological context 
essential to a more historically informed understanding of the debate. In this concluding 
section, however, I shall confine my focus to a selection of responses to Priestley’s work 
written by a dissenter, a dissenter who conformed, and a Catholic. 
 Priestley’s attempts to refute the ideas of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, and Price were 
part of a wider debate among rational dissenters, occasioned by their attempt to formulate 
philosophical foundations for their theology. Three book-length contributions to the 
discussion initiated by Priestley’s writings on materialism and philosophical necessity are 
particularly worthy of analysis for the way in which they illustrate how writers from 
different denominational and theological positions challenged Priestley’s claim to have 
laid a rational foundation for his religious beliefs. The first of these works is John 
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Palmer’s Observations in Defence of the Liberty of Man as a Moral Agent (1779).
252
 
Palmer (1729-1790) had studied under David Jennings at the dissenting academy at 
Wellclose Square, afterwards becoming an assistant to John Allen at the Presbyterian 
New Broad Street Chapel, London, where he became pastor in 1759.
253
 In his theology, 
Palmer followed a similar trajectory to Priestley, abandoning the Calvinistic principles in 
which he had been educated and adopting Socianian views. Palmer and Priestley were 
well acquainted with one another; Priestley referred to Palmer in 1779 as ‘an old 
acquaintance, whom I respect, and whom I believe to be actuated by the best views’.
254
 
 However, as the title of his book would suggest, Palmer disagreed with Priestley 
on the question of the freedom of the will. Palmer, like Priestley, was concerned to 
establish a rational basis for religious belief, and yet he felt, like Price, that the freedom 
of the will was a necessary prerequisite for this. In his Observations, he rehearsed many 
of the well-established arguments for philosophical liberty, Clarke, Wollaston, and Price 
all featuring prominently in the work. Palmer denies that the relationship between 
motives and volitions can be explained in the same way as the operations of cause and 
effect in the natural world on the grounds that the mind is immaterial and is therefore not 
subject to the laws of matter. He thus relies on the distinction between moral and physical 
necessity, arguing that although motives influence volitions, still the mind has the power 
of ‘suspending and altering its determinations’ and is ‘free to deliberate upon, and in 
consequence of this to choose and determine the motives of its conduct’.
255
 Palmer goes 
on to claim that necessitarianism subverts the foundations of morality, adding to Price’s 
criticisms that, in Priestley’s ‘scheme of necessity’, there appears to be ‘a real and great 
absurdity in prayer’.
256
 In response to Priestley’s attempt to argue for necessity from 
Scripture, Palmer argues that there are just as many passages in the Scriptures ‘which 
address mankind, as possessed of choice or agency’.
257
 To Priestley’s attempt to 
differentiate his own philosophical necessity from Calvinism, Palmer counters that ‘the 
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two schemes bear a much nearer affinity to one another, than the Dr. is aware of’, and 
that ‘the practical influence [of Calvinism and philosophical necessity] must be very 
much the same’, as in both systems ‘man is the mere passive instrument of the divine will 
or agency’.
258
  
 Palmer’s work is less important for the force or originality of its arguments, than 
for the fact that it appears to have been widely read among rational dissenters. Joshua 
Toulmin informed John Sturch that he had read the book, along with Price’s letters to 
Priestley, whilst making up his own mind on the question of the freedom of the will.
259
 
Thomas Belsham used the work in his philosophy lectures at the dissenting academies at 
Daventry and Hackney, and Andrew Kippis recommended the work in his summary of 
the debate over liberty and necessity in his notes to the 1794 edition of Doddridge’s 
lectures.
260
 It was most likely this fact that led Priestley to reply to Palmer.
261
 In his A 
Letter to the Rev Mr. John Palmer, in Defence of the Doctrine of Philosophical Liberty 
(1779) Priestley commented that the book had been ‘a work of great expectation among 
many of our friends’; in the year following its publication, Palmer’s Observations had, 
according to Priestley, ‘been submitted to the perusal of persons of great learning and 
worth, who […] think highly of it, and have recommended the publication, not only as 
excellent in itself, but as very proper to follow that of Dr. Price’.
262
 
 In Priestley’s reply to Palmer, he reiterated his claim that to hold two different 
determinations of the will to be possible is essentially to claim that an effect can occur 
without a preceding cause. In response to Palmer’s point on the distinction between moral 
and physical necessity, Priestley urged his antagonist to consider the evidence of fact, as 
opposed to the ‘mere nominal distinctions of things’. Experience demonstrates that the 
will ‘constantly and invariably decides according to motives’; the causal relationship 
between motives and the will is thus ‘as absolutely certain as any truth in natural 
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philosophy’.
263
 In reply to Palmer’s concerns on the moral effects of necessitarianism, 
Priestley again calls on his antagonist to judge from experience. The passage again hints 
at the prevalence of the necessitarian doctrine among Priestley’s and Palmer’s circle: 
‘Cast your eye over those of your acquaintance, and whom you know to be 
necessitarians, especially those who have been so early in life, and who are most attached 
to that doctrine’, Priestley instructs Palmer, ‘They are numerous enough to enable you to 
form some judgment of the practical tendency of their principles’.
264
 Priestley’s private 
letters depict him attempting to stem the effects of Palmer’s work by sending copies of 
his own reply to his correspondents. In November 1779, for example, Priestley told 
Cappe to expect a copy from Lindsey; in December he sent Caleb Rotheram, an 
acquaintance of Palmer’s, a copy of the work.
265
   
 The next year Palmer replied to Priestley in his An Appendix to the Observations 
in Defence of the Liberty of Man (1780). He here reiterated the arguments in defence of 
philosophical liberty, and criticised Priestley’s interpretation of Price’s arguments. In 
April Priestley replied with A Second Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Palmer (1780), in 
which he requested his antagonist to produce some proof from fact of the existence of the 
self-determining power. The passage illustrates that Priestley thought of Palmer’s and 
Price’s recourse to our consciousness of the power of self-determination as being 
problematic in exactly the same way as Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s recourse to 
‘common sense’: a ‘merely imagined feeling, or consciousness’ of the freedom of the will 
is wholly arbitrary; whereas ‘one person may assert [it]’, another, Priestley argues, ‘who 
is certainly constituted in the same manner, may deny [it]’.
266
 Priestley subsequently 
challenges Palmer to reconcile free will with the divine prescience, cautioning his 
antagonist not to give up the latter lightly. Priestley is here explicit on what is at stake in 
the debate between Palmer and himself. In order for Palmer to retain both the divine 
prescience and the self-determining power he would, according to Priestley, be obliged to 
rank the former ‘among the mysteries of faith, things to be held sacred, and not to be 
submitted to rational enquiry’, in exactly the same way that ‘many truly pious christians 
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do the doctrines of transubstantiation and the Trinity’.
267
 In other words, Priestley is 
suggesting that Palmer can retain both free will and divine prescience only if he sacrifices 
his conviction that all aspects of Christian doctrine can be rationally explained. In this 
way, he is positioning his own necessitarianism as the only rational basis for Christian 
belief, and suggesting that Palmer’s libertarianism bears some relation to the irrational 
tendencies of Catholicism and Anglicanism. 
 The second response to the debate, Benjamin Dawson’s The Necessitarian: or the 
Question concerning Liberty and Necessity stated and discussed (1783), was not directly 
a reply to Priestley’s writings. However, it was undoubtedly informed by the arguments 
over the freedom of the will among rational dissenters in the 1770s.
268
 Dawson (1729-
1814) is a fascinating character in relation to the rational dissenters, whose career 
illustrates well the complex affinities between Anglican latitudinarianism and rational 
dissent as it developed during the latter half of the eighteenth century.
269
 Dawson, in his 
early career, had followed a very similar trajectory to John Seddon, Robert Andrews, and 
George Walker: he entered the Kendal Academy with his brother Thomas Dawson (c. 
1725-1782) as an exhibitioner of the London Presbyterian Board in 1746 where he was 
taught by Caleb Rotherham; in 1748 he progressed to Glasgow University on the Dr 
Williams’s foundation, graduating MA in 1750.
270
 He defended a thesis, De summo bono, 
which was published for the university by the Foulis press in 1750.
271
 He then served as a 
dissenting minister at Congleton, Cheshire and at Leek, Staffordshire; following a brief 
period as a teacher he became assistant minister at St Thomas’s Presbyterian Church, 
Southwark in 1757.  
 However, Dawson departed radically from this career trajectory: after one year at 
Southwark, he followed the example of his elder brothers Thomas and Abraham (1713?-
1789) and conformed to the Church of England. In 1760 he became rector of Burgh, 
                                                 
267
 A Second Letter to Palmer, 44. 
268
 The full title of the work is Benjamin Dawson, The Necessitarian: or the Question concerning Liberty 
and Necessity stated and discussed, in XIX Letters (1783).  
269
 For a full analysis of Dawson’s career and relationship with Priestley see G. M. Ditchfield, ‘Joseph 
Priestley and the Complexities of Latitudinarianism in the 1770s’, in Rivers and Wykes, 144-72, from 
which many of the details of the following section are derived.   
270
 B. W. Young, ‘Dawson, Benjamin (1729-1814)’, ODNB. See also John Nichols, Illustrations of the 
Literary History of the Eighteenth Century consisting of Authentic Memoirs and Original Letters of 
Eminent Persons, 8 vols (1817-58), vol. VI (1831), 860-9. 
271
 Benjamin Dawson, Dissertatio philosophica inauguralis de summo bono (Glasgow, 1750). 
 171 
Suffolk, a living which he held until his death. Despite his conversion to Anglicanism, 
Dawson retained his contacts with dissenters: in 1763 he accompanied his pupil Sir 
Benjamin Ibbetson to the Warrington Academy, where he became a member of the 
literary circle around John Aikin. Dawson’s brother Obadiah remained a dissenter and 
was a member of Priestley’s congregation at Mill Hill Chapel, Leeds. Once within the 
Church, Dawson positioned himself in the liberal, latitudinarian camp; he was a close 
associate of Francis Blackburne, and wrote prolifically between 1766 and 1773 in support 
of Blackburne’s campaign to repeal compulsory subscription to the Thirty-Nine 
Articles.
272
 Dawson served as secretary to the Feathers Tavern Association and was one 
of the signatories to the petition which it circulated in 1771-2 for the abolition of 
compulsory subscription for university graduates and Church of England ministers.
273
  
 Dawson’s The Necessitarian, written then some twenty years after he had 
abandoned dissent, is a philosophical dialogue consisting of a series of nineteen letters 
between ‘Cleanthes’ and ‘Philemon’.
274
 The character of Cleanthes is a necessitarian; the 
thrust of his argument is very similar to Priestley’s. He allows that man is free, in the 
sense that ‘He doth as he will’, and that ‘what a man doth voluntarily, he doth freely’. 
However, he maintains that the will is always determined by motives.
275
 The character of 
Philemon, the libertarian, holds that the will is free, in the sense that although motives 
influence, they do not necessarily determine the will.
276
 For Philemon, the will is an 
active power which can choose ‘to ACT, forbear action, or continue action’.
277
 Philemon 
has recourse to a number of arguments, many of which are very similar to those found in 
Price, Berington, and Palmer, in defence of his libertarian position. Firstly, Philemon 
argues that the ‘experience and feeling’ of free agency is the proof of its actual 
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existence.
278
 Secondly, Philemon argues that our ‘Consciousness of moral rectitude and 
depravity is […] a plain proof of human liberty’ as ‘Conscience never applauds or 
condemns us for such actions as we consider ourselves under a necessity to perform’.
279
 
However, through the succeeding epistolary exchange, Philemon comes to abandon his 
belief in the arguments supporting his libertarianism. Firstly, Cleanthes convinces him 
that the argument from experience is inconclusive; secondly, Cleanthes argues that it is 
solely the motive which constitutes the moral value of an action, and, therefore, that to 
break the link between motive and volition is to ‘annihilate the act, with respect to its 
moral nature’.
280
 Philemon subsequently comes to accept that ‘That which proceeds from 
an act must be as real and certain as the Act itself’, that it is not the consciousness of the 
goodness of an action which makes the act good, but rather ‘the Goodness or Worth of 
the Act’ which itself depends upon the determining motive, and thus that ‘an action can 
have no worth but on the supposition of a motive determining the Will’.
281
 His 
conversion is complete when he declares that ‘the Foundation of Morality and Religion 
[…] rests secure upon the principle of NECESSITY’.
282
 
 Interestingly, this dialogue between Cleanthes and Philemon is preceded by a 
short preface, presumably in Dawson’s own voice, which anchors the debate between the 
two characters in a specific theological context. In the preface Dawson writes that the 
ensuing disquisition ‘originated from a theological debate concerning the Articles of the 
Church’, specifically article X (‘Of Free Will’) and article XVII (‘Of Predestination and 
Election’). Although it is not entirely clear whether this debate really occurred or whether 
it is a fictional context, Dawson elaborates by explaining that in the course of the debate 
the tenth and twelfth articles (both of which deny the free will of man) were selected by 
one of the company (a ‘prompt Arminian’) as ‘instances of absurd and pernicious 
doctrine’.
283
 Against this, it was argued, presumably by a more theologically orthodox 
respondent, that ‘necessity’ and ‘fatalism’ ought to be properly distinguished and that 
free will is, in fact, much nearer akin to necessitarianism. Furthermore, the advocates of 
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free will have ‘not informed themselves of the true Calvinistic doctrine on this head’ and 
are mistaken in supposing that ‘the Church [of England] could possibly mean to set forth 
such pernicious, nay impious doctrine as they considered this to be’. According to 
Dawson’s narrative, the two disputants then decided to cease from theological discussion 
and to turn instead to ‘the open field of Philosophy’.
284
 Dawson is thus casting the 
dialogue between Cleanthes and Philemon as a philosophically grounded defence of the 
Calvinistic doctrine of free will enshrined in the articles of the Church of England. In this 
way, he is presumably attempting to show that Anglican doctrine on the question of the 
freedom of the will is rational, in the sense that it can be shown to be consistent with 
philosophical reasoning. 
 That Dawson should have been attempting to rationally justify certain of the 
articles of the Anglican Church is particularly significant considering the history of his 
relationship with Priestley. This relationship dates back to the early 1770s, and to the 
Anglican petition to relieve clergymen from compulsory subscription to the articles of the 
Church, a campaign with which, as I have shown, Dawson was prominently involved. As 
a dissenter, Priestley had no immediate interest in the success of the clerical petition. 
However, as a result of his friendship with Lindsey (who, at this point, was still an 
Anglican clergyman and a key figure behind the petition), Priestley came to follow the 
debates in the House of Commons and, eventually, to support the petitioners. In 
Priestley’s 1769 work, Considerations on Church Authority, a response to Archdeacon 
Thomas Balguy’s recent attacks on the ecclesiastical reformers, Priestley had enquired 
provocatively ‘who among the clergy, that read and think at all, are supposed to believe 
one-third of the thirty-nine articles of the church of England’, conjecturing that there was 
only a one in a thousand chance that Balguy himself believed in every article.
285
 The 
comment, although intended to support the reformers’ cause, evidently proved offensive 
to Dawson. Two years later, Dawson, in a series of ‘Remarks’ appended to his edition of 
John Jones’s Free Thoughts, responded to Priestley’s accusation by claiming that it was 
unfair and, moreover, that an individual’s belief or disbelief in certain theological 
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doctrines was a matter for his own private conscience to decide: ‘to charge us’, replied 
Dawson,  
 
with not believing, if we read and think at all, one third of what we have solemnly 
subscribed, is more than uncandid and indecent; it is to detract from our good name; it is 
to judge us too in a matter on which man’s judgment ought never to be given.
286
         
  
News soon reached Lindsey that Priestley was planning to publish an attack on Dawson, 
which Lindsey feared would damage the cause of the Anglican petitioners. Priestley 
subsequently wrote to Lindsey to reassure him, noting, with more than a hint of sarcasm, 
that had he written against Dawson then it would have been intended to serve the 
petitioners’ cause by ‘setting in a strong light the evil and iniquity of subscription to the 
Thirty-nine Articles, in the case of a mind so enlightened as his’.
287
 Priestley’s comments 
make it clear that he despised Dawson for conforming to the Church of England, 
interpreting Dawson’s conversion to Anglicanism as a betrayal of the fundamental values 
of dissent.
288
 In the same letter to Lindsey, Priestley accused Dawson of subscribing to 
the Church merely in order to attain preferment; in his A Letter of Advice of 1773 
Priestley reiterated this charge, acerbically labelling Dawson’s conversion a ‘dark 
transaction’, and adding that Dawson was guilty of contradicting himself by defending 
Socinianism in his publications whilst publicly subscribing to trinitarian articles.
289
 The 
fact that Dawson, in The Necessitarian, employed Priestley’s philosophical arguments to 
provide a rational foundation for Anglican doctrine would thus undoubtedly, assuming he 
ever encountered the work, have infuriated Priestley. Given the implications the work 
would have had for those familiar with its author’s and Priestley’s previous altercations, 
it is interesting that it was read by rational dissenters. Belsham used Dawson’s work in 
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his philosophy lectures at Daventry and New College, Hackney and Kippis recommended 
it in the additional references he added to his 1794 edition Doddridge’s lectures.
290
 
 The third response to Priestley was by the Roman Catholic priest Joseph 
Berington. In 1779 Berington fulfilled his promise to outline at length his own 
philosophical system with the publication of his Immaterialism Delineated; or, a View of 
the First Principles of Things (1779).
291
 The work is divided into two books: 
Immaterialism Delineated, in which Berington outlines at some length his own 
philosophical system, and an Explanation of Materialism; or, Reply to Dr. Priestley’s 
Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, in which Berington works systematically through 
each section of Priestley’s text and offers a corresponding refutation of his arguments. 
Berington’s work is worth considering here for two reasons: firstly, because it is one of 
the fullest responses to Priestley’s materialist system, and, secondly, because Berington, 
like Palmer and Dawson, was keen to stress the rationality of his own religious belief. His 
work is thus a contestation of Priestley’s claim that his materialist and necessitarian 
system laid the most rational foundation on which to ground Christian theology. 
Berington was most likely responding to British Protestant assumptions about Roman 
Catholicism when he opened the first book with the statement that: 
 
The mind of a Roman Catholic may be as open to rational inquiry, and be as free to 
speculate on every subject placed within the reach of human investigation, as any 
member of the reformed churches: for his submission must be rational.
292
     
  
 Immaterialism Delineated is a long, densely written, and complex work which 
appears to have made little impact, either on Berington’s contemporaries, or on 
subsequent intellectual historians.
293
 In the course of the text, Berington cites many 
British and continental philosophers and theologians, so that his own opinion is not 
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always easy to infer.
294
 What is clear is that Berington accepts, for the most part, 
Priestley’s force theory of matter. Like Priestley, he holds that properties generally 
conceived as being inherent in body are actually effects derived from the action of bodies 
impressed on the senses.
295
 Whereas philosophers have considered ‘solid extension’ as 
being an inherent quality of body, Berington thus holds that it is a ‘general effect, or 
phenomenon, whose cause is the combined action of body impressed on a percipient 
being’.
296
 The ‘essential and universal form’ of matter, Berington argues, is ‘energy’ or 
‘force’; the powers of attraction and repulsion are ‘modes of the original force impressed 
on all matter’.
297
 It is here worth noting that Berington differentiates his own criticism of 
Priestley’s materialism from Price’s: regarding ‘the nature of matter particularly’, 
Berington says, his own and Price’s ideas ‘so widely differ [that] we must have seen 
many things in different points of view’.
298
 Where Berington differs from Priestley is in 
his rejection of the possibility that the force theory of matter could lead to a system of 
materialism. Berington maintains that the powers of attraction and repulsion ascribable to 
matter should be considered as ‘really inherent in its [matter’s] constituent 
uncompounded elements’.
299
 All that is ‘real’ and ‘positive’ in matter is thus ‘simple’ and 
‘indivisible’. These simple elements, which unite to form the complex substance of 
matter, are, in themselves, ‘intrinsically immaterial’: ‘They constitute matter, but are not 
matter itself: so, intrinsically they are not either solid, or hard, or extended, which 
appearances however they are calculated to exhibit’.
300
 Berington claims that he cannot 
conceive how Priestley can call himself a materialist after having ‘spoiled matter of all its 
materiality’.
301
 To Berington’s understanding, the force theory of matter provides a 
foundation for ‘a general system of Immaterialism’.
302
  
                                                 
294
 Among his influences Berington claims James Harris, Pierre Sigorgne (1719-1809), Leibniz, and 
Bonnet. 
295
 Berington, Immaterialism Delineated, 76. 
296
 Immaterialism Delineated, 92. 
297
 Immaterialism Delineated, 37; 67. 
298
 Immaterialism Delineated, 435. 
299
 Immaterialism Delineated, 76. 
300
 Immaterialism Delineated, 143. 
301
 Immaterialism Delineated, 222. 
302
 Immaterialism Delineated, 143. 
 177 
 Just as the ultimate causes of sensation are simple and immaterial, so too is the 
mind that perceives them. Berington conceives of sensation within a divinely ordered 
system which is perpetually maintained by the active agency of the deity: 
 
Every effect on my mind is harmonically generated by the energy of infinite power, 
referred to that preconcerted order, which subsists between us, and which connects my 
being and nature to the great cause, who made me, and who continues to support and 
actuate my mind.
303
 
      
He thus relies heavily on a kind of occasionalism: there is no ‘real similitude’ between 
‘the cause and the effect’ or between ‘the impression and its sensation’. However, the 
pre-established order ensures that ‘each effect is relatively expressive of its cause’.
304
 
Berington dwells particularly on Priestley’s suggestion that the brain might be possessed 
of a percipient or sentient power in addition to its vibrating power; if this is true, says 
Berington, then Priestley has entirely failed to show where this capacity proceeds from.
305
 
Whereas the materialist rather clumsily ‘superadds’ a new power which he supposes to 
inhere in the brain, the immaterialist holds that ‘the sentient principle is itself a substance 
sui generis, of an order superior to and distinct from the brain’.
306
 The reasoning powers 
are thus the properties of a simple, immaterial substance. Berington subsequently 
rehearses many of the arguments to show that consciousness is incompatible with the 
compounded nature of body, variations of which he had outlined in his original response 
to Priestley’s edition of Hartley.
307
 
 What Berington adds to his previous criticism is an analysis of Priestley’s attempt 
to demonstrate that materialism is sanctioned by the Scriptures. In response to the 
historical aspects of Priestley’s materialist thesis, Berington is more consistently 
historicist than Priestley in his approach to the language of the Scriptures and the early 
Church Fathers. Firstly, Berington argues that, although Priestley is correct to say that the 
words usually interpreted as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ do not convey, in their original usage, 
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abstract, metaphysical concepts, this does not necessarily mean that the early Christians 
thought of the soul as material. It is important to keep in mind, Berington argues, that 
‘Oriental language, like every species of poetry, abounds singularly in images of sense’. 
It is therefore natural that ‘the expressions of the sacred writers’, even when they seem 
most to ‘lose sight of matter’, should ‘retain much of their native character’.
308
 The 
sacred writers and the early Fathers simply did not have words at their disposal adequate 
to the expression of ‘an immaterial, simple, spiritual substance’.
309
 The present 
metaphysical notion of ‘Immateriality’ is, undoubtedly, a modern thing, but this does not 
mean that it is any less true. In fact, the natural progress of language means that it is now 
more calculated to exhibit ‘a just and more adequate idea of the nature of God and of 
man’.
310
 Berington essentially inverts Priestley’s narrative of how the pure Christian 
doctrine preached by the apostles was corrupted by the admission of oriental philosophy. 
Although ‘many philosophers and Christian fathers, educated in the schools of 
Heathenism […] were too material in their conceptions of the divine and human natures’, 
Berington argues, 
 
In process of time, as real Christianity gradually effaced improper associations, the ideas of 
mankind were simplified; they began better to discriminate between immaterial and 
material substance.
311
 
  
 Secondly, Berington argues that Priestley is simply wrong in much of his 
scriptural and patristic exegesis. He holds that the immaterial system is only strengthened 
by the fact that it coincides with the opinions of so many of the ancient philosophers. 
Furthermore, there are many biblical passages, says Berington, that cannot, ‘without the 
greatest violence’, be reconciled with Priestley’s materialist system.
312
 Drawing on the 
authority of Ralph Cudworth’s Intellectual System (1678) and William Warburton’s 
Divine Legation of Moses (1738-41), Berington sets out to show that, contrary to 
Priestley’s assertion, many of the early Christian authors did hold the notion of 
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incorporeal substance. The first Fathers were ‘not at all tinctured with the gross strain of 
Materialism, at least in the manner Dr. Priestley has represented them’.
313
 Tertullian, for 
example, Berington argues, held an opinion similar to that of many modern philosophers 
that ‘the soul divested of all corporeal organs, is not susceptible of sensation and 
affection’.
314
 Numerous passages in the writings of Aquinas ‘so precisely coincide with 
modern notions’, that they prove that his ideas on the nature of matter and spirit ‘were as 
clearly defined as the most accurate Metaphysician could desire’.
315
 
 In a concluding letter to Priestley, Berington again attempted to emphasise the 
rationality of his religious convictions. Here he states that, although it was education that 
first made him a Catholic, it was a ‘most rational conviction’ that confirmed his belief. 
His subsequent statement again challenges Priestley’s claim to have formulated a rational 
philosophy which is compatible with Christian theology. ‘It has sometimes occurred to 
me’, Berington continues, in a fascinating aside,  
 
that there can be no rational medium betwixt Catholicism and Deism. Were I not what I 
am; to-morrow, I think, I should be, what most men of learning, in the reformed Church, 
either are, or soon will be. Your own conscience will best explain my meaning. 
Socinianism is a very favourite opinion; will you tell me, how far that persuasion is 
distant from the Religion which a Socrates or a Plato, unassisted by any superior 
guidance, might have framed and delivered to mankind?
316
 
 
What Berington is doing in this passage strikes at the roots of Priestley’s project. 
Priestley, under the influence of earlier theologians such as Edmund Law, conceived of 
his own work in formulating and disseminating his Unitarian theology and his 
necessitarian and materialist philosophy as a continuation of the project initiated by the 
first Protestant reformers.
317
 His attempt to purge Christian doctrine of its corruptions, 
and to bring Christian belief into a closer alliance with reason, stemmed from the same 
urge that drove the reformers to rescue true Christianity from the debased form of 
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religion promoted by the Catholic Church. What Berington is essentially saying is that 
such a project is impossible; Protestantism will eventually lead to deism, and Socinianism 
is merely one step further along this path than, for example, Price’s Arian theology.  
 The extract is worth comparing with a passage in a 1787 letter from Priestley, 
informing Lindsey of an incident related by John Coates, assistant minister at the Old 
Meeting in Birmingham.
318
 Having recently returned from a trip to London, Coates had 
told Priestley of a comment made by Price: as Priestley related it to Lindsey, Price, ‘in 
large company //in// which you [i.e. Lindsey] and D
r
 Kippis were present, said “he should 
not be suprised if I [i.e. Priestley] should become a deist” and that D
r
 Kippis, as well as 
yourself, replied to him in my favour’.
319
 Although Lindsey later discredited the report, it 
is indicative of the fear, within rational dissent, that Priestley’s ideas were dangerously 
close to deism, and even to atheism. The advocates of the rationalist tradition, such as 
Price, and the Shaftesburian tradition, such as Wodrow, felt that Priestley’s materialism 
and necessitarianism had become (or was close to becoming) incompatible with Christian 
belief. The fragility of this boundary between Socinianism and deism would come to the 
fore in Priestley’s final attempt to clarify his rationalised form of Christianity in response 
to the writings of David Hume, and it is to this attempt that I shall now turn.           
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4. Defining rational religion: Priestley’s response to Hume (1780-1782) 
 
By the second half of the eighteenth century David Hume had come to replace the 
freethinkers of the early century – Toland, Collins, and Tindal – as the primary focus of 
Christian apologists. As we have seen in chapter 2, Reid, Beattie, and Oswald had 
concentrated much of their intellectual energies on attacking Hume’s ideas, which they 
saw as a direct challenge to the foundations of Christian belief. In this they were not 
alone among their contemporaries: numerous authors from across denominational divides 
in Scotland and England attempted refutations of Hume’s writings. It is important to 
stress that to almost all eighteenth-century thinkers, the only consequence of Hume’s 
infidelity was immorality. Shaftesbury’s rejection of the practical possibility of virtuous 
atheism in an influential passage from his Characteristicks held true for most authors in 
the second half of the century; significantly, Beattie quoted the passage from Shaftesbury 
in the sixth edition of his Essay printed in 1778.
1
 William Rose’s review of Hume’s 
Dialogues in the Monthly Review for 1779 captured well the fears of the majority of 
Hume’s eighteenth-century readers: if Hume’s ideas on religion were true, then 
 
the wicked are set free from every restraint but that of the laws; the virtuous are robbed of 
their most substantial comforts; every generous ardour of the human mind is damped; the 
world we live in is a fatherless world; we are chained down to a life full of wretchedness 
and misery; and we have no hope beyond the grave.
2
 
  
Hume’s own writings on the subject of religion have been assessed, debated, and 
reassessed many times over by his critics from the eighteenth century to the present day.
3
 
Some of the most interesting recent work in this field has attempted to recover how 
Hume’s ideas were responded to by his contemporaries.
4
 An understanding of the way in 
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which his work was received among English rational dissenters is beginning to emerge. 
Isabel Rivers, for example, has shown that Hume’s Philosophical Essays (1748) was 
incorporated into Philip Doddridge’s philosophy lectures, and thus into the syllabuses at 
the liberal dissenting academies.
5
 Elsewhere, Rivers has examined a number of Hume’s 
antagonists in light of their denominational affiliations, and explored how rational 
dissenters, including Rose, Price, and Priestley, attempted to formulate a response to 
Hume’s scepticism.
6
 James Fieser has analysed in some depth Rose’s and Samuel 
Kenrick’s reviews of Hume’s philosophical works, including their very different 
responses to his writings on religion.
7
  
 My aim in this chapter is not to add anything to the vast amount of criticism on 
Hume. Rather, it is, firstly, to contribute something to the existing accounts of the 
reception of Hume’s writings among dissenters by examining how Hume’s ideas were 
discussed in the Wodrow/Kenrick correspondence. This, along with the available 
literature on the reception of Hume, will develop a context for my second task, namely, to 
provide a detailed analysis of Priestley’s attempt to formulate a rational defence of 
Christianity in response to Hume’s scepticism. This will provide a more substantial 
account of Priestley’s response to Hume than has previously been offered, and further 
extend my account of the relationship between the English rational dissenters and the 
Scots.
8
 Finally, I consider one extraordinary response to Priestley to emerge from within 
the intellectual culture of rational dissent: William Turner’s Answer to Dr. Priestley’s 
Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1782). I argue that Turner’s reply to Priestley 
marked a significant turning point within rational dissent, in that it was the first work to 
argue against Priestley’s ideas from a position that was, theologically and 
philosophically, more heterodox than Priestley’s own. Moreover, Turner’s book brought 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘The Early British Reception of Hume’s Writings on Religion’, in The Reception of Hume in Europe, ed. 
Peter Jones (London, 2005), 30-42; James Fieser, ‘Hume’s Concealed Attack on Religion and His Early 
Critics’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 20 (1995), 83-101.  
5
 Rivers, The Defence of Truth through the Knowledge of Error, 19-20. Doddridge had been told about 
Hume’s work by his Anglican friend William Warburton, Correspondence, vol. V, 167. However, the 
reference to Hume in his lecture course might have been added by Ashworth.   
6
 Rivers, ‘Responses to Hume on Religion by Anglicans and Dissenters’, 691-95. 
7
 James Fieser, ‘The Eighteenth-Century British Reviews of Hume’s Writings’; ‘Beattie’s Lost Letter to the 
London Review’, Hume Studies, 20.1 (1994), 73-84 . 
8
 On Priestley’s response to Hume see Popkin, ‘Joseph Priestley’s Criticism of David Hume’s Philosophy’.  
 183 
to the fore the vexed question of whether atheism and virtue were really incompatible, 
and provided an answer to this question very different to Shaftesbury’s.        
 
Wodrow and Kenrick on Hume 
 
As I have shown in chapter 2, one of the many fascinating aspects of the correspondence 
between James Wodrow and Samuel Kenrick is their discussion of a number of 
contemporary works of Scottish philosophy. One of the authors who features most 
frequently in this discussion is David Hume. On 8 April 1751 Kenrick wrote to Wodrow 
of his ‘assiduity to accomplish y
e
 Debt I owed you’ in reading through Hume’s essay ‘On 
Liberty and Necessity’.
9
 The letter records a fairly detailed, and at points highly comical, 
account of Kenrick’s study and assessment of the work: 
 
I sat me down, I scratched my noddle I perused Mr Hume’s Essay on Liberty and 
Necessity; wherein you know he reconciles what He imagines have been by y
e
 learned 
esteemed insuperable Difficultys inexplicable intricacys strange contradictions, by all y
e
 
thinking world ever since y
e
 origin of Philosophy to this enlightened Day. 
 
Despite acknowledging Hume’s declared intention to reconcile the debate over liberty 
and necessity, Kenrick clearly understood the essay as a criticism of the libertarian 
position. Notwithstanding his opinion that the argument is ‘ushered in, & childishly 
repeated w
th
 a good deal of vanity’, Kenrick finds Hume’s argument ‘plausible enough’. 
He emphasises the theological implications of the text, not explicitly drawn out in 
Hume’s essay, commenting specifically on the work’s potential to overturn the 
foundation of the ‘boasted liberty & independence’ inherent in Arminian doctrine and its 
potential assertion that ‘orthodox’ [i.e. Calvinist] doctrine has ‘true Philosophic Truth’ on 
                                                 
9
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its side.
10
 Kenrick concludes that, ‘To one of my circumstances who has not opportunity 
to sift y
e
 matter to y
e
 bottom’, ‘y
e
 thing appears highly probable’, adding that he ‘sh
d
 be 
glad of your own, or your bright companion’s notion of what this Gentleman advances’.
11
  
 On 21 January 1752 Wodrow responded with an account of his own reading of 
Hume’s Political Discourses (1752).
12
 Wodrow opens his account of the text by 
commenting approvingly on the work’s stylistic qualities: 
 
One after having read such a book finds himself pleased and Entertained (much in the 
same way as by a modern romance) from the Propriety of the language & Harmony of the 
Periods & the novelty & oddness of some of the thoughts. 
 
He continues to describe the tendency of these stylistic effects to generate ‘scepticism’, 
somewhat curiously equated by Wodrow with the term ‘modesty’: 
   
He discovers more modesty or if you please Scepticism in this than in the former work 
indeed the subjects give more scope for it as some of them are of such a kind that you 
make think as you please about them & the world will not think of you a bit the worse. 
 
This leads Wodrow to a further description of the often disconcerting effects of reading 
Hume’s writings: ‘His arguments & reasonings never or seldom produce any solid 
conviction //but// leave the mind some way loose & more uncertain than when you 
begun’.
13
 Wodrow’s response here is fairly typical.
14
 He continues with an 
impressionistic description of the reading experience in which he imaginatively compares 
reading Hume to the observation of a popular children’s game: 
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He uses an argument to establish a point then he throws out some thing on the other side 
which overturns all he said & leaves you just as you were, then he sets it up; then down 
with it & at the end you don’t know what to think. Did you ever see our children throw at 
their Pin-Cocks. A pin for a throw at that cock there – you missed it you Dog you – 
another throw. Hollow, over he goes on his back – Set him up again, let me have another 
broadside for my own cock. Hume’s reasoning brings always to my mind some match of 
this kind.
15
 
 
Wodrow’s description of reading Hume resonated strongly with Kenrick. Encouraged by 
his friend’s assessment, Kenrick responded two days later with a similar account of his 
own experience of reading Hume’s An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals 
(1751). Kenrick here develops the derogatory implications of describing Hume’s 
reasoning as child’s-play: 
 
when I read I am entertained & instructed with particulars, I understand ‘em; But when I 
finish a section or the whole, I lose the aim or proper Effect – I see two or three childish 
pieces of affectation but I can easily overlook these for the sake of other things of greater 
worth – To tell you the truth I had walk’d ab
t
 my room above an hour thinking on this 
matter. 
 
However, in the same letter he informs Wodrow of the ‘strange doubting humour I have 
been in of late (formed from y
e
 learned productions of H –)’.
16
 As M. A. Stewart has 
noted, there is little extant evidence of Hume’s influence on eighteenth-century religious 
belief.
17
 However, some of the social effects of Hume’s writings are alluded to in the 
letters. In addition to these accounts of the two men’s private reading experiences, the 
letters refer to the role of Hume’s writings in promoting deism among ministers of the 
Church of Scotland. Commenting on the relatively small number of deists amongst the 
Scottish clergy in January 1769, Wodrow informed Kenrick that there were ‘A few about 
Edr. in East Lothian & in the Merse by reading Dd. Hume’s books and by their 
conversation & connexions with him & his friends’. To this he added: ‘you may add a 
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scattered Clergyman or two here & there in other parts of the country who has happened 
to get his education among that set of people’. Interestingly, Wodrow contrasts his 
forecast of the relatively slow spread of deism with a prediction that Socinianism will 
increase rapidly. He told Kenrick that ‘it is my apprehension that most of the men of 
learning & freedom of thought among the clergy both in Scotland & in most Protestant 
countries in Europe will soon become Socinians’.
18
    
 It is here worth recalling Wodrow’s comparison of Hume and Adam Smith.
19
 
Whereas Woodrow had cautiously expressed his opinion that Smith’s writings on ethics 
could be reconciled with Christianity, the ‘licentious tendency’ of Hume’s writings was 
obvious.
20
 Hume’s ideas were incompatible with Christian belief. In this respect, 
Wodrow’s and Kenrick’s response to Hume provides a useful context in which to 
approach Priestley’s understanding of Hume’s ideas. As we shall see, in some important 
respects Priestley responded to Hume in a similar way to Wodrow and Kenrick. 
However, perceiving the threat of Hume’s ideas, he made a more sustained attempt to 
respond to the intellectual content of Hume’s arguments, and it is to this response that I 
shall now turn.   
  
Priestley’s Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1780) 
 
Priestley most likely conceived of his Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever during his 
trip to the continent with Shelburne in the mid-1770s. Relating his travels in his Memoirs 
over a decade later, he recalled that ‘all the philosophical people’ to whom he had been 
introduced at Paris were ‘unbelievers in Christianity, and even professed Atheists’. 
Making no secret of his own Christian beliefs, Priestley must have appeared something of 
an anomaly to his continental acquaintances: he was told by some of them that he was 
‘the only person that they had ever met with, of whose understanding they had any 
opinion, who professed to believe in Christianity’. Yet, inquiring further into their own 
beliefs, Priestley soon concluded that ‘they had given no proper attention to it and did not 
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really know what Christianity was’.
21
 It was not only in France that Priestley associated 
with such philosophical unbelievers: ‘a great part of the company’ whom Priestley met 
through Shelburne in England were also unbelievers in Christianity. It was his 
discussions with members of Shelburne’s coterie which led Priestley to think that he 
could ‘combat their prejudices with some advantage’ and provided him with the stimulus 
to begin the first volume of the work.
22
 
  Like others of Priestley’s metaphysical works, early drafts of the Letters were 
circulated among his correspondents and subsequently revised in light of their comments. 
A letter from Priestley to Joseph Bretland of October 1779, for example, indicates that 
Bretland had advised Priestley on the contents of the first letter. The same letter, and 
another to Newcome Cappe, demonstrates that others, including Lindsey, John Jebb, and 
Price, read a draft of the work before it was published.
23
 This early draft would evolve 
into the work eventually published in 1780 as a result of two significant publications of 
the late 1770s: David Hume’s autobiographical ‘My Own Life’ (1778), and his Dialogues 
concerning Natural and Revealed Religion (1779). The first of these, Hume’s 
autobiography, was a brief and fairly self-deprecating account of Hume’s literary career. 
It was published with a letter from Adam Smith to William Strahan, in which Smith 
described the serenity and fortitude Hume had displayed in the face of his imminent 
demise, and famously described Hume as ‘approaching most nearly to the idea of a 
perfectly wise man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will admit’.
24
 Smith’s letter 
was an important contribution to the debate over Hume’s personal character, which was 
underpinned by the eighteenth-century doubt as to whether an unbeliever in Christianity 
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could live a virtuous life.
25
 The second of these works, Hume’s Dialogues, had most 
likely been largely completed by 1751.
26
 However, on the advice of friends among whom 
he had circulated a manuscript of the work, Hume had decided not to publish it during his 
lifetime, primarily in order to avoid provoking the clamour against his perceived 
infidelity. He revised the text towards the end of his life and left detailed instructions in 
his will for the work’s posthumous publication. The Dialogues was eventually published 
in 1779, three years after Hume’s death, by his nephew (Adam Smith, Hume’s first 
choice of a publisher, having thought it unwise to undertake Hume’s request).  
 Hume’s death at the height of his literary reputation occasioned renewed interest 
in his work. As I have observed before, Priestley, in 1774, had claimed that he was ‘truly 
pleased with such publications as those of Mr. Hume’, as they had occasioned the subject 
of religion to be ‘more thoroughly canvassed, and consequently to be better understood 
than it was before’.27 However, by 1780 Priestley and Lindsey evidently felt that Hume’s 
views on religion had been taken seriously enough by some to warrant a response. In a 
letter of 1779 to Cappe, Priestley stated that it was his reading of Hume that had led him 
‘to write a series of “Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever”’.
28
 Lindsey, in a letter to 
William Tayleur, described Priestley’s Letters as ‘something that he [i.e. Priestley] had 
written against Mr Hume’s piece of Natural Religion’.
29
 The same letter is interesting in 
that it shows that Lindsey thought of Hume as a deist, rather than an atheist. He told 
Tayleur: ‘Mr Hume allows that there is intelligence and wise design in the first cause, but 
denies his Benevolence’. For this reason, Lindsey explained, ‘his book may hurt […] 
some minds that read it’. He continues: ‘I shall be glad to see this objection particularly 
answered’.
30
 It is as a response to Hume’s ideas, directed towards those likely to be 
affected by Hume’s criticisms of natural religion, that Priestley’s eventually published 
work ought, primarily, to be understood.  
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 This said, however, it is worth noting that, except in the title of the work, Priestley 
does not mention Hume until the ninth of the fourteen letters of which the book is 
comprised. It is thus likely that the main section of the work was written, and that 
Priestley had formulated the substance of his defence of theism, before he had read 
Hume’s Dialogues. The first eight letters of Priestley’s work are dedicated to outlining 
his system of natural religion: the proofs, from nature, for the being and attributes of God. 
Variations of most of Priestley’s arguments here can be found in his earlier works, 
particularly the first volume of the Institutes, however the Letters to a Philosophical 
Unbeliever constitutes their most systematic expression. In the first letter Priestley 
reiterates his theory of knowledge, what he terms ‘the natural ground of evidence’ or ‘the 
assent that we give to propositions of all kinds’.
31
 This is largely derived from chapter III, 
section II of Hartley’s Observations on Man, ‘Of Propositions, and the Nature of 
Assent’.
32
 Priestley here distinguishes between two different kinds of propositions: those 
founded on demonstration, such as the propositions of geometry and algebra, and those 
founded on observation, such as the truths of natural philosophy. The principles of 
natural religion are generally of the latter class: that is, although they cannot be 
demonstrated a priori, they can be proved by evidence to the extent that our conviction of 
them ‘shall hardly be distinguishable, with respect to its strength, from that which arises 
from a demonstration properly so called’.
33
 
 In letter II, ‘Of the direct Evidence for the Belief of a God’, Priestley applies this 
method of reasoning to outline his version of what is now usually referred to as the 
argument from design. This is not, of course, in any sense original: the design argument 
stretches back at least to Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, with which Priestley was familiar, 
and was common currency in the eighteenth century, finding expression in authoritative 
texts such as John Wilkins’s The Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), which 
was widely used in the education of clergymen, and Joseph Butler’s The Analogy of 
Religion (1736), the arguments and language of which Priestley’s own work parallels at 
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several points.
34
 The argument from design, in Priestley’s account of it, runs something 
as follows. The constant observation that ‘chairs’, ‘tables’, ‘houses’, and ‘books’ are not 
made without men lays the foundation for an association of the ideas of these objects 
with the idea of men as the makers of them. This association becomes established in the 
mind so that whenever we see a chair, a table, a house, or a book we have no doubt – 
even if we do not see when or how they were made – that ‘some men or other did make 
them’.
35
 Likewise, our experience of observing birds build nests, spiders make webs, or 
bees build honeycombs leads us to associate the ideas of these objects with the ideas of 
the animals that made them. This, Priestley holds, is largely the origin of our more 
complex idea of causation: as a man necessarily advances in the habit of generalising his 
ideas, ‘he calls chairs, tables, nests, webs, &c. by the general term effects, and men, 
animals, &c. that produce them, by the term causes’. Priestley then instances the slightly 
different, and somewhat problematic, example of our constant observation that one plant 
proceeds from another, and one animal from another ‘by natural vegetation, or 
generation’. According to Priestley, although the parent plant or animal is commonly 
referred to as a ‘cause’, the word is, in this instance, used in a less proper sense as the 
plant or animal has ‘no design’ in producing its effect, and no ‘comprehension of the 
nature or use of what they produce’.
36
 For one thing to be the ‘proper cause’ of another it 
is necessary for it to be ‘capable of comprehending the nature and uses of those 
productions’ of which it is the cause. The constant observation of this conjunction of 
causes and effects leads us to internalise the maxim that ‘wherever there is a fitness or 
correspondence of one thing to another, there must have been a cause capable of 
comprehending, and of designing that fitness’. To the possible objection that this 
empirical account of causation opens the door to relativism Priestley responds that: 
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The experience and observations of all men, without exception, are so much alike, that 
such associations of ideas as these must necessarily have been formed in all their minds, 
so that there is no possible cause of any difference of opinion on the subject.
37
           
       
 Priestley then proceeds to the specifically theological aspect of his argument. 
Granting the validity of the previous explanations, it ought to be acknowledged that: 
 
If a table or a chair must have had a designing cause, capable of comprehending their 
nature and uses, [then] the wood, or the tree, of which the table was made, and also the 
man that constructed it, must likewise have had a designing cause, and a cause, or author, 
capable of comprehending all the powers and properties of which they are possessed, and 
therefore of an understanding greatly superior to that of any man, who is very far, indeed, 
from comprehending his own frame.
38
  
  
Even if we were to allow that the species of man had no beginning, it would not follow 
that ‘it could be the cause of itself’; for ‘the idea of a cause of any thing implies not only 
something prior to itself, or at least cotemporary with itself, but something capable at 
least of comprehending what it produces’.
39
 For the same reason,  
 
All the species of brute animals, and the world to which they belong, and with which they 
make but one system, and indeed all the visible universe (which, as far as we can judge, 
bears all the marks of being one work) must have had a cause, or author, possessed of 
what we may justly call infinite power and intelligence. 
 
It is thus possible, Priestley claims, to show from ‘the most irresistible evidence’ and 
from ‘the strongest analogies possible’ that ‘the world must have had a designing cause, 
distinct from, and superior to itself’. We might just as well claim that ‘a table has not a 
designing cause’ as that ‘the world, or the universe, considered as one system, had 
none’.
40
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 In letter III Priestley considers four common objections to his basic theistic 
hypothesis. Firstly, he attempts to answer the argument that if we accept that the universe 
requires an intelligent cause then, for the same reason, we could argue that ‘that 
intelligent cause must require a superior intelligent cause, and so on ad infinitum’.
41
 To 
avoid this infinite regression, it could be alleged, it is surely simpler to say that the 
universe had no cause than to say that the cause which produced it had none. Priestley 
answers this with a logically fragile train of reasoning. Firstly, he holds that it is a self-
evident truth that something must have existed from eternity (otherwise nothing could 
have existed at present); secondly, he argues that this original being must be capable of 
comprehending itself and therefore must have been ‘necessarily uncaused’. Thirdly, he 
argues that a being capable of comprehending itself may be called ‘infinite’, and that ‘we 
may, perhaps, be authorised to say’ that an infinite being, unlike a finite being, does not 
require a cause. Priestley’s cautious wording in this third part of his argument is part of 
his attempt to negotiate the difficulty of the fact that he is discussing truths which are, 
strictly speaking, ‘above our comprehension’ as finite creatures.
42
 As we have seen time 
and again in Priestley’s writings, it is crucial for him that the doctrines of religion are in 
no sense contrary to reason. Priestley is here at the limits of what can be understood by 
the human mind, and yet he is at pains to stress that these truths are not irrational or 
mysterious in any way. This leaves him in what is arguably a paradoxical position: 
although the conclusions we reach about an uncaused, infinite being are, by their nature, 
‘above our comprehension’, we are, says Priestley, ‘compelled’ into them by ‘the plainest 
and the most cogent train of reasoning’; although it may be said to be ‘above our reason’ 
to comprehend ‘how this original being, and the cause of all other beings, should be 
himself uncaused’, it is ‘by no means properly contrary to reason’.
43
  
 Whereas Priestley had been forced to rely on a partly demonstrative proposition in 
the first part of his argument, he is afterwards keen to show that his conclusion can be 
reached by empirical reasoning. That there is ‘an uncaused intelligent being’ follows as a 
necessary conclusion from our experience of ‘what does actually exist’.
44
 Here, however, 
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Priestley soon runs into problems. He holds that from experience we learn of the 
existence of ‘such things as are incapable of comprehending themselves, are finite, and 
[that] therefore require a cause’. Although this experience provides us with an analogy 
for judging of other finite things, ‘it by no means furnishes any analogy by which to 
judge concerning what is totally different from any thing to which our experience 
extends’.
45
 Priestley’s purpose here is to show that although we are right to say that all 
finite things require a cause, we are wrong to extend this rule to things ‘infinite’ and ‘not 
destitute of original self-comprehension’ because we have had no experience of infinite 
things. It is thus wrong to say that the cause of the universe requires a cause. The 
problem, of course, is that in the process of refuting one argument, Priestley has 
seemingly undermined his original argument for the existence of a God by denying the 
grounds for the analogy between what we observe of finite causes and what we infer 
about the origin of the universe as a whole. 
 The second point which Priestley attempts to refute is the argument that ‘a whole 
may have properties which the parts have not’; whilst each part of the universe might 
require a cause, it could be argued, it does not necessarily follow that the whole universe 
does.
46
 This objection to the design argument is, in some ways, particularly problematic 
for Priestley, as it bears some resemblance to his own argument for the materiality of 
man. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Priestley had relied strongly on the idea 
that just because the individual parts of the brain are not capable of thinking, this does not 
mean that the brain conceived as a system of parts cannot think. In response to the 
objection, Priestley relies on the analogy between our experience of objects in the world 
and our assumptions about the universe as a whole in an attempt to demonstrate the 
manifest contradiction of the proposition that an arrangement of ‘caused beings’ could 
constitute an ‘uncaused one’: 
 
To say, that the whole universe may have had no cause, when it is acknowledged that 
each of its parts, separately taken, must have had one, would be the same thing as saying 
that a house may have had no maker, though the walls, the roof, the windows, the doors, 
and all the parts of which it consists, must have had one.    
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He subsequently points out, bizarrely given his earlier writings, that such a conclusion 
would clearly contradict ‘what we may call our common sense’.
47
 Priestley then attempts 
to differentiate his own argument on the mind of man from this objection to his theism. 
Whereas ‘thinking’ and ‘materiality’ are merely different, ‘caused’ and ‘uncaused’ are 
contradictory. Thus whereas in the first case it is not impossible that the former could 
result from the latter, in the second case it clearly is. However, Priestley, again, soon runs 
into problems. Firstly, he states, in attempting to invalidate the theory that intelligence in 
the universe could result from the arrangement of the sun, the earth, and the other planets, 
that the universe is ‘so unlike the uniform composition of a brain, that the argument from 
analogy entirely fails’. Again, this seems to inadvertently undermine his earlier argument 
for the being of a deity: it is difficult to see how, if the analogy between the human mind 
and the universe as a whole ‘entirely fails’, Priestley’s earlier analogy between a house or 
a table and the universe could be at all meaningful. Secondly, Priestley, albeit 
hypothetically, allows the supposition that ‘all that is intellectual in the universe, should 
be the necessary result of what is not intellectual in it’. Even if this were the case, argues 
Priestley, ‘there should still be what has been sometimes called a soul of the universe’; 
this hypothesis is, to Priestley’s mind, essentially theistic and ‘would be a real foundation 
of religion’.
48
 Despite the fact that Priestley quickly dismisses this supposition (‘our 
imagination’, he says, ‘revolts at the idea’), he is here facing the same problem he had 
come up against in the Disquisitions: that everything in the universe is the divine power, 
and thus that the deity itself might be material.
49
 
 The third point which Priestley considers in letter III is the objection that his 
argument leads to a species of anthropomorphism: that ‘as all the intelligence we are 
acquainted with resides in the brains of men and animals’, then the deity, ‘if he be a being 
distinct from the universe, and intelligent, must […] have in him something resembling 
the structure of the brain’.
50
 To this Priestley responds that the fact that the deity and the 
human mind possess intelligence does not necessarily mean that they are similar in other 
respects. He draws on examples from natural philosophy to illustrate the point that ‘Many 
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things have common properties that are very dissimilar in other respects’.
51
 Steel and air, 
for example, are both possessed of the property of elasticity; however, by means of sense 
perception, we would not be able to find any similarities between these two substances. 
Here Priestley hints at how he might have attempted to resolve the problem concerning 
the relation of the deity to the physical world by drawing on an analogy from his research 
in natural philosophy. There are many intangible powers in nature – Priestley lists as 
examples gravitation and repulsion – which can act, even in places occupied by other 
bodies. Just like these powers, Priestley conjectures, ‘the divine power […] may 
penetrate, and fill all space, occupied or unoccupied by other substances, and yet be itself 
the object of none of our senses’.
52
                   
 Fourthly, and finally, Priestley considers the argument advanced by the atheists of 
antiquity that ‘the universe might have been formed by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, 
which had been in motion from all eternity, and therefore must […] have been in all 
possible situations’.
53
 Against this Priestley argues, slightly more convincingly, that the 
ancient philosophers had only a confused notion of what an atom really was. ‘Atoms’, 
according to Priestley, can only mean ‘solid particles of matter […] which, however 
small, are perfectly compact’ and must therefore ‘consist of parts that have strong powers 
of attraction’.
54
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is this force of attraction, 
rather than body itself, which, for Priestley, constitutes anything like the ‘essence’ of 
matter.
55
 There is thus no reason why, from experience, we ought to conclude that ‘these 
small masses of matter could have those powers without communication ab extra’.
56
 We 
might just as well, according to Priestley, claim that magnets or even human beings were 
‘originally existent’ as we might claim that atoms, properly understood, could have come 
into existence without an external cause. 
 Having defended, to his satisfaction, the argument for the existence of a God 
against the most commonly advanced objections, Priestley moves on in letters IV-VIII to 
consider what can reasonably be affirmed – ‘what the actual phenomena of nature 
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compel us to admit’ – about the attributes of God.
57
 Having proved that there must be a 
self-existent being, Priestley argues that we ‘cannot help concluding’ that this being must 
be infinitely powerful, infinitely intelligent, omnipresent, eternal, unequalled, and 
unchanging. These qualities, to which he afterwards refers as the ‘primary attributes of 
the deity’, he holds as largely self-evident once we have accepted the arguments in favour 
of the being of God.
58
 He then attempts to illustrate a number of arguments to prove the 
benevolence of the deity. Priestley’s first step here is to draw out the teleological aspects 
of his design argument. In letter V he states that the marks of design in the system of 
nature prove conclusively that the author of nature had ‘some end in view’.
59
 It is evident, 
for example, that the end of plant and animal life is health and vitality. Taking it for 
granted that a state of health is a state of enjoyment, it is thus evident that the intention of 
the maker must have been the happiness of his creatures. Here again, Priestley’s 
optimistic assessment of the human condition comes to the fore. He argues that in order 
to ascertain the intention of the creator, we ought to consider not only the ‘actual state of 
things’ but the ‘tendencies of things in the future’.
60
 As we have seen before, Priestley 
considered the course of human history as a progress towards perfection; he here cites 
advances in medicine, governance, and religion in support of this belief.
61
 Since these 
advances ought to be attributed to divine providence, they afford yet another example of 
the divine benevolence.  
 In letter VI Priestley counters the objection that the existence of pain and death 
weighs against the idea that the deity desires the happiness of his creatures. Death, by 
allowing for a ‘succession of creatures, of each species’, makes the ‘sum of happiness 
[…] upon the whole, greater’.
62
 It is much more desirable that there should be a 
succession of individuals as this enables the whole species to advance more quickly 
towards maturity. The consistence of pain with the divine benevolence is explained, for 
Priestley, by Hartley’s theory of association. Pain, in Hartley’s system, is a necessary part 
of the formation of ideas in the minds of children; it is only by experiencing the pain 
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occasioned by falls or burns, for example, that children can develop the necessary caution 
against these occurrences.
63
 Against the objection that a ‘pure and perfect benevolence’ 
might have fashioned a ‘different original constitution of nature, in which evils might not 
have been necessary’, Priestley holds that there are no grounds on which to assert that 
this would even have been possible ‘within the limits of infinite power itself’.
64
 
Furthermore, Priestley argues that a system where the deity acts by ‘laws, or general 
methods’ is preferable to a hypothetical world in which the deity creates men ‘with all the 
feelings and ideas that are acquired in the course of a painful and laborious life’.
65
 
General laws allow for the exercise of wisdom both in God and in man; the present 
world, in Priestley’s scheme, allows for the formation of man in preparation for his future 
existence. 
 For Priestley proving the benevolence of the deity is the key to proving all of his 
moral attributes. Justice, mercy, veracity, and all other qualities of a moral nature are, 
philosophically considered, ‘only modifications of benevolence’.
66
 A being truly 
benevolent will thus necessarily act in accordance with the principles of justice, mercy, 
and veracity, because only by acting in this way could he promote the happiness of the 
moral agents subject to his governance. Accepting that the deity is benevolent, therefore, 
is a sufficient proof that he deals with moral agents justly. We can thus be certain that 
virtuous or vicious actions will be rewarded or punished accordingly in an afterlife, even 
if, in this world, the wicked might, ‘in some cases, derive an advantage from their 
vices’.
67
 However, in addition to this assurance, there is, according to Priestley, 
independent empirical evidence of the moral government of the world: primarily, the 
observable truth that, in the majority of cases, ‘virtue gives a man a better chance for 
happiness than vice’.
68
 This very simple truth is largely the foundation of the moral 
aspect of Priestley’s natural theology: a system where the pleasure or pain occasioned by 
natural occurrences is fixed by the deity, in such a way as to effect the general happiness 
of his creation: 
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It cannot, therefore, but be, that virtue must, upon the whole, lead to happiness, and vice 
to misery; and since this arises from the constitution of nature, and of the world, it must 
have been the intention of the author of nature that it should be so.
69
            
 
 In letter VIII Priestley advances the evidence, from natural religion, for the future 
existence of man. He here relies solely on one argument. Accepting that things are 
evidently in a progress to some better state, there is, says Priestley, ‘some reason’ to 
expect that ‘this melioration will go on without limits’. At various points in the previous 
four letters Priestley has asserted that we can be reasonably sure that the deity is infinitely 
benevolent. He here appears to take the infinite benevolence of the deity for granted and 
argues that, ‘as exact and equal government arises from perfect benevolence’, 
 
we cannot […] but be led by this analogy to expect a more perfect retribution than we see 
to take place here, and, consequently, to look for a state where moral agents will find 
more exact rewards for virtue, and more ample punishments for vice, than they meet with 
in this world.
70
 
                 
Priestley himself is willing to admit that this is far from conclusive: the argument from 
analogy is not ‘so strong as to produce a confident expectation of such a future state’, but 
produces only ‘a wish for it’. His subsequent conjecture that ‘this wish itself, being 
produced by the analogy of nature, is some evidence of the thing wished for’ does little to 
conceal the essential weakness of the analogy.
71
 Notwithstanding this, however, Priestley 
goes on to assert that the natural evidence of the moral government of the world is so 
strong that even ‘those who are properly atheists, believing that nothing exists besides the 
world, or the universe’ ought to determine their conduct in accordance with it. This is an 
exceptional passage in that, in opposition to the widely held contemporary belief, it 
implies that an atheist could be virtuous. Priestley then goes on to claim, extraordinarily, 
that there may ‘be a future state, even though there be no God at all’.
72
 Just as we have no 
real knowledge of how the human species came into being, ‘our re-production may be as 
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much within the proper course of nature, as our original production’.
73
 This is part of 
Priestley’s attempt to describe in naturalistic terms the doctrines of his theology, and a 
part of his overall design to make the teachings of religion palatable to philosophically 
minded readers. He concludes this section with another analogy between theology and 
natural philosophy, comparing the hypothetical ‘dissolution of a human body by 
putrefaction, and the recovery of it’ to the ‘total solution of a piece of metal in a chymical 
menstruum’ which was once thought to be an absolute loss of it.
74
 
 It is worth noting that Priestley’s attempt to find evidence from nature for a future 
state marks a change in the arguments he had previously advanced in support of 
Christianity. In his Institutes Priestley had asserted that a future state was a doctrine of 
revealed, not natural, religion. His reason for doing so in this case was to deny the 
orthodox argument that an immaterial and thus immortal soul, deducible from reason, 
was sufficient evidence of a future state. It was on exactly this point that Berington, as we 
have seen, had criticised Priestley for weakening the arguments for natural religion.
75
 
One possible explanation for this change in Priestley’s sentiments is that, after the 
publication of Hume’s Dialogues in 1779, he felt that strengthening the arguments for 
natural religion had become a more pressing task.  
 Despite the lack of any explicit reference to Hume in the first part of Priestley’s 
work, it is significant that most of the arguments in the first eight letters had appeared, at 
various points, in the mouths of the characters in Hume’s Dialogues. In the course of the 
debate between the characters in Hume’s work, Cleanthes (Hume’s empirical theist) had 
voiced some of the defences of natural religion discussed above. In Part II, for example, 
Cleanthes outlines a more concise version of the argument from design (termed by 
Cleanthes the ‘argument a posteriori’) to that developed at some length by Priestley.
76
 
Cleanthes also shares Priestley’s optimism on the general prevalence of happiness: 
against Demea’s bleak depiction of human life in Part X, Cleanthes exclaims that ‘fact 
and experience’ prove conclusively that ‘Health is more common than sickness: Pleasure 
than pain: Happiness than misery. And for one vexation that we meet with, we attain, 
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upon computation, a hundred enjoyments’.
77
 Cleanthes’s summary of the moral 
implications of his theism is also very similar to Priestley’s position: in Part XII he tells 
Philo that ‘genuine theism’  
 
represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who 
created us for happiness, and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, 
will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will transfer us into an infinite variety of 
scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render our felicity complete and durable.
78
 
  
Likewise, some of the criticisms of Cleanthes’s position voiced by Philo (Hume’s 
sceptic) and Demea (Hume’s rationalist and – at other points, and somewhat 
incongruously – mystical theist) correspond to the hypothetical objections considered by 
Priestley in letter III. In Part IV of Hume’s work, for example, Philo questions 
Cleanthes’s claim that an immaterial being must be the cause of the material world, by 
asking why we should not then enquire into the cause of that immaterial being: ‘If the 
material world rests upon a similar ideal world’, argues Philo, ‘this ideal world must rest 
upon some other; and so on, without end’.
79
 In the same section, Demea claims that 
Cleanthes is essentially advocating a species of anthropomorphism by insisting on the 
similarity of the human mind and the divine, corresponding to the third possible objection 
answered by Priestley in letter III.
80
 
 Yet it is not until letter IX that Priestley finally comes to consider Hume’s work 
directly. It is clear from his comments here that he had perceived the thrust of Hume’s 
intentions. Priestley interpreted Philo as voicing ‘the sentiments of the writer’, and 
understood Philo’s eventual acceptance of the theistic argument in Part XII as 
disingenuous: ‘though the debate seemingly closes in favour of the theist’, noted 
Priestley, ‘the victory is clearly on the side of the atheist’.
81
 However, in its response to 
Hume, Priestley’s work is, again, problematic. The first point to note is that Priestley, 
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although he acknowledged that Hume’s writings had undoubtedly had ‘a considerable 
effect in promoting the cause of atheism’, persisted in refusing to take the metaphysical 
aspects of Hume’s thought entirely seriously: ‘With respect to Mr. Hume’s metaphysical 
writings in general’, Priestley informed his imagined correspondent, ‘my opinion is, that, 
on the whole, the world is very little the wiser for them’.
82
 This partly explains the fact 
that when he finally does turn to Hume’s ideas on religion, Priestley is, at points, 
unwilling to dignify his antagonist with a serious response. In considering Philo’s 
speculations on the possible origins of the world, for example, Priestley notes that they 
are ‘unworthy of a philosopher, and miserably trifling on so serious a subject’, and thus 
require ‘no particular animadversion’, even though they investigate the necessary 
consequences of Cleanthes’s (and Priestley’s)  insistence that we can infer about the deity 
only from what we observe of the natural world. In this respect, it is interesting that 
Priestley characterises Hume’s writings in terms very similar to Wodrow and Kenrick. 
He describes Hume’s prose as being ‘wire-drawn’ and merely ‘literary’ in character, as 
opposed to writings concerned with ‘the pursuit of truth’ or ‘the advancement of virtue 
and happiness’: 
 
In many of his Essays (which, in general, are excessively wire-drawn) Mr. Hume seems 
to have had nothing in view but to amuse his readers, which he generally does agreeably 
enough; proposing doubts to received hypotheses, leaving them without any solution, and 
altogether unconcerned about it. In short, he is to be considered in these Essays as a mere 
writer or declaimer, even more than Cicero in his book of Tusculan Questions.
83
 
 
In a similar way, Priestley later describes Hume’s objections to the arguments for the 
benevolence of the deity as ‘mere cavilling’. The allusion to childishness found in both 
Wodrow’s and Kenrick’s responses to Hume recurs in Priestley’s account: after 
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criticising Hume for evidently not having read Hartley’s Observations on Man, Priestley 
notes that ‘Compared with Dr. Hartley, I consider Mr. Hume as not even a child’.
84
  
 This said, however, Priestley does make some attempt to engage with aspects of 
Hume’s scepticism. He tells his imaginary correspondent that he will ‘recite what I think 
has the most of the appearance of strength, or plausibility, in what Mr. Hume has 
advanced on the atheistical side of the question’.
85
 This, once again, emphasises 
Priestley’s commitment to the idea that atheistic ideas ought to be engaged with, and 
locates him firmly within a rational dissenting tradition which can be traced back to 
Doddridge’s academy lectures.
86
 Yet, in response to Hume’s criticisms, he merely 
reiterates the arguments he had made in the earlier letters. Priestley’s fundamental 
problem is that he largely ignores what is arguably Philo’s most forceful criticism of 
Cleanthes’s theistic position: that the analogy upon which all inferences about the deity 
necessarily depend within an empiricist theological framework is essentially a very weak 
one. It is this point which Philo makes at some length immediately after Cleanthes first 
outlines the argument from design in Part II of the Dialogues; here, Philo argues that ‘the 
dissimilitude’ between the universe and a house is ‘so striking’ that ‘the utmost’ 
Cleanthes can ‘pretend to’ is ‘a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar 
cause’.
87
 The same point underpins Philo’s statement towards the end of the work that 
observations pertaining to the natural world, although not necessarily inconsistent with a 
theological explanation, cannot provide a foundation for inferences concerning a wise 
and benevolent deity such as Cleanthes argues must exist.
88
 Priestley’s failure to 
recognise this point is made even more explicit by the various contradictions in his own 
account, some of which I have explored above.  
 It is only in letter X that Priestley does respond to this aspect of Hume’s 
argument. Here, in considering Hume’s contention in the eleventh of his Philosophical 
Essays that we cannot, from natural religion, infer a future state, Priestley notes Hume’s 
insistence on the ‘total dissimilarity between the Divine Being and other intelligent 
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agents’.
89
 In response to this, Priestley argues that the deity is not ‘in Mr. Hume’s sense, 
an unique, of a genus or species by himself’, but ‘is to be placed in the general class of 
intelligent and designing agents, though infinitely superior to all others of that kind’.
90
 
This, however, obviously contradicts Priestley’s earlier statement, in refutation of the 
idea that the deity requires a cause, that experience does not provide us with an analogy 
with which to judge of infinite things. 
 It is also interesting to note how Priestley attempts to fit Hume into a tradition of 
Scottish philosophy. As we have seen already, Priestley himself associated this Scottish 
tradition with an arbitrary recourse to ‘instinctive’ principles in order to account for the 
origins of certain ideas more philosophically explained by Hartley’s theory of 
association.
91
 In letter XIV, for example, ‘An Examination of Mr. Hume’s Metaphysical 
Writings’, Priestley censures Hume’s attempt in the fifth of his Philosophical Essays to 
explain why we receive a stronger conception of an idea when we are led from one idea 
to another by resemblance, contiguity, or causation: ‘Unable to account for this’, says 
Priestley, Hume ‘ascribes it to an instinct of nature’.
92
 Priestley is here explicit on what 
this kind of argumentative procedure reminds him of: Hume, he says, ‘might just as well 
have done what Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, did afterwards, viz. ascribe the sentiment 
of belief itself, as well as that which is the cause of belief, to an arbitrary instinct of 
nature’.
93
    
 
Responses to Priestley’s Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever 
 
Some of the problems with Priestley’s response to Hume may explain why a number of 
readers of the first drafts of the Letters among Priestley’s correspondents advised him to 
delay publication of the work. In November 1779 Priestley had told Cappe that Lindsey 
and John Jebb had thought the Letters ‘too metaphysical’ and had advised him not to 
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publish it.
94
 In January 1780 Lindsey told Turner that Priestley had not published the 
Letters at an earlier date because of the ‘too abstruse metaphysical cast of the former part 
of it’.
95
 However, these concerns did not appear to strike Priestley’s admirers. Samuel 
Kenrick read Priestley’s Letters in 1781; his response, detailed in a letter to Wodrow of 
15 April, is particularly interesting for its conspicuous lack of any engagement with the 
theological and philosophical arguments outlined in Priestley’s work. Kenrick clearly 
understood the book as, primarily, a response to Hume: he told Wodrow that it was ‘in 
the form of a l
r
 to a young gentleman, who seems to have been a disciple of Hume’s with 
regard to infidelity’. More specifically, he interpreted the work as a riposte to Adam 
Smith’s attempt to defend Hume’s personal character in his letter to Strahan: ‘I am glad 
to find’, Kenrick told Wodrow, ‘that he [Priestley] has given a challenge to Dr Adam 
Smith who has spoken so highly of Hume’s Wisdom and Virtue to defend his admired 
friend’. In this sense, it is clear that Kenrick understood the debate as being as much 
about Hume’s personal reputation as about the philosophical cogency of his ideas. 
Kenrick saw Priestley as issuing a challenge to Smith to defend the comment he had 
made in his adulatory letter: he told Wodrow that ‘if the last Dr [i.e. Smith] do not step 
forth as the guardian of his friend’s reputation, it must be presumed he is either afraid of 
his antagonist, or of the validity of the cause’.
96
 Wodrow too was by no means 
unsympathetic to the work. Despite subsequently acknowledging his preference for Reid, 
he told Kenrick in June 1787 that he had read Priestley’s Letters at Edinburgh and ‘liked 
it much’.
97
 
 However, another of Priestley’s respondents was much less receptive and did 
focus closely on the book’s argument. Matthew Turner (d. 1789?) published his Answer 
to Dr. Priestley, on the Existence of God anonymously in 1782. Turner’s book is 
significant because it was the first response to Priestley to emerge from within the 
intellectual culture of rational dissent which adopted a line of argument more heterodox 
than Priestley’s own. In fact, Turner’s book was nothing less than an explicit avowal of 
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atheism.
98
 In many ways Turner’s Answer represented exactly what Priestley’s critics, 
such as Berington and Price, had most feared. It pursued the empirical lines of reasoning 
advocated by Priestley one step further, and in doing so it excluded any notion of a deity 
from a coherent explanation of the natural and moral system of the world. It also seized 
on Priestley’s suggestion that an unbeliever in Christianity could be virtuous, and used 
this concession to deny outright the expediency of grounding ethics in any kind of 
theological system.    
 Little is known about Turner’s early life: he was a surgeon and a chemist at 
Liverpool, who developed a friendship with the pottery manufacturer Josiah Wedgwood 
(1730-1795) in the early 1760s. It was most likely through Wedgwood’s partner, Thomas 
Bentley (1731-1780), the porcelain manufacturer, that Turner first met Priestley.
99
 
Between 1762 and 1765 Turner delivered a course of lectures on chemistry and 
pneumatics at the Warrington Academy. However, it is clear from a letter Turner wrote to 
John Seddon accepting the post at Warrington on 16 March 1762 that he was acquainted 
with Priestley and Seddon prior to commencing his duties at the academy.
100
 It is thus 
likely that Priestley and Turner became fairly well acquainted: Priestley attended 
Turner’s lectures at Warrington, and, according to his own testimony, was largely 
indebted to Turner for introducing him to the study of chemistry.
101
 The question of the 
authorship of the Answer to Dr. Priestley has been the subject of some speculation. The 
source of the attribution to Turner was a note added to the American edition of Priestley’s 
Memoirs by Thomas Cooper (1759-1839), describing Turner as a ‘professed Atheist’ and 
a ‘republican’.
102
 However, as David Berman has correctly pointed out, the text contains 
two separate voices: the ‘Answer’, a central analysis of Priestley’s arguments purportedly 
conveyed to the compiler of the book by his unnamed ‘friend’, is framed by an 
advertisement, a prefatory address, and a postscript, the last two of which are signed by 
someone identifying himself as ‘William Hammon’.
103
 This has led Berman to conjecture 
that the book was actually the work of two authors: William Turner, the author of the 
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‘Answer’, and an unknown ‘editor’.
104
 If Berman’s thesis is correct, then it is possible 
that the unknown editor was Turner’s friend Bentley.
105
  
 However, the question of the authorship of the work is less interesting than the 
rhetorical strategy which the framing device enables. Much as in Hume’s Dialogues, the 
presence of more than one authorial voice allows the work to express different and 
contradictory ideas about religion. It is likely, in fact, that the narrative was structured in 
such a way for this express purpose: the work makes a radical statement rejecting 
Christian belief, whilst simultaneously qualifying this statement by purposely limiting the 
scope of its analysis. In the advertisement to the work the editor assures his readers that 
the ‘question here handled is not so much, whether a Deity and his attributed excellencies 
exist, as whether there is any Natural or Moral proof of his existence and of those 
attributes’.
106
 In this way, he clearly limits the scope of his enquiry to natural religion: 
‘Revealed knowledge is not descanted upon; therefore Christians at least need not take 
offence’.
107
 In the prefatory address the tone becomes much more polemical. The editor 
there goes on to state that by reading Priestley’s letters and the answer that his friend had 
written to them, his ‘scepticism’ in religion was changed into ‘atheism’. Here he is 
explicit in his acknowledgement: ‘when I am asked, whether there is a God or no God’, 
he writes, ‘I do not mince the matter, but I boldly answer there is none, and give my 
reasons for my disbelief’.
108
 At another point he states: 
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As to the question whether there is such an existent Being as an atheist, to put that out of 
all manner of doubt, I do declare upon my honour that I am one. Be it therefore for the 
future remembered, that in London in the kingdom of England, in the year of our Lord 
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly declared himself an 
atheist.
109
 
 
This is very likely to be a response to a passage in Philip Doddridge’s popular work of 
practical divinity, The Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul (1745). In chapter XI  
Doddridge had challenged his infidel reader to sign a dated memorandum of his 
renunciation of Christianity, confident that even ‘many a Man, who would be thought a 
Deist’ would never dare.
110
 However, it is worth noting that, despite these unflinching 
avowals, the editor afterwards repeats the insistence of the advertisement that he is 
discussing only natural religion: he promises Priestley that, as soon as the latter publishes 
a defence of revealed religion, he will ‘hold [him]self open to it’.
111
 In this way he 
qualifies, at least nominally, his declaration of unbelief. In an attempt to define more 
specifically what he means by atheism, the editor goes on to align himself with the 
opinions of Hume, Helvetius, Diderot, and D’Alembert. As Martin Priestman has argued, 
the positions subsequently expressed, both in the preface and in the answer, were 
undoubtedly informed by these thinkers.
112
 However, they are also very close to 
Priestley’s own ideas. Despite their widely divergent conclusions, it is significant that the 
lines of reasoning pursued by Turner and Priestley were essentially very similar.  
 In the final passage of the prefatory address the editor begins to outline the 
philosophical basis of his atheism. From this it is clear that he shared both Priestley’s 
belief in the power of reason and his commitment to empirical principles: ‘Against my 
feeling and my experience’, he states, ‘I cannot argue, for upon these sensations is built 
all argument’.
113
 Like Priestley the editor concludes from the observation of nature that 
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there is ‘a principle of intelligence and design’ in the universe. Where he differs from 
Priestley is in his denial that this principle is ‘extraneous from itself’.
114
 He subsequently 
compares this intelligent principle – what he calls the ‘vis naturæ’, or ‘the perpetual 
industry, intelligence and provision of nature’ – to ‘the properties of gravity or any 
elastic, attractive or repulsive power’.
115
 As we have seen, Priestley had made exactly this 
analogy in his Letters, and in the Disquisitions had actually equated the attractive and 
repulsive forces with the divine power, notwithstanding his denial that these forces were 
in any way a part of the deity itself.
116
 Priestley’s rather tenuous distinction on this point 
is given short shrift by the editor: he insists that the creative designing principle is, like 
these other properties, inherent in matter. Whereas systems, such as Priestley’s, which 
ascribe this designing principle to an ‘extraneous foreign force’ make ‘the universe and 
all other organised matter a machine made or contrived by the arbitrary will of another 
Being’, the editor’s own system ‘admits no other God or designing principle than matter 
itself and its various organisations’.
117
  
 The editor next draws attention to Priestley’s contentious suggestion that the 
existence of a future state of rewards and punishments is possible even if we allow the 
possibility that the deity does not exist. This leads him on to one of the central questions 
his preface is attempting to address, namely, ‘whether immorality, unhappiness or 
timidity necessarily do or naturally ought to ensue from a system of atheism’, or, put 
another way, Pierre Bayle’s question of ‘whether honesty sufficient for the purposes of 
civil society can be insured by other motives than the belief of a Deity?’
118
 Like Bayle, 
and unlike, of course, the vast majority of his contemporaries, the editor believes that 
virtuous action is consistent with atheism. What is particularly significant here is that he 
explains morality in very similar terms to Priestley, except, of course, with the important 
distinction that he omits the necessity of a belief in the deity. According to the editor’s 
system, ‘There is nothing in fact important to human nature but happiness, which is or 
ought to be the end of our being’; ‘self-happiness’ is consistent with, indeed is a 
necessary condition for, the happiness of all, since ‘we cannot individually be happy 
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unless we join also in promoting the happiness of others’.
119
 Morality is still closely 
linked with the hope of rewards and the fear of punishments. However, this is no longer, 
as in Priestley’s scheme, a divine sanction, but a starkly secular one: ‘men of low minds 
[…] will always have their religion or pretence of it’, ‘but I am mistaken’, the editor 
declares, ‘if it is not the gallows or the pillory that more govern their morals than the 
gospel or the pulpit’.
120
           
 In the ‘Answer’ constituting the main body of the text an even more penetrating 
criticism of Priestley’s position is developed. Here Turner begins by questioning one of 
Priestley’s fundamental assumptions. According to Turner, Priestley’s conviction that the 
universe is an ‘effect’ is ‘a postulatum without concession and without proof’.
121
 The 
universe might just as well be a cause. If the universe has existed from all eternity, as 
Priestley allows that it probably has, then it is surely more rational to ascribe design to 
what Turner calls the ‘energy of nature’, than to ascribe it, as Priestley does, to ‘some 
other extraneous Being’.
122
 Turner returns to Priestley’s equivocal position on the 
relationship between matter, the forces which act upon it, and the deity. Following 
Priestley’s own rules of reasoning, there is no reason for him, according to Turner, to 
‘suppose gravity, elasticity and electricity to have been imprest [sic] on bodies by a 
superior Being, and not originally inherent in matter’. It could only be in order to ‘favour 
his own hypothesis of a Deity’ that Priestley should adhere to his own theory rather than, 
for example, Hume’s conjecture that ‘motion might as well as other powers and 
properties have been originally inherent in matter’.
123
 This, of course, makes Priestley 
guilty of the philosophical fallacy which he declaims so fervently against in others: 
positing causes which appearances do not strictly necessitate.  
 Turner also points out the paradox at the heart of Priestley’s argument: the fact 
that he continually emphasises that all our knowledge is derived from our experience of 
finite causes and yet holds that we can infer from this knowledge that there is an infinite 
cause. Turner mocks Priestley’s paradoxical claims, his own convoluted syntax 
mimicking the specious reasoning of his antagonist: 
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He [Priestley] goes on with his career of words to argue about an unseen being with 
another whom he will allow to have no idea of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail 
in the dispute, whether he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having 
any.
124
 
 
Like Hume’s character Philo, he also recognises that the analogies at the heart of 
Priestley’s arguments are fallacious: ‘Neither is there any analogy between the works of 
art, as a table or house, and of nature, as a man or tree’.
125
 He continues in a tone of thinly 
muted sarcasm to enquire of Priestley ‘whether there is not some difference between a 
table and the world?’
126
 In response to Priestley’s arguments for the benevolence of the 
deity, Turner charges Priestley with projecting human qualities and aspirations onto an 
imaginary divinity. In a powerfully destructive passage he writes: 
 
The whole of this is absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the 
rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into imaginary Beings with 
more imaginary properties and then fall down and worship them. God is said to have 
made man in the image of himself. If he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return 
makes God in his own image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, 
so differs the God of each devotee. They are all idolaters or anthropomorphites to a man; 
there is none but an atheist that is not the one or the other.
127
      
 
The charge of ‘enthusiasm’ would have particularly stung Priestley, given that his 
attempt to formulate a rational defence of Christianity was, in part at least, an attempt to 
distinguish true Christianity from ‘enthusiastic’ and irrational beliefs.  
 What is again significant about the ‘Answer’ is that it draws attention to some of 
the dangerous consequences of Priestley’s reasoning. Turner focuses specifically on 
Priestley’s contention that ‘there may be a future state though there be no God, because 
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he [Priestley] reasons it may be in the course of nature’.
128
 However, if this is true then 
‘the course of nature may be as it were without a God’, and thus there is ‘no natural 
proof of a Deity’.
129
 In fact, throughout out the ‘Answer’ Turner is concerned to show 
that morality and religion should be separated. He is adamant that religion is not an 
adequate foundation on which to ground moral judgments: to ‘support still the efficacy of 
religion in making men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of 
fact’.
130
 He argues that ‘It were better to seek another support for morality than a belief in 
God’.
131
 Although he does not attempt to outline a complete secular theory of morality, 
he essentially ‘naturalises’ Priestley’s own natural theology. In other words, he takes 
many of the arguments which Priestley advances to prove God’s benevolence and shows 
that these hold good, even when the existence of the deity is denied. For example, if, as 
Priestley argues, ‘virtue tends to happiness’, then there is no reason why ‘a sensible 
atheist’ should not ‘hold it right to be virtuous’.
132
 Significantly, Turner here refers back 
to the reports of Hume’s death: ‘Who could wish an end better or more happy than that of 
Mr. Hume, who most certainly was an atheist’.
133
 Turner agrees with Priestley that the 
‘true principle most commonly seen in human actions’ is ‘the natural inclination of man 
for pleasure’, however it is ‘philosophy’ and not ‘religion’ which can reconcile this 
inclination with morality. Even if there is no God it does not necessarily follow that ‘the 
world which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted’, for: 
 
The wisdom of nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection of the 
Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be spared, especially such a 
haughty jealous, and vindictive one as God is most generally represented to be.
134
 
 
 Priestley replied to Turner’s tract five months later with his Additional Letters to 
a Philosophical Unbeliever, in Answer to Mr. William Hammon (1782). The substance of 
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his argument was an attempt to prove that the universe could not be an ‘uncaused 
being’.
135
 He relies heavily on the assumption that a cause must be capable of 
understanding an effect; the reason why an eye, an animal, or any other part of the 
physical universe cannot have been uncaused is, says Priestley, ‘that they are not capable 
of comprehending themselves’.
136
 He continues: 
 
If any being whatever bear the marks of design, there must exist somewhere a mind 
capable of that design; and if it be not capable of it itself, we must look for it in some 
other being.
137
  
 
Priestley largely ignores Turner’s (and Hume’s) criticisms of the analogical aspects of his 
argument. His insusceptibility to these criticisms largely stems from his inability to 
conceive of the natural world within anything but a teleological framework. He persists in 
the comparison between a ‘telescope’ and an ‘eye’ because they are ‘equally mere 
instruments, adapted to a particular purpose’. They both, therefore, ‘prove the existence 
of what we call a mind, capable of perceiving that end or purpose, with a power of 
providing that means, and of adapting it to its end’.
138
 To Turner’s provocative 
suggestion that the only thing which hinders ‘a series of finite causes to be carried back 
ad infinitum’ is that ‘the reasoner or contemplator of the course of nature is tired’, 
Priestley dogmatically replies that ‘the mind will always revolt at the idea of going back 
ad infinitum, through an infinite succession of mere finite causes’.
139
 
 Interestingly, Priestley censures as ‘manifestly disingenuous’ Turner’s claim that 
his sustained attacks on the arguments for natural religion were not to be interpreted as a 
denial of the doctrines of revealed religion.
140
 However, Priestley seemingly endorses 
Turner’s assertion of the independence of the two when he attempts to convince Turner 
that a belief in revelation is compatible with Turner’s atheistic beliefs. In an extraordinary 
passage Priestley urges that, as long as Turner admits ‘an intention, or design, in nature’, 
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then he ‘cannot exclude the idea of what we call character, and proper personality, 
whether it belong to a being distinct from the visible universe, or to the visible universe 
itself’. Admitting this, ‘the whole system of revelation may follow’, even though Turner 
has denied all of the natural and moral arguments for the being of a God.
141
 The passage 
exemplifies Priestley’s equivocal position in relation to the authority of natural religion: 
the fact that, at points, he appears to lay so much stress upon it, whilst, at others, he 
asserts its proper subordination to the doctrines of revelation. This same notion had led 
Priestley to close his letter on Hume’s Dialogues by repeating in earnestness what Philo 
had concluded ‘by way of cover and irony’: that a ‘person seasoned with a just sense of 
the imperfection of natural reason will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity’.
142
 
Priestley’s earlier, bold accusations that Thomas Reid and William Enfield were, in 
different ways, guilty of ‘scepticism’ on account of their cautious approach to the powers 
of human reasoning, sit uneasily with his claim here to be, in Philo’s words, ‘a 
philosophical sceptic’ as an essential step to being ‘a sound and believing christian’.
143
                 
 These two passages are also, perhaps, indicative of the turn that Priestley’s 
intellectual career would take after 1782. Priestley’s personal letters indicate that he had 
begun to turn away from metaphysics by the early 1780s. In April 1780 Priestley told 
Bretland that he was undecided as to whether it would be ‘worth while’ to publish a 
second edition of his Disquisitions; he admitted that he had ‘not looked over it since it 
was published’ and had given up reading his antagonists’ responses to the work.
144
 In 
April 1782 he told Toulmin: ‘The call for the “Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever” has 
not been considerable’. In this letter the alacrity which Priestley had characteristically 
shown for controversy is conspicuously lacking: he told Toulmin that he would ‘perhaps’ 
reply to the answer he had just received from Turner.
145
 In October of the same year, 
Priestley told Caleb Rotheram that he had seen through the press what would be 
‘probably a last edition’ of the Disquisitions and treatise on necessity: ‘I think I have now 
quite done with these metaphysical subjects’, Priestley continued, ‘and shall confine 
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myself to philosophy [i.e. natural philosophy] and theology’.
146
 Following his election as 
minister to the congregation at the New Meeting House, Birmingham in 1780, Priestley 
held to his word, immersing himself in the study of early Christian history. Between 1782 
and 1794, when he left England permanently for North America, he produced three 
major, multi-volume works: An History of the Corruptions of Christianity (1782), An 
History of Early Opinions concerning Jesus Christ (1786), and A General History of the 
Christian Church (1790), all of which were concerned with proving the Unitarian nature 
of primitive Christianity. It is important to note, however, that to Priestley himself, this 
would not have been a radical shift in interests. Priestley conceived of his science, his 
philosophy, and his theology as all part of one, essentially religious, intellectual project. 
His turn to the study of Scripture and the patristic authors was a turn to the study of 
revealed, rather than natural religion; however, as we have seen in chapter 3, revealed 
religion had played an important role, even in his more strictly philosophical works.  
 Moreover, notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, there is some evidence to 
suggest that Priestley had intended to continue his metaphysical project. As early as 1775 
Priestley told Cappe that he had made ‘many observations on human nature, with a view 
to the illustration of Hartley’s theory’. These observations concerned ‘the conduct of the 
human mind and happiness’ and were ‘intermixed with observations on education’; 
Priestley told Cappe of his intention to ‘publish them altogether as one work’ at some 
point in the future.
147
 In November 1776 Lindsey told William Turner, in what was most 
likely a reference to this project, that Priestley was ‘in earnest, set down to his great 
metaphysical work’, noting his ‘great expectations’ of the book on the grounds of the 
‘clearness of his views of things, and art of making difficult things easy, and from his 
thorough comprehension of Hartley’.
148
 Priestley worked sporadically on this manuscript 
for as long as sixteen years. In the late 1780s, notwithstanding his earlier comment to 
Rotheram that he had ‘quite done’ with metaphysical subjects, he was evidently still at 
work on the project. A letter of 1787 records him requesting Lindsey to procure books 
from the London bookseller Samuel Hayes which Priestley required for the purpose of 
collecting ‘facts concerning human nature’ to aid his plan to ‘illustrate and extend’ 
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Hartley’s theory.
149
 However, all plans for this work were abandoned after the 
Birmingham riots of 1791.
150
 In his Appeal to the Public (1791), published in the wake of 
the riots, Priestley recorded the irreparable loss of a manuscript consisting of 
‘Illustrations of Hartley’s doctrine of Association of Ideas, and farther observations on 
the Human Mind’, which would ‘probably have been the most original, and nearly the 
last, of my publications’. Of the several volumes of ‘hints and loose materials’, Priestley 
informed his readers, not ‘one scrap was recovered’.
151
 In addition to this lost work, 
Priestley pursued one more metaphysical project.  In the early 1790s he persuaded his 
bookseller Joseph Johnson to issue a new edition of Anthony Collins’s Inquiry in an 
attempt to further promote his own necessitarianism.
152
 A letter to Lindsey of 17 October 
1790 indicates that William Frend (1757-1841), who was actively promoting 
Unitarianism in the University of Cambridge, had agreed to write a tract to accompany 
the work along with Priestley’s preface.
153
 The tract, however, never appears to have 
materialised.  
 James Dybikowski is thus, in part, right that the development of Priestley’s 
‘system of ideas’ spanned a fairly brief period between 1774 and 1780, and that by 1780 
Priestley’s ‘intensively creative philosophical period was largely over’.
154
 However, it is 
important not to impose our own systems for categorising knowledge onto Priestley’s 
more synoptic world view. His later works in theology were, to Priestley’s mind at least, 
a continuation of these metaphysical works. To continue my own narrative of the 
development of the philosophical ideas of the rational dissenters, however, I shall now 
return to the dissenting academies, and to Priestley’s younger contemporary, Thomas 
Belsham. In 1774 Unitarianism had begun to develop a more substantial institutional 
structure following the opening of Lindsey’s chapel at Essex Street in London. By 1787 
Priestley could refer to Lindsey’s chapel as ‘the head quarters of unitarianism’.
155
 In the 
1780s, following Priestley’s move to Birmingham, Unitarian doctrine found a more 
                                                 
149
 Letters to Lindsey, 1787. 
150
 Rutt, I, i, 274.  
151
 Priestley, An Appeal to the Public, on the Subject of the Riots in Birmingham (Birmingham, 1791), 38.  
152
 A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty. By Anthony Collins, Esq. Republished with a 
Preface, by Joseph Priestley (1790); Letters to Lindsey, 18 August 1790. 
153
 Letters to Lindsey, 17 October 1790. 
154
 Dybikowski, ‘Joseph Priestley, Metaphysician and Philosopher of Religion’,  86. 
155
 Letters to Lindsey, 17 June 1787. 
 216 
secure foothold in the provinces. By 1791 Priestley could write to Lindsey of his desire to 
found a second and ‘proper unitarian Chapel’ at Birmingham.
156
 In the last two decades 
of the eighteenth century, further provincial societies were formed through the efforts of a 
younger generation of Presbyterian radicals: William Christie (1750-1823) and Thomas 
Fyshe Palmer (1747-1802) in Scotland, William Turner (1761-1859) at Newcastle, Harry 
Toulmin (1766-1823) at Monton and later Atherton near Manchester, and William Frend 
at Cambridge. However, as I shall now demonstrate, in these years it was left largely to 
Belsham to transform Priestley’s philosophical system into an academic syllabus that 
would underpin the theological ideas of the emerging Unitarian movement.  
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5. The reception of Priestley’s ideas in the liberal dissenting academies (1781-1796) 
 
I began this thesis by considering the evolution of Priestley’s ideas in the Daventry and 
Warrington dissenting academies. We have seen how these ideas evolved through 
Priestley’s engagement in the 1770s and early 1780s with the writings of Reid, Beattie, 
and Oswald (chapter 2), with Price, Berington, and Palmer (chapter 3), and with Hume 
(chapter 4). By the early 1780s Priestley had fully formulated his mature philosophy of 
religion. In an attempt to trace the diffusion of these ideas through the intellectual culture 
of rational dissent from the 1780s onwards I shall now return, once again, to the 
academies. This final chapter examines how Priestley’s ideas made their way into the 
philosophy syllabuses taught at Warrington, Daventry, and New College, Hackney 
between 1781 and 1796. I focus on a series of lecture notes from Warrington, most likely 
dating from the early 1780s, before proceeding to examine the career and writings of 
Thomas Belsham. Belsham was undoubtedly the most important figure in relation to 
philosophy and rational dissent in the last two decades of the century. However, very 
little attention has been devoted to his work in this respect.
1
 Drawing on Belsham’s 
extensive published and manuscript works, I show how he developed Priestley’s 
philosophy of the 1770s and early 1780s into a series of lectures which formed the core 
of the philosophy syllabus at New College, Hackney until its closure in 1796. In the 
course of this analysis, I pay particular attention to Belsham’s treatment of the Scottish 
philosophers, drawing to a conclusion my survey of the intellectual ties between the 
English rational dissenters and the Scots.  
 As we have seen in chapter 2, Reid’s, Beattie’s, and Oswald’s books were all held 
in the Warrington Academy library. However, it is interesting, and perhaps surprising, 
that the extant records appear to indicate that although the library held copies of 
Priestley’s works on linguistics and natural philosophy by 1775, his philosophical works 
(the Disquistions, the correspondence with Price, and the Institutes) were not added to the 
catalogue until after 1786 when the library had been transferred to Manchester New 
                                                 
1
 See Thomas Madge, On the Character and Writings of Thomas Belsham. Extracted from the Monthly 
Repository for February 1830 (1830), esp. 30-2; Sell, Philosophy, Dissent and Nonconformity, 77-80. 
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College.
2
 The Warrington Academy library did, however, hold a copy of Caulfield’s An 
Essay on the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul (1778), one of the several hostile 
responses to Priestley’s materialism written by Anglican clergymen.
3
 Yet from a set of 
extant notes it is possible, to some extent, to reconstruct the philosophy lectures delivered 
at Warrington in the late 1770s or early 1780s, and to show that Priestley’s materialist 
theory was discussed in these lectures.
4
 The first reference to Priestley in the notes comes 
mid-way through a commentary on Part III, chapter 4 of Isaac Watts’s Logick, or, the 
Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth (1725). Here the lecturer considers the 
problem of retaining a clear and distinct meaning when assigning names to ‘Modes or 
abstract Ideas’. These words are often difficult to understand as they are frequently used 
in very different senses and, in some cases, ‘the affectation of science’ has, according to 
the author, ‘led men to frame words without any distinct ideas’. It is in the example given 
to demonstrate this point that the first reference to Priestley occurs: 
 
Let any one only reflect for a moment what long controversies have of late been written 
upon the subject of materialism. Let him consider that Spinoza and his followers denyed 
that there was any thing in the universe but matter, that Berkely denyed there was any 
matter in the universe, that Berkely’s theory has been controverted by many writers ever 
since, and that Doctor Priestley is again introducing materialism and he will be convinced 
that the word matter and all the words that have rela[ted] to it are not clearly understood 
by the several opponents and that we have not thoroughly considered the origin of 
language or the art by which the Mind separ[a]tes its complex Ideas and affixes names to 
its several perceptions.      
 
The reference is presumably to Priestley’s redefinition of matter as something possessed 
only of the property of extension and of the powers of attraction and repulsion, in 
opposition to the traditional understanding of matter as a solid, impenetrable, and inert 
substance possessed only of a vis inertiae. 
                                                 
2
 A Select Catalogue of Books in the Library of the Warrington Academy, 6; 12; MS Misc 24 (iv). 
3
 HMO MS Misc 24 (i); see chapter 3. 
4
 These lectures might have been delivered by William Enfield. For more on the authorship and dating of 
the lectures see appendix II. All subsequent references are to HMO MS Seddon 6. 
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 The second reference to Priestley in the notes occurs in the course of a discussion 
of Doddridge’s proposition 83: ‘To enquire into the most considerable arguments to 
prove the immateriality of the soul’.
5
 Following a brief preamble in which the lecturer 
asserts that man can intuitively discern two distinct substances within himself, the 
commentary on Doddridge’s lectures begins at scholium 6, approximately half way 
through Doddridge’s lecture 95. The lecturer follows Doddridge closely in arguing, 
against the notion that if brutes are possessed of perception then they must be immortal, 
that ‘immateriality does not imply immortality as to the Brutes’.
6
 He subsequently 
follows Doddridge through scholia 8 and 9, in which Doddridge argues that although it is 
not demonstrable that the soul is immaterial it is at least possible and even highly 
probable that it is. To Doddridge’s reference in scholium 9 to the theory of a ‘vehicle of 
the soul’ the lecturer adds that the subject of consciousness or thought ‘must be ver[y] 
different from gross Body’, and that if the mind is material then it must be ‘some more 
subtil kind of matter which lodges some where in the Brain and which matter may be a 
monad incapable of division’. To the references listed in Doddridge, which include 
Wollaston and Cudworth, the notes add that Zeno (334-262), the Greek neo-Platonist 
Hierocles, and ‘The Rabbis’ held something like this position. The lecturer then copies 
almost verbatim from scholium 10 (‘As to the opinion the heathen Philosophers 
entertained on this subject there is room for debate’), which marks the end of the lecture 
in Doddridge’s textbook.
7
 A passage in the notebook then reads ‘I shall conclude with 
giving you an account of Plato’s arguments for the Immateriality of the Soul’, after which 
follow six numbered points ending with the words: ‘These arguments are founded on 
good sense’.  
 Subsequently, the lecturer points out the difficulties with arguing for the 
immateriality, and from this for the immortality, of the soul from the divisibility, the 
inertness, or the solidity of matter. In this way, the lecturer is following in the 
pedagogical tradition associated with Doddridge by outlining the arguments against the 
orthodox position.
8
 The section begins by suggesting that the argument that the soul is 
                                                 
5
 Doddridge, Lectures, 205. 
6
 Lectures, 208. 
7
 Lectures, 209. 
8
 Rivers, The Defence of Truth through the Knowledge of Error, 4. 
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immortal because it is immaterial, and that it is immaterial because it could not be 
composed of an infinitely divisible substance such as matter, is problematic as far as the 
infinite divisibility of matter ‘is only in imagination and not in reality’. The lecturer then 
moves on to make a similar point in relation to the argument for the immateriality of the 
soul from the inertness or solidity of matter, where the second reference to Priestley’s 
works is introduced: 
 
As to the opposite Qualities of body and mind these have been principally argued from 
the inertness and solidity of matter – For inertness and activity one would imagine could 
not reside at the same time in the same subject. But the immateriality would not help us 
because some very accute Philosophers have denied that Quality in matter, and if so 
matter and mind may be the same, which whoever should assert ought not to be called a 
materialist – D
r
. Priestley who espouses this notion is so far from affirming the soul to be 
matter according to the common sense of matter that he does not suppose there is any 
such thing as matter in this view – His definition of matter is not that it has a vis inertiæ 
he makes its essence to consist in an attractive and repul[sive] quality. Now there cannot 
be attraction witho[ut] activity he denies therefore the vis inertiæ and the solidity and 
impenetrability of matter and therefore his opinion comes nearer to Berkeley. He chuses 
indeed to use the old Terms and so calls the soul immaterial. 
 
This passage is interesting because it illustrates that, like Seddon at Warrington in the 
1760s, and like Merivale at Exeter in the early 1770s, the tutor using Doddridge’s 
lectures at Warrington in the late 1770s or the early 1780s updated the references to 
include contemporary philosophical works. The passage illustrates that it was Priestley’s 
redefinition of the concept of matter and the ways in which this redefinition affected the 
traditional argument for the immateriality of the soul that most strongly affected the 
Warrington lecturer.
9
 Subsequently, he argues that as there is so much debate concerning 
the nature of matter it is impossible to determine whether the soul is immaterial or not. 
Nevertheless, this ought not to affect the argument for the soul’s immortality, for it is still 
possible to show that the body and the mind are two distinct substances. At this point he 
refers the students to ‘some of the late answers to D
r
 Priestley’, which assert, against 
                                                 
9
 The fact that he states that Priestley ‘calls the soul immaterial’ is also very interesting. 
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Priestley’s position, that the unity of consciousness and the ability of the mind to 
compare ideas necessary to the faculty of judgment prove that consciousness cannot be 
the result of an organised system of matter. Given that Caulfield’s Essay on the 
Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul was in the academy library, it is not 
improbable to assume that this was one of the ‘answers’ which the lecturer had in mind. 
He then suggests several further arguments which prove that matter and spirit are two 
distinct substances, including ‘the power of the mind to form abstract ideas’ and ‘the 
diff[erence] between the Ideas and the mind employed about those Ideas’. From this, he 
concludes decisively that ‘gross body is not the thinking power within us’, and that ‘that 
which thinks, judges, and form[s] abstract Ideas is not the same with body’. This is 
qualified slightly by the observation that ‘whether we allow them [body and mind] to be 
the same substance and only different modes is ano[the]
r 
thing’. The notes conclude with 
‘one or two arguments for the immortality of the soul independent on its being material 
or immater[ial]’. These seem to follow the argument that the perfection of the universe of 
God requires that every being should exist which can possibly exist; thus, it is impossible 
that ‘any moral agent should cease to exist’, the happiness of the whole creation requiring 
that he should not be destroyed.  
 If the evidence of these notes is at all representative, then Priestley’s ideas were 
clearly not endorsed in the philosophy lectures at Warrington. However, it ought to be 
remembered that the pedagogical method in the liberal dissenting academies meant that 
the opinions and preferences of the tutor would not necessarily be adopted by the 
students. The fact that Priestley’s ideas were discussed at Warrington means that students 
would have encountered his works in an educational environment where they were free to 
decide for themselves on philosophical and theological disputes. In some cases students 
clearly did adopt Priestley’s ideas. William Turner (1761-1859) for example, who had 
studied at Warrington under Aikin and Enfield between 1777 and 1781, and who thus 
most likely encountered Priestley’s ideas in the philosophy lectures at Warrington, stated 
his belief in the theological and metaphysical views associated with Priestley at his 
ordination into the dissenting ministry in 1782.
10
 Furthermore, Turner’s eldest son 
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 A Sermon delivered at Pudsey in Yorkshire, Sept. 25, 1782, by the Rev. Philip Holland. An Address on 
the Nature and the Propriety of Ordination, with Questions proposed by the Rev. Joseph Dawson, and the 
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William Turner (1788-1853) went on to become a tutor in mathematics, natural 
philosophy, and mental and moral philosophy at Manchester College, York in 1809. In 
his lectures at Manchester College, Turner, according to one of his pupils Edward 
Higginson (1807-1880), ‘always adhered closely to the Hartleyan philosophy, and 
ardently followed it into all its applications to mind and morals’.
11
  
 
The philosophical career of Thomas Belsham 
 
By far the most important figure in relation to the diffusion of Priestley’s ideas in the 
dissenting academies was Thomas Belsham. Belsham (1750-1829) had been a pupil 
under Aikin at Kibworth in 1757-8 and under John French at Ware and Wellingborough. 
In 1766 he entered the Daventry Academy, then headed by Caleb Ashworth, where he 
would, presumably, have followed a course not dissimilar to that undertaken by Priestley 
fourteen years earlier.
12
 On completing his course in 1770, Belsham was selected as 
assistant tutor at Daventry, lecturing in Greek, and subsequently in mathematics, logic, 
and metaphysics until 1778, when he left Daventry to become minister to the Independent 
congregation at Worcester. It was most likely whilst a tutor at Daventry that Belsham had 
discovered Priestley’s metaphysical writings. A letter Belsham wrote from Worcester to 
Timothy Kenrick (1759-1804), who had succeeded him as tutor in mathematics and 
natural philosophy at the academy, illustrates that he had begun studying Priestley’s 
necessitarian philosophy. At this stage, however, Belsham, like Joshua Toulmin, had yet 
to make up his own mind on the question.
13
 He told Kenrick that he was not ‘a confirmed 
necessarian’ but rather ‘an inquirer into the subject’, acknowledging ‘many difficulties’ 
which he did ‘not well know how to solve’.
14
  
 In 1781, following the retirement of Thomas Robins (1732-1810), Ashworth’s 
successor at Daventry, the Coward Trustees invited Belsham to return as divinity tutor 
                                                                                                                                                 
Answers by William Turner, Jun. (Wakefield, 1782), 51-4. On Turner see R. K. Webb, ‘Turner, William 
(1761-1859)’, ODNB. For a brief account of Turner’s years at the academy see Stephen Harbottle, The 
Reverend William Turner: Dissent and Reform in Georgian Newcastle upon Tyne (Leeds, 1997), 14-18. 
11
 Life and Letters of Martineau, vol. II, 261. See also John Kenrick’s biography of Turner, CR, 10, new 
ser. (1854), 132-7; Edward Higginson, Eternal Life, the Gift of God in Jesus Christ (1854).  
12
 See chapter 1. 
13
 On Toulmin see chapter 3. 
14
 Thomas Belsham to Timothy Kenrick (c. 1779), quoted in Williams, Memoirs of Belsham, 171.  
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and minister to the Independent congregation. Following a brief period of agonised 
indecision, Belsham, somewhat reluctantly, accepted the offer. Belsham treated his new 
role as a religious duty and chose to return to Daventry only because he was convinced 
that his decision would best serve the interests of the dissenting cause. In a letter to 
Samuel Heywood (1753-1828) Belsham outlined his conviction that the purpose of the 
academy should be to prepare candidates for the dissenting ministry; the same letter 
includes an outline of the syllabus which illustrates that under Belsham the course of 
study at Daventry was broad, encompassing classics, Hebrew, geography, logic, 
mathematics, ethics, pneumatology, natural philosophy, anatomy, oratory, divinity, 
ecclesiastical history, and homiletics.
15
 
 On returning to Daventry, Belsham made some substantial adjustments to the 
theological syllabus which would prove influential in shaping the doctrinal beliefs of a 
new generation of dissenting ministers. As far as concerns his own theological beliefs, 
Belsham had more or less retained his adherence to the system he had encountered in the 
1760s as a student in Doddridge’s lectures; he was, in his own words, ‘evangelical’ in his 
principles, adhering to Samuel Clarke’s Arian position on the pre-existence of Christ.
16
 
However, conscious that theological debate had moved on since Doddridge’s day, 
specifically that Priestley’s and Lindsey’s controversial Unitarianism – ‘the question 
concerning the simple humanity of Christ’ – had been ‘scarcely glanced at in 
Doddridge’s lectures’, Belsham determined to draw up a new course of lectures for his 
students on commencing his duties as divinity tutor.
17
 The subsequent narrative of his 
own conversion to Unitarianism is well known.
18
 Belsham, as he himself related it, 
collected all the texts from the New Testament treating of the person of Christ; these he 
supplemented only with the comments of ‘one or more learned and approved Trinitarian, 
Arian, or Unitarian expositors’, omitting any interpretive comments of his own in order 
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16
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 Belsham, Memoirs of Lindsey, 287. 
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 Belsham, Calm Inquiry, v-x; Memoirs of Lindsey, 285-91. The description of Belsham’s conversion from 
his Memoirs of Lindsey was reproduced in Madge, On the Character and Writings of Belsham. 
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to provide his students with an unbiased view of the subject.
19
 Despite his assumption 
that this method of analysis would demonstrate the invalidity of the Unitarian arguments, 
Belsham, to his initial dismay, inadvertently converted many of his most able students to 
Unitarianism. Although Belsham himself initially remained resistant to Unitarian ideas, 
the process of teaching these lectures for the next seven years gradually led him to 
abandon his own beliefs in the divinity and pre-existence of Christ. He eventually came 
to embrace Priestley’s and Lindsey’s Socinian theology, of which he would become the 
most vocal expositor and defender in the last decade of the eighteenth, and the early 
decades of the nineteenth centuries. Eventually feeling himself no longer able to continue 
as divinity tutor at Daventry as a result of the alteration in his theological beliefs, 
Belsham resigned his office in January 1789. 
 Yet alongside these changes he made to the theological aspect of the syllabus at 
Daventry, Belsham innovated radically in his teaching of philosophy.
20
 Belsham’s letter 
to Heywood provides further details of the philosophical component of the Daventry 
syllabus: logic was taught in the first year; ‘the doctrine of the Human Mind’, ‘the Divine 
existence and attributes’, and ‘the first principles of Ethics’ in the second; ‘a 
comprehensive system of Ethics, connected with the discoveries and precepts of 
Revelation’ was taught in the third year.
21
 Some record of the lectures delivered by 
Belsham at Daventry is available from a set of lecture notes belonging to Nicholas 
Thomas Heineken (1763-1840), a student at Daventry between 1780 and 1785.
22
 
Heineken’s notes, which can be dated to approximately 1783, show that Belsham used 
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Doddridge’s textbook in his philosophy lectures, but that, like the lecturers at 
Warrington, and like Savage at Hoxton and Merivale at Exeter, he updated the arguments 
with references to contemporary works.
23
 In fact Heineken’s notes appear to be a record 
solely of Belsham’s additions, presumably explained by the fact that Doddridge’s book 
was easily available to consult in a printed edition.
24
 The notes suggest that these 
additional references were heavily influenced by Priestley’s writings of the 1770s. 
Heineken’s shorthand notes to lecture 4, for example, ‘A brief view of the doctrine of 
Animal Spirits’, contain the headings ‘vibrations’, ‘Association & abstract ideas’, and 
conclude with the statement ‘Newton, Hartley & Priestl//e//y, solve these phænomena. 
doctrine vibrations’. Heineken’s notes to lecture 5 contain an inquiry into whether the 
faculties are innate or acquired in which Belsham refutes the theory of innate ideas and 
shows how the faculties of memory, imagination, judgment, passion, and volition can be 
explained using Hartley’s theory of association. The remaining notes contain several 
references to Hartley’s Observation on Man, and to Priestley’s The Doctrine of 
Philosophical Necessity illustrated, and to Dawson’s, Palmer’s, and Price’s replies to the 
work. Lecture 29 appears to have covered the topic of materialism: among the shorthand 
notes it is possible to make out the words ‘vis inertia’, ‘immaterialists’, ‘and ‘Dr 
Priestley’.
25
   
  Soon after Belsham’s resignation from Daventry he was invited to become 
professor in divinity and resident tutor at New College, Hackney, which had been 
founded three years previously in 1786 in the wake of the closure of the academy at 
Hoxton. By this stage Belsham was well acquainted with Priestley; the two men 
corresponded and visited one another frequently. Priestley was particularly interested in 
Belsham’s career as divinity tutor at New College; he had encouraged Belsham to accept 
the post and in November 1789 told Belsham: ‘I rejoice exceedingly at the accounts I 
hear from several quarters of your reception in the Academy, and the prospect it affords 
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of your being eminently useful there’.
26
 A month earlier, Priestley had informed Lindsey 
of his intention to give Belsham a copy of the first volume of his A General History of the 
Christian Church (1790), which he hoped Belsham would use in the lectures he was soon 
to deliver in ecclesiastical history. In the same letter Priestley requested Lindsey to send a 
copy of his An History of Early Opinions concerning Jesus Christ (1786) to Belsham for 
the Academy library.
27
 It is clear that Priestley saw Belsham’s appointment at Hackney as 
a way of spreading the theological and philosophical principles of the emerging Unitarian 
movement: commenting on Belsham’s appointment in a letter to Lindsey of 1789, 
Priestley enthused: ‘It [i.e. New College] will be an Unitarian Academy, do what they 
will’.
28
 
 Once again, Belsham’s innovations in his teaching of theology at New College 
were paralleled by innovations in the philosophy syllabus. Belsham’s philosophy 
lectures, which survive (with important differences) in both manuscript and printed 
editions, mark a significant turning point in the kind of philosophy that was taught at the 
liberal dissenting academies.
29
 Belsham’s lectures updated the course of philosophy 
outlined in Doddridge’s textbook by bringing into the academy syllabus developments in 
British philosophy since 1750. What is particularly interesting is that whereas Belsham 
ostensibly retained the objective and inquiring method of Doddridge’s lectures – he 
writes in the preface of his intention to ‘state the evidence on both sides with fairness and 
impartiality’ – the tone of the lectures is markedly more dogmatic.
30
 Whilst Belsham 
acknowledges his intent to ‘do justice to the opinion of others’, he admits to regarding 
himself as under no ‘obligation to conceal his own’.
31
 In fact, Belsham’s opening 
declaration of his commitment to impartiality is seemingly contradicted two pages later 
by his statement that: 
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The doctrine of Association, opened by Locke, improved by Gay, matured by Hartley, 
and illustrated by the luminous disquisitions of Dr. Priestley, the author regards as 
established beyond the possibility of controversy, in the judgment of those philosophers 
who have studied, and who understand it.
32
 
 
Furthermore, the vast scope of the references which had been such an important aspect of 
Doddridge’s course is considerably narrowed in Belsham’s lectures: Belsham generally 
confines himself to modern, British writers and the majority of the references are to 
authors working in the tradition of Locke and Hartley.
33
   
 Belsham’s printed lectures, published in 1801, are divided into three sections: a 
prefatory ‘Compendium of Logic’, ‘Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind’, and 
‘Elements of Moral Philosophy’.
34
 It is worth noting that, despite Belsham’s declaration 
of his commitment to Hartley’s theory of the association of ideas, the system of 
epistemology outlined in the first of these three sections is not merely a repetition of 
Priestley’s and Hartley’s sensationalism. In the introductory ‘Compendium of Logic’ 
Belsham states, in notably un-Priestleian language, that ‘All reasoning is founded upon 
intuitive principles’.
35
 He follows Locke in identifying ideas of reflection as a different 
class of ideas to those derived wholly from sensation and defends this position against 
Hartley’s contention that the former are merely a more complex species of the latter.
36
 
There is also evidence that Belsham had engaged with some of the criticisms of 
empiricist ideas in Reid’s and Price’s writings; it is worth noting in this respect, for 
example, his observation that our ideas are ‘supposed, though erroneously, to be 
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representations of things’.
37
 However, Belsham is careful to differentiate his own system 
from that of Price. In his discussion of the power of intuition Belsham confines the 
function of the intuitive faculty to ‘the reception of the relation between two ideas by the 
immediate inspection of the mind’.
38
 He undoubtedly has Price in mind when he clarifies 
this definition by noting that ‘Intuition is not a distinct mode of knowledge’, rather, 
intuitive propositions are ‘general inferences from the most obvious sensible 
appearances’.
39
 Belsham also importantly reiterates Locke’s and Priestley’s assertion that 
‘of real essence we know nothing; only that in different substances they must necessarily 
be different’ and that ‘our ideas of substances extend no farther than to their properties; 
how these properties are combined we know not’.
40
 If Priestley’s ideas on epistemology 
are wholly derived from Hartley, then Belsham, at least in this opening section of the 
work, is a Lockeian.
41
              
 However, when Belsham comes to consider the question of innate ideas in the 
second part of the book his Lockeian stance is coloured with Priestley’s polemic. In 
‘Elements of the Philosophy of Mind’ Belsham states that the advocates of the hypothesis 
of innate ideas – and the references here make it explicit that he is thinking of Reid, 
Beattie, and Oswald – ‘do not attempt to reason upon it [the hypothesis], or to bring 
evidence in support of it’.
42
 Instead they ‘assume it as a fact’ and ‘if any objection be 
proposed, it is silenced by an authoritative appeal to common sense’.
43
 Belsham 
subsequently dedicates over thirty pages to explaining the doctrine of the association of 
ideas and the theory of vibrations in opposition to this hypothesis. To association can be 
ascribed ‘all intellectual, moral, and abstract ideas of every description’; our ideas of 
‘solidity, duration, virtue, cause [and] effect’ can all be ‘resolved into simple ideas of 
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sensation’.
44
 In fact, Belsham here contradicts the emphasis which he had placed on a 
Lockeian epistemology in the opening section of the work. He notes in the course of a 
series of ‘Remarks’ on the ‘Origin of Assent to various Classes of Propositions’ that what 
‘Mr. Locke calls ideas of reflection’ are ‘in fact nothing more than very complex ideas of 
sensation’.
45
 It is also worth noting the role which, in Belsham’s mind, the ‘Scotch 
philosophy’ had come to assume as a body of thought antagonistic to the doctrine of the 
association of ideas. Throughout Belsham’s account, Hartley’s system is frequently 
contrasted with the recourse to inexplicable instincts promoted by the Scots. In the course 
of a comment on Hutcheson’s theory of morals in the manuscript edition of the lectures, 
for example, Belsham notes that Hutcheson’s system is ‘not explaining a phenomenon 
but giving it up as inexplicable. How different from D
r
 Hartley’s’.
46
 At one point in the 
printed text Belsham notes that neither ‘Dr. Reid or any other of the Scottish 
metaphysicians […] perfectly comprehend Dr. Hartley’s doctrine in its full extent’.
47
 In a 
section considering the generally accepted belief that the same qualities in external 
objects produce the same sensations in different persons, Belsham notes that ‘The Scotch 
philosophy pleads that the belief of this fact is instinctive’. A paragraph later, considering 
the proofs of the existence of the material world, Belsham comments that the ‘Scotch 
philosophy again refers us to instinctive conviction, a doctrine already sufficiently 
exploded’.
48
 In a later section on memory, in which Belsham attempts to explain the 
faculty along associationist lines, he notes that ‘we are to judge of the credit due to 
memory by experience, and not, as the Scotch philosophy teaches, by instinct’.
49
 What 
this suggests is that Belsham, following Priestley, was attempting to define the 
philosophical principles that he thought proper to underpin rational dissent in opposition 
to contemporary Scottish thought.      
 It is worth pausing briefly here to recall Seddon’s moral philosophy lecture 
delivered at Warrington in the late 1760s.
50
 As we saw in chapter 1, Seddon there, in the 
course of a discussion of man’s propensity to the truth, had posited a distinction between 
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actions proceeding from reason and actions proceeding from ‘impulse and passion’, 
listing among the latter actions motivated by the ‘parental [and] conjugal affects and the 
amor Patriæ’.
51
 It is interesting to contrast this with Belsham’s statement in a section 
from his lectures on the ‘Origin of the Affections’: ‘SOME of the AFFECTIONS, besides 
what are called the natural appetites’, Belsham there notes, ‘are commonly believed to be 
instinctive, and therefore take the name of NATURAL. Such are the parental, filial, and 
fraternal affections. Also the love of truth and virtue’.
52
 Belsham subsequently argues that 
these affections are ‘states of pleasure and pain’ and are thus ‘evidently excited by 
external objects’; these ‘can only affect us by association’, therefore, ‘all the affections 
are the result of association’.
53
 Belsham continues to argue that 
 
it would be easy to analyse the conjugal, parental, and fraternal affections, patriotism or 
the love of one’s country, benevolence, the love of truth and virtue, the love of God, &c. 
and […] to prove that all the affections of the human mind are the effect of association, 
and not of instinct.
54
 
 
Belsham’s point, of course, is to show that even so called ‘natural’ affections are not 
instinctive but can be explained by the doctrine of association. The difference between 
his own account and that found in Seddon’s earlier lecture reflects the way in which the 
philosophy lectures at the academies had changed in the intervening years under the 
influence of Priestley’s campaign to promote Hartley’s theory of association and his 
attack on the rationalist and the Shaftesburian advocates of innate ideas. 
 In moral philosophy Belsham followed Priestley in attempting to ground ethical 
judgments in Hartley’s theory of association. He explains in the preface, again in a 
somewhat dogmatic tone, that: 
 
The Theory of Morals, defended in this work, is that which necessarily follows from the 
Hartleyan Theory of the Mind, and from the doctrine of the Association of Ideas. And the 
author has endeavoured, briefly, to point out the errors into which eminent writers who 
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have adopted a different theory have fallen, in their attempts to explain the nature of 
virtue, of the moral sense, and of moral obligation.
55
   
 
In the final section of the book, ‘Elements of Moral Philosophy’, Belsham begins his 
account of morals by stressing the link between virtue and happiness: ‘virtue’ is defined 
as ‘THE TENDENCY OF AN ACTION, AFFECTION, HABIT, OR CHARACTER, TO THE 
ULTIMATE HAPPINESS OF THE AGENT’; ‘vice’ as ‘THE TENDENCY OF [AN] ACTION, 
AFFECTION, HABIT, OR CHARACTER, TO PRODUCE MISERY, OR TO DIMINISH ULTIMATE 
HAPPINESS’.
56
 He responds to Price’s objection to this definition – that it could sanction 
‘pernicious’ and ‘horrible’ actions as long as a degree of ‘advantage’ or ‘pleasure’ could 
be shown to result from them – by arguing simply that ‘Injustice, malignity, and the like, 
never can, in the present constitution of things, tend to happiness’.
57
 Like Priestley, 
Belsham then attempts to sanction this theory of morals theologically by stressing the 
benevolence of the divine will. Inferring, by analogy with the faculties and feelings of the 
human mind, that it is ‘happiness alone’ which gives value to the existence of an infinite 
being, Belsham holds that the felicity of the deity ‘is the result of the uncontrouled 
exercise of infinite benevolence’ and that the divine rectitude ‘consists in its undeviating 
conduct to this most important end’.
58
 To act virtuously is thus to act in a way which 
produces the greatest amount of happiness, which is also to act in accordance with the 
will of God. In the succeeding section, Belsham attempts to show how benevolence and 
self-interest can be reconciled by arguing that all actions are performed at first from an 
interested motive, and that these actions, repeated over time, generate affections, or 
‘tendencies to perform the action independent of the advantage to be derived from it’.
59
 
From this Belsham is able to summarise his theory of morals in a phrase reminiscent of 
Paley: ‘benevolence is the rule, and self-interest the obligation, of virtue’.
60
 In his 
subsequent discussion of moral obligation, Belsham argues that, in the order of our 
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conceptions, the obligation to act in accordance with self-interest is antecedent to the 
obligation to act in conformity to the will of God and to reason.
61
 
 In his discussion of the moral sense, Belsham describes the development of the 
faculty in very similar terms to Hartley and Priestley. At the outset he defines the moral 
sense as:  
 
THAT FACULTY, AFFECTION, OR STATE OF MIND, WHICH EXCITES AN 
INSTANTANEOUS, DISINTERESTED APPROBATION AND LOVE OF WHAT IS 
CONSIDERED AS VIRTUE, AND DISAPPROBATION AND ABHORRENCE OF WHAT IS 
CONSIDERED AS VICE, WHEN PERCEIVED IN OURSELVES OR OTHERS.
62
  
 
Preserving the format of Doddridge’s lectures, Belsham then outlines the arguments 
advanced by those who claim that the moral sense is instinctive and those who claim that 
it is acquired. However, here again, Belsham’s own perspective overwhelms any urge he 
might have towards objectivity; the ‘diversity’ and ‘even contrariety of the dictates of the 
moral sense in different ages and countries’ is an ‘insuperable objection’ against the 
arguments that it is instinctive.
63
 Belsham then gives his own Hartleian definition of the 
formation of the faculty: 
 
The MORAL SENSE is an affection of mind, the origin and progress of which is similar to 
that of other mental affections, generated by the impression of external circumstances; 
interested in its commencement, and gradually purifying itself in its course, till in its 
highest and most perfect state it becomes completely disinterested.
64
    
 
Hence the idea of ‘right’ is not, as Price would argue, a simple idea, but ‘that complex 
idea or feeling which is generated by the COALESCENCE OF ALL THOSE AFFECTIONS, and 
their correspondent expressions, to which the term RIGHT has been applied’.
65
 As in 
Priestley’s account, this leads Belsham to stress the malleability and hence the ultimate 
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perfectibility of man; because the moral sense is not innate but ‘originates in education’ it 
can be ‘corrected, improved, and confirmed, as men advance in life’.
66
  
 Belsham concludes the third part of the book with a survey of the various 
accounts of virtue and moral obligation advanced by the major seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century moralists. Belsham’s list of figures from the end of the seventeenth 
and the first half of the eighteenth century is fairly predictable: Clarke, Browne, Butler, 
Hutcheson, Wollaston, Cumberland, Rutherforth, Hartley, Price, and Hume. To this he 
adds an account of the ethical theories developed since the 1760s in the works of Reid, 
Smith, Paley, Thomas Cooper, Thomas Gisborne (1758-1846), and William Godwin 
(1756-1836).
67
 Following a summary of each author’s ethical theory Belsham states a list 
of objections, most of which stem from Belsham’s conviction that most previous 
moralists have failed either to link virtue and happiness or to take into account the theory 
of the association of ideas. To Clarke’s rationalism, for example, Belsham replies that it 
effectually severs the link between virtue and happiness to the extent that a moral agent 
might, by the practice of virtue, actually ‘diminish his own happiness and that of 
others’.
68
 In his objections to Price’s theory Belsham is more explicitly critical than 
Priestley had been: Price’s account he describes as ‘obscure and unintelligible’, his 
philosophy ‘does not indeed profess to explain any thing, but refers to a kind of infallible 
judge within, the dictates of which appear in fact to be very different in different 
persons’.
69
 Interestingly, Belsham’s response to each of the Scottish moral philosophers 
is characterised by his criticism of their reliance on the theory of innate ideas. 
Hutcheson’s whole theory is ‘founded upon the supposition that the Moral Sense is an 
instinctive principle’ and is thus ‘refuted by every argument and fact, which proves that 
affection to be the result of education and habit’.
70
 Reid, who ‘warmly patronizes the 
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doctrine of instinctive principles’, is clearly wrong as long as Belsham’s own account of 
the mind is assumed to be correct.
71
 Smith’s idea of ‘Sympathy’ is merely ‘the same 
principle with Dr. Hutcheson’s Moral Sense, and Dr. Clarke’s and Dr. Price’s Reason’; 
that is ‘it is judging of virtue and vice in another, by our own standard of right and 
wrong’. Since ‘our moral perceptions are neither instinctive nor infallible, they cannot be 
an accurate criterion of virtue’.
72
 Hume’s ‘natural benevolence or humanity’ is ‘but 
another word for moral sense, sympathy, &c.’; he thus ‘falls into the common error of 
supposing it to be an instinctive affection’.
73
 
 Belsham is most sympathetic in this survey to Cumberland’s conception of a 
natural law founded in benevolence; Cumberland’s definition of virtue and his attempt to 
reconcile benevolence and self-interest, Belsham states, ‘coincides with that which has 
been stated in these papers as the true theory of morals’.
74
 He also gives a favourable 
account of Hartley, who, he states, defines virtue in terms of compliance to ‘the will of an 
infinitely benevolent divine Being’, and to those writers who followed Hartley in their 
ethical theory, namely Cooper and Gisborne.
75
 It is here, however, that the differences 
between the printed version of these lectures and the manuscript edition is most 
interesting. In the manuscript edition Belsham credits, not Cumberland, but Rutherforth 
with coming closest to expressing the true theory of morals.
76
 This suggests that Belsham 
changed his opinions about the relationship between the dual motives of rational self-
interest and benevolence. The other significant difference relates to Belsham’s attitude 
towards Paley’s ethical theory.
77
 In the manuscript edition Belsham begins his account by 
stressing the essential similarity between his own and Paley’s systems: ‘It is evident that 
this [i.e. Paley’s] definition of the nature & obligations to human virtue coincides nearly 
with that in these lectures’. Here it is only Paley’s choice of language in his description of 
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moral obligation to which Belsham objects: ‘the term violent is not strictly proper when 
applied to motive as it seems to imply compulsion’. To Paley’s markedly voluntarist 
concept of obligation, Belsham adds that ‘there is such a thing as obligation in honour, 
interest, expedience, prudence, equity, &c in which the will of a superior has no 
concern’.
78
 The same modification of Paley’s voluntarism is reiterated in the printed 
edition.
79
 However, there Belsham is much more critical of Paley’s use of the word 
‘violent’: ‘a violent motive’, writes Belsham, ‘is a phrase scarcely intelligible’ since the 
ideas of will and compulsion or external force are incompatible.
80
 Belsham’s statement in 
the manuscript that his own and Paley’s theories are similar is omitted entirely from the 
printed text; instead, Belsham states that, ‘even as a definition of human virtue’, Paley’s 
account is ‘incorrect and inadequate’.
81
 His objections to Paley’s theory are, firstly, that it 
does not allow even for the possibility that those who disbelieve in the existence of God 
or the doctrine of a future life can be virtuous in any sense, and, secondly, that it places 
too much emphasis on self-interest and so fails to recognise that moral habits and 
affections which have become wholly disinterested can be virtuous.   
 The final point to note about Belsham’s lectures is the way in which they marked 
a change in emphasis in the topics discussed as part of the philosophy course. As we have 
seen in chapter 1, moral philosophy dominated the philosophy syllabuses at the 
Northampton, Daventry, and Warrington academies. A substantial part of Doddridge’s 
lectures were devoted to moral philosophy; and the same topic provided the subject 
matter for all of John Taylor’s published philosophical works. In Belsham’s lectures this 
predominance is diminished slightly, reflecting the shift in the wider philosophical 
debate, both among rational dissenters and among British society at large, occasioned by 
Priestley’s writings of the late 1770s. Whereas the final book on moral philosophy 
comprises some seventy-eight pages of the printed edition of Belsham’s lectures, ninety-
one pages, well over a quarter of the long second book, are dedicated to his discussion of 
the question of liberty and necessity.  
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 Here the debate is unsurprisingly couched in Priestleian terms: the question in 
dispute between the libertarians and the necessitarians is ‘Whether volition can take place 
independently of motives’. Whereas the libertarian holds that ‘in the same previous 
circumstances, and with views and inclinations precisely the same, a different choice may 
be made’, the necessitarian maintains that ‘there can be no difference in the choice 
without a correspondent difference in the previous state of mind’.
82
 Belsham 
subsequently outlines the arguments advanced by both sides, adding to the relevant 
sections from the writings of Clarke, Locke, Hartley, Edwards, Hume, Price, Reid, 
Beattie, Priestley, Palmer, and Dawson references to later contributions to the debate by 
Alexander Crombie (1760-1840), John Gregory (1753-1821), and Belsham’s brother 
William Belsham (1752-1827). Once again, Belsham’s veneer of objectivity slips at 
various points in his account. The question of whether motives are the ‘physical’ or the 
‘moral’ causes of volitions (which – as we have seen – had been fundamental to 
Berington, Price, and Palmer) Belsham, following Priestley, dismisses as ‘trifling’ and 
‘merely verbal’.
83
 After listing the arguments on both sides of the debate, Belsham 
proceeds to detail the arguments against philosophical liberty. Most of these are derived 
from Priestley: philosophical liberty supposes an effect without a cause, and thus, by 
denying the strongest argument for the being of God, leads to atheism; it is dangerous to 
virtue and inconsistent with moral discipline; it is inconsistent with the prescience of the 
deity. He then continues to state and answer the principal objections to philosophical 
necessity. Here, again, the arguments are largely derived from Priestley. Interestingly, 
Belsham here equates philosophical liberty with ‘common sense’, suggesting that both 
are irrational and un-philosophical. He writes that ‘the existence of philosophical liberty 
in human agents is favoured by superficial views of human nature’; this, ‘in the language 
of the Scotch philosophers, is the appeal to common sense; the dictates of which 
according to their system, are authoritative and infallible’.
84
 
 Chapter XI of the second book is dedicated to the question of materialism.
85
 
Belsham outlines the arguments of both the materialists and the immaterialists, before 
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proceeding to state and then answer the principal objections against the materialist 
position. Again, nearly all of the arguments are derived from Priestley. However, 
Belsham, as in the first section of the book, is keen to emphasise the Lockeian 
epistemology underpinning Priestley’s ideas. He notes at one point, for example, that ‘we 
know nothing of real essences’; that our ‘knowledge of the coexistence of various 
properties and powers in the same substance, is acquired only by observation and 
experience’.
86
 In the course of his definition of ‘solidity’ Belsham observes that the word 
is ‘unconnected with any positive idea’ and ‘expresses no more than the unknown cause 
of resistance’, subsequently referring his students to Locke’s Essay.
87
 Perhaps the sole 
modification of Priestley’s ideas in this section relates to terminology. In his opening 
definitions Belsham notes that the materialists are so called ‘with some impropriety of 
expression’.
88
 He later clarifies this remark by stating that the materialists’ ‘denial of 
solidity and inertia reduces matter, very nearly, to the commonly received notion of 
spirit’, so that ‘Dr. Priestley’s hypothesis may with as much propriety be called 
spiritualism as materialism’.
89
 Priestley himself had, of course, left his work open to this 
interpretation. In anticipation of a possible objection to his theory he had written in the 
Disquisitions: ‘If they say that, on my hypothesis, there is no such thing as matter and 
everything is spirit, I have no objection’.
90
  
 Here, once again, it is worth stressing the difference between Belsham’s lectures 
and the lectures delivered at Warrington earlier in the century, some account of which I 
have given above. In his concluding ‘General Remarks’ Belsham observes that the 
controversy concerning the immateriality of the soul was once ‘considered as of great 
importance’ as ‘it was presumed that what is immaterial must necessarily be 
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incorruptible’.
91
 In other words, the soul’s immateriality comprised the central argument 
in support of the doctrine of a future life. In Belsham’s account, of course, this is no 
longer the case. The evident materiality of the soul (at least in the sense in which 
Priestley had redefined matter) is another proof that we cannot infer our own immortality 
from reason alone; any hope of a future life is grounded solely in the doctrine of a 
resurrection outlined in the Scriptures.
92
 This leads Belsham to refute many of the 
arguments which in the lecture delivered at Warrington were advanced as conclusive. As 
we have seen, the lecturer at Warrington argued, in support of the soul’s immortality, that 
the perfection of the moral creation necessitates the impossibility that ‘any moral agent 
should cease to exist’.
93
 In direct contradiction to this Belsham argues:  
 
It cannot be proved to be an act of injustice, that a being should be brought into existence 
to answer some important and beneficial purpose under the divine government, and that 
after passing through a variety of scenes diversified with pleasure and pain, but in which 
happiness predominates upon the whole, when the end for which he was created is 
accomplished, he should cease to exist.
94
    
 
Whereas the Warrington lecturer had cited Plato’s arguments for the immateriality of the 
soul, and had concluded that these arguments were ‘founded on good sense’, Belsham 
contests that ‘the arguments for the soul’s immortality in the Phædo of Plato’ prove 
nothing more than ‘the deplorable ignorance and perplexity of the strongest minds when 
destitute of the light of divine revelation’.
95
 Priestley’s influence then, by the end of the 
1780s, had fundamentally altered the nature of the arguments advanced in support of 
Christianity in the lectures at the most important of the liberal dissenting academies. 
 This influence was to become instituted in the academy syllabus through 
Belsham’s tenure at New College, Hackney between 1789 and 1796. During these years 
Belsham educated a generation of dissenting ministers in the theology and metaphysics of 
Locke, Hartley, and Priestley. Among the students educated under Belsham at Hackney 
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Charles Wellbeloved (1769-1858), John Corrie (1769-1839), David Jones (1765-1816), 
John Jones (c. 1766-1827), Jeremiah Joyce (1763-1818), and John Kentish (1768-1853) 
all went on to contribute significantly to the development of early nineteenth-century 
Unitarianism.
96
 Between 1789 and 1796 the empiricist tradition was effectively secured 
as the predominant intellectual position within rational dissent. This paralleled the rise to 
prominence of a Socinian theology: when the Unitarian Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge was set up in 1791, it was established on a narrowly Socinian basis.
97
 The 
statement of the first general meeting asserted: ‘there is one mediator between God and 
man, the MAN Christ Jesus’, and repudiated the worship of Christ as ‘idolatrous’.
98
 
 However, by this stage, at least according to the story most often told, rational 
dissent was already in decline.
99
 The reaction in England to the outbreak of the French 
Revolution had resulted in the increased persecution of the rational dissenters. The 
dissenters’ campaign to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts, which had been gaining in 
momentum in the last decades of the century, was not to resurface until the second 
decade of the 1800s. In the same year that Priestley’s house and laboratory were 
destroyed in the Birmingham riots, Richard Price died. Priestley left England 
permanently in 1794, Andrew Kippis died in 1795, and in 1796 New College, Hackney 
closed, due to exhausted funds.
100
 This transitional period of rational dissent requires 
further study, particularly in relation to its changing intellectual culture. However, it 
seems likely that 1796, if not 1791, marked the beginning of the long decline of 
Priestley’s influence within rational dissent.        
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Epilogue: philosophy and rational dissent after 1796 
 
What happened to the influence of Priestley’s philosophy among rational dissenters after 
the dissolution of New College, Hackney in 1796? To ascertain whether Priestley’s ideas 
permeated the syllabuses at any of the other liberal dissenting academies would require 
further research which must remain beyond the scope of this thesis. It is hard to imagine 
that Priestley’s ideas would not have been discussed at the other academies. However, it 
seems unlikely that Priestley’s philosophical writings would have been instituted in the 
curriculum in anything like the way they had been at Hackney under Belsham at the most 
significant liberal dissenting academy at the end of the eighteenth century: Manchester 
New College (1786-1803). Thomas Barnes, divinity tutor 1786-1798, his assistant Ralph 
Harrison, and George Walker, divinity tutor 1798-1803, were all Arians and were 
unlikely to have been sympathetic to Priestley’s philosophical and theological ideas. 
Walker, as I have shown in chapter 2, developed his own system under the influence of 
Lord Monboddo; Priestley wrote of Barnes in April 1789 that he was ‘an enemy to all 
free inquiry’.
1
 However, this is likely to have changed at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. In 1803 Charles Wellbeloved, who had studied at Hackney under Belsham and 
been an assistant to Cappe at York, succeeded Walker as divinity tutor and the college 
moved to York, where it would remain until 1840. In 1809 William Turner (1788-1853) 
joined the staff as tutor in mathematics and natural philosophy, and in 1810 John Kenrick 
(1788-1877) was appointed as tutor in classics. Judging from the later recollections of 
James Martineau, a student at Manchester College, York between 1822 and 1827, the 
legacy of Priestley and Belsham comprised the core of the philosophy syllabus at this 
time.
2
 It is also likely that Priestley’s ideas would have been incorporated into the 
syllabus at the third Exeter Academy, which was reopened by Timothy Kenrick and 
Joseph Bretland in 1799. Bretland was, as I have shown in chapter 3, theologically and 
philosophically much closer to Priestley than either Walker or Barnes; Kenrick had been 
Belsham’s assistant at Daventry between 1781 and 1784 and was a committed Unitarian.
3
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However, the impact of the academy was not extensive: it closed in 1805 and in the six 
years it was open only eleven students passed through the whole course.
4
  
 But what impact did this teaching have? Despite the fact that academy tutors, and 
no doubt many individual ministers and laymen, continued to teach and to study the 
theological and philosophical tradition shaped by Priestley until well into the nineteenth 
century, this tradition would not be inherited and developed by any significant thinker 
within rational dissent. Broadly speaking, those who emerged from within the intellectual 
culture of rational dissent to produce significant works of philosophy in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries went down one of two routes: they either 
developed secular accounts of ethics and epistemology, or they attempted to ground a 
belief in Christianity on a wholly new kind of philosophical system. Of those in the 
former group, the work of William Godwin and William Hazlitt (1738-1820) would merit 
further investigation in connection with their indebtedness to the philosophical traditions 
of rational dissent.
5
 Of those in the latter group, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) 
and Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867) provide very different, but equally interesting 
case studies of the ways in which rational dissent after Priestley would renew its 
intellectual culture through an engagement with very different traditions in philosophy 
and theology, particularly those being developed in Germany.
6
   
 A very brief survey of the career of Coleridge illustrates well the fate of 
Priestley’s intellectual legacy and brings together some of the strains of thought I have 
been discussing in this project. As an undergraduate at Jesus College, Cambridge in the 
mid-1790s, Coleridge had come under the influence of Priestley’s protégé, William 
Frend. In the heady atmosphere generated at Cambridge by the publication of Frend’s 
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polemical tracts and his subsequent trial and dismissal from his teaching position, 
Coleridge had imbibed many of the theological and political ideas associated with 
Unitarian dissent.
7
 This evidently included a thorough engagement with the philosophical 
writings of Hartley and Priestley: in 1794 Coleridge told his friend, the young poet 
Robert Southey, ‘I am a compleat Necessitarian – and understand the subject as well 
almost as Hartley himself – but I go further than Hartley and believe the corporeality of 
thought – namely, that it is motion’.
8
 Coleridge’s 1794 poem, ‘Religious Musings’, 
illustrates a youthful attempt to fuse this materialistic psychology with a universe 
animated by the deity and in a millenarian progress towards perfection. Priestley himself 
has a walk-on part towards the end of the poem – ‘Lo! Priestley there, patriot, and saint, 
and sage’ – where he appears as one of the privileged ‘Co-adjutors of God’ ushering in 
‘Love’s wondrous plan’ in the company of Milton, Newton, and Hartley.
9
 By 1797 
Coleridge had become something of a ‘rising star’ within the Unitarian movement.
10
 The 
success of the theological lectures he delivered at Bristol in 1795-6 led to his being asked 
to preach to dissenting congregations around the city; with the help of his friend, the 
Unitarian minister John Prior Estlin (1747-1817), he very nearly entered the dissenting 
ministry, seriously considering an offer to replace John Rowe as minister to the Unitarian 
congregation at Shrewsbury.
11
  
 However, Coleridge’s enthusiasm for Unitarianism was not to last. In the very 
different intellectual climate brought about by the perceived failure of the ideals of the 
French Revolution, Coleridge was to vehemently renounce his Unitarianism. In 1806 he 
told George Ficker, in a passage which mirrors in reverse (both in its pessimism and in its 
scriptural exegesis) Priestley’s account of his own theological development thirty years 
earlier, 
 
I was for many years a Socinian; and at times almost a Naturalist, but sorrow, and ill 
health, and disappointment in the only deep wish I had ever cherished, forced me to look 
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into myself; I read the New Testament again, and I became fully convinced, that 
Socinianism was not only not the doctrine of the New Testament, but that it scarcely 
deserved the name of a religion in any sense.
12
 
 
Furthermore, Coleridge turned forcibly against Priestley’s and Hartley’s mechanistic 
account of perception, and eventually rejected the whole empiricist philosophical 
tradition, which he came to see as contributory to the decline of religious belief. In the 
course of his extensive and well-documented search for new conceptual frameworks in 
which to anchor his religious convictions, Coleridge introduced to England aspects of 
contemporary German idealist thought, in particular that of Kant and Schelling, the study 
of which he had begun at the University of Göttingen in 1799. He also attempted to 
reinvigorate the Christian-Platonic tradition, drawing on the writings of the seventeenth-
century Cambridge Platonists, as well as on Plato, the neo-Platonists, and Christian 
mystics such as Jacob Böhme and William Law.
13
 Under the influence of these traditions, 
Coleridge was to devote four chapters of one of his most widely-known works, 
Biographia Literaria (1817), to demonstrating the inability of the Hartleian theory of the 
association of ideas to provide a coherent account of perception.
14
 In chapter 8 of the 
same work Coleridge argued, against Priestley and other materialists, that ‘as materialism 
has been generally taught, it is utterly unintelligible’.
15
 In a series of public lectures 
delivered at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in London in 1818-19, Coleridge outlined a 
forceful criticism of contemporary materialist thought.
16
 A fascinating passage in a letter 
to Thomas Poole of February 1801 demonstrates that the programme of extensive 
philosophical reading undertaken by Coleridge in the late 1790s and early 1800s was 
intimately connected with his rejection of his Unitarian heritage: respecting some letters 
he had written on the ‘supposed Discovery of the Law of Association by Hobbes’ – an 
attribution similar to that often repeated by Priestley – Coleridge told Poole that: 
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Since I have been at Keswick, I have read a great deal / and my Reading has furnished 
me with many reasons for being exceedingly suspicious of supposed Discoveries in 
Metaphysics. My dear Poole! Plato and Aristotle were great and astonishing Geniuses, 
and yet there is not a Presbyterian Candidate for a Conventicle but believes that they 
were mere children in Knowledge compared with himself & Drs Priestly & Rees, &c – 
17
    
 
 Many other passages from Coleridge’s marginalia evince the disdain with which 
he eventually came to think of Priestley’s philosophy. In his copy of the Anglican 
clergyman William Sherlock’s A Vindication of the Trinity (1690), for example, 
Coleridge contrasted the erroneous, yet more sophisticated, arguments of ‘the philosophic 
Unitarians’ of the seventeenth century, such as Andreas Wissowatius (1608-1678), with 
those of ‘their degenerate successors, the Priestlians & Belshamites’.
18
 Interestingly, 
many of Coleridge’s comments reproduce almost verbatim some of the criticisms of 
Priestley’s ideas I have surveyed in the preceding chapters. On reading the Baptist 
minister Andrew Fuller’s The Calvinistical and Socinian Systems examined and 
compared (1793), for example, Coleridge noted, as had Augustus Toplady, that 
Priestley’s Socinianism and Fuller’s Calvinism were ‘in essentials both the same’. 
Echoing Lord Monboddo in his letter to Price, Coleridge criticised both systems for 
annihilating man and dissolving everything into the agency of the deity: ‘it is all God; all, 
all are but Deus infinite modificatus’.
19
 By this stage in his career, Coleridge had long 
rejected such implications of his youthful necessitarianism: in his copy of G. E. Lessing’s 
Sämmtliche Schriften (1825-8), he wrote ‘it is scarcely possible for an expanding Mind to 
rest in Unitarianism as taught by Priestley!’
20
  
 Coleridge’s experience ought not, of course, to be taken as characteristic of the 
trajectory of British Unitarianism. By 1805 Coleridge had come to believe in the 
centrality of the Trinity, and his legacy was inherited, not by dissent, but by the Anglican 
Broad Church movement. It could be argued, moreover, that Coleridge was at most only 
ever on the fringes of dissent; many Unitarians, Coleridge’s friend Estlin, for example, or 
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the editor of Priestley’s works John Towell Rutt (1760-1841), preserved Priestley’s 
philosophical and theological heritage well into the nineteenth century.
21
 The significance 
of Coleridge’s experience lies in the fact that it parallels that of a figure who would 
become hugely influential in the course of nineteenth-century Unitarianism: James 
Martineau. 
 Martineau (1805-1900) was thoroughly immersed in the tradition of British 
rational dissent. He was born into a Presbyterian family in Norwich; as a child he 
worshipped at the Octagon Chapel, once home to John Taylor, which by the early years 
of the nineteenth century had moved towards Unitarianism. He attended the school of the 
Unitarian minister Lant Carpenter (1780-1840) at Bristol, and afterwards trained for the 
dissenting ministry at Manchester College, York under Wellbeloved, Kenrick, and 
Turner. Here, he was introduced to the Priestleian philosophical and theological tradition 
and became, in his own words, ‘an enthusiastic disciple of the determinist philosophy’.
22
 
Upon graduating, he became minister at the Eustace Street Presbyterian meeting house, 
Dublin, moving, in 1832, to the ministry of the Paradise Street Chapel, Liverpool. Here, 
he published the influential and widely read The Rationale of Religious Inquiry (1836), 
which invoked Locke in arguing, against an unquestioning acceptance of the infallibility 
of the Scriptures, that ‘reason is the ultimate appeal, the supreme tribunal, to the test of 
which even scripture must be brought’.
23
 However, around this time Martineau began to 
question, like Coleridge before him, the efficacy of Priestley’s metaphysical system. In a 
revealing letter of 1840 to the American Unitarian minister William Ellery Channing 
(1780-1842), Martineau reflected on the intellectual heritage Priestley and Belsham had 
bequeathed to British Unitarianism. He told Channing: 
 
their influence has practically determined the whole form of our theology, and what is 
more to be lamented, the general spirit of our religion. No one can well owe a deeper debt 
of gratitude than I do to the writings of Priestley, to which I attribute not only my first 
call to the pursuit of religious philosophy, but the first personal struggles after the 
religious life. For many years I was an ardent admirer of his school, and I should think 
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myself a castaway if I ever ceased to admire his extraordinary powers, and venerate his 
faithful use of them.  
 
However, Martineau continued: 
 
I feel persuaded that his metaphysical system is incapable of continued union with any 
true and deeply operative sentiments of religion; that it is at variance with the 
characteristic ideas of Christianity; and will spontaneously vanish whenever our churches 
become really worshipping assemblies, instead of simply moral, polemical, or dissenting 
societies.
24
 
 
 Martineau’s career from this stage onwards can be characterised in part by his 
attempt to formulate new philosophical positions to replace the tradition he had inherited 
from Priestley and Belsham. When Manchester College moved back from York to 
Manchester in 1840 Martineau was appointed Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy. 
His ‘Introductory Lecture’ and appended ‘Syllabus’, printed as one of the Introductory 
Discourses to mark the opening of the session in 1840, indicate how the intellectual 
culture of rational dissent had changed forty years on from the closure of New College, 
Hackney. Locke still featured prominently in the syllabus, and there was still, 
interestingly, an emphasis on Scottish philosophy. However, something of Doddridge’s 
broad and non-dogmatic approach had been restored. In his lecture, Martineau stressed 
that to ‘introduce [his students] to the works, to interpret the difficulties, to do honour to 
the labours, to review the opinions, of the great masters of speculative thought in every 
age and in many lands, [would] be an indispensable portion of [his] duty’.
25
 The students 
were to read Plato and Aristotle, and, significantly, were introduced to the work of Kant 
and Hegel. At York, Martineau co-edited a journal, the Prospective Review, in which he 
began the process of reconstructing the ethical and epistemological foundations of his 
theism. Interestingly, many of these ideas were forged in dialogue with the writings of 
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Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Price, and, above all, Butler.
26
 Again in the footsteps of 
Coleridge, Martineau was later to spend several months studying in Germany. At Berlin 
he attended the philosophy lectures of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburgh (1802-1872), 
reading Hegel and rediscovering the works of Plato and Aristotle, the effects of which he 
would later refer to as a ‘new intellectual birth’.
27
  
 In 1853 Manchester New College relocated to London in the wake of financial 
difficulties. At his inaugural lecture on his appointment to the chair of philosophy in 
1854, Martineau cast himself as heir to the rich philosophical tradition of rational dissent. 
In the course of his address he touched on many of the figures who have featured 
prominently in my own preceding narrative: 
 
I meet here those with whom a respect for philosophy is an inheritance and a necessity; 
who cannot but honour a study conquered for them by the sagacious genius and 
illustrated by the noble truthfulness of Locke; whose earnest meditations both of thought 
and piety have been in the companionship of the pure-minded Hartley; who are not less 
conscious than I am myself of unspeakable obligations to the versatile, comprehensive, 
and guileless Priestley; and on whose shelves you rarely miss the acute and thoughtful 
volumes of Dr. Price. When I remember how largely the divinity of Dr. John Taylor, of 
Norwich, was affected by the studies which belonged to him as Ethical Tutor at 
Warrington, and how closely the name of Enfield is preserved in conjunction with that of 
Brucker, and in general how much our freer theology owes to the just balance of critical 
research and speculative reason, I feel that there are pledges in the past for a worthy 
appreciation here of philosophical pursuits, and am resolved not to endanger that 
wholesome predisposition by immoderate and untenable claims.
28
 
 
However, he follows with a note of caution: 
 
At the same time there is danger as well as honour in belonging to a class rich in noble 
antecedents; danger of mistaking the heritage committed to our trust: – of cherishing with 
faithful pride the particular judgments delivered to us from the past, and letting slip the 
                                                 
26
 See Carpenter, James Martineau, 289-302. 
27
 Carpenter, James Martineau, 314-23. 
28
 On Taylor see chapter 1; on Enfield’s translation of Brucker see chapter 2. 
 248 
habits of severe activity, the fresh hopes of truth, the resolve to take a master’s measure 
of the time, which saved our predecessors from merely repeating the symbols of an 
earlier age.
29
   
 
 By this stage in his career, notwithstanding his paean, Martineau had long 
abandoned the sensationalism, necessitarianism, and materialism associated with 
Priestley and Belsham. The account of his own intellectual development which formed 
the preface to his Types of Ethical Theory (1895), drawn up towards the end of his life 
from the lectures he delivered at London, reads like a conversion narrative. He talked of 
being, during his years as a student at Manchester College, ‘inevitably shut up in the 
habit of interpreting the human phenomena by the analogy of external nature’, and of 
‘serving out successive terms of willing captivity to Locke and Hartley, to Collins, 
Edwards, and Priestley, to Bentham and James Mill’.
30
 Martineau’s reaction against this 
tradition – his ‘apostasy’ as he referred to it – he characterised as primarily ethical: ‘It 
was the irresistible pleading of the moral consciousness which drove me first to rebel 
against the limits of the merely scientific conception’.
31
 It is fascinating to note how 
closely Martineau’s account of his own experience echoes Belsham’s account of his 
conversion to Socinianism one hundred and six years earlier.
32
 In fact, it is certainly 
possible that Martineau had Belsham in mind when he described the process by which, 
during his years as a philosophy tutor at Manchester College, his own opinions changed 
gradually through the experience of teaching: ‘the same text books were still in use’, he 
recalled, ‘but in effect, I was educating myself out of a school into which I supposed that 
I was educating others’.
33
   
 Even a superficial survey of Martineau’s extensive work in moral philosophy (‘a 
mixture of exposition and of search’) must, unfortunately, remain beyond the scope of 
this project.
34
 However, in conclusion to my own account of the theological and 
philosophical ideas of the rational dissenters of the eighteenth century, I would like to 
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briefly recall the three intellectual traditions available to that generation which I referred 
to in the introduction to this thesis: the empiricist, the rationalist, and the Shaftesburian. It 
is a testimony to the lasting influence of the eighteenth-century rational dissenters that 
Martineau’s Types of Ethical Theory concludes with an analysis of these same three 
traditions, reclassified in Martineau’s terminology as the ‘hedonist’, the ‘dianoetic’, and 
the ‘aesthetic’ ethical schools. In Martineau’s account of the first, Priestley and Belsham 
have been effaced entirely: the flow of ideas is traced from Hobbes through Hartley, 
Bentham, and Mill to Martineau’s contemporaries Alexander Bain (1818-1903) and 
Charles Darwin (1809-1882). His account hinges on his criticism of the fundamental 
claim of this ethical tradition: his assertion that it is impossible ‘to effect the transition 
from the cogency of personal pleasure and pain to that of others’ pleasures and pains’; 
that it is ‘but a sophistical slip of thought which carries the Utilitarian from the principle 
‘Each for his own happiness’ to that of ‘Each for the happiness of all’’.
35
 In Martineau’s 
account of the second (the tradition to which he himself was most sympathetic), it is 
interesting to note that Price has been restored as the ‘chief representative’ of a tradition 
including Cudworth and Clarke. Looking back to Price’s 1758 Review, Martineau found 
in Price’s distinction between ‘Speculative Reason’ and ‘Moral Reason’ an exact 
coincidence with the antithesis of ‘Theoretical and Practical’ knowledge he had 
discovered in Kant.
36
 In his account of the third tradition, represented by Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, Martineau (as had Doddridge before him) defended Shaftesbury against the 
charge that he grounds ethics on a narrowly conceived sense. He emphasises the rational 
aspects of Shaftesbury’s thought, stressing the relation which Shaftesbury’s concept of 
the moral sense has to the understanding and the will.
37
 His eulogy to Hutcheson recalls 
the sentiments expressed in the Wodrow/Kenrick correspondence: ‘A generous 
philosophy became in him a generous personality’.
38
 What is significant in this analysis is 
that Priestley’s and Belsham’s achievement – the result of their campaign from the mid-
1770s to the mid-1790s to make the empiricist tradition the predominant intellectual 
position within rational dissent – had, by this point, been effectively undone.  
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 A comprehensive analysis of Martineau’s ideas would, of course, necessitate a 
more thorough focus on their historical context. Martineau’s writings need to be 
understood both against the background of the theological divisions within nineteenth-
century Unitarianism, and in the context of wider nineteenth-century religious and 
intellectual history. However, this very brief survey of his career illustrates well the 
gradual process by which Priestley’s philosophical legacy was superseded within British 
rational dissent. Although his theology undoubtedly continued to find adherents during 
this period, there was no one among the Unitarians with the intellectual capacity of 
Martineau to inherit the empiricist tradition from Belsham as Belsham had done from 
Priestley at the end of the eighteenth century. In a sense, Priestley’s critics of the previous 
generation were proved right: Priestley’s empiricism became incompatible with religious 
belief. His religious philosophy was too intertwined with a biblical literalism which to the 
nineteenth century seemed naïve. To trace the influence of Priestley’s philosophical 
writings further, it would be interesting to investigate the reception of his ideas in North 
America or in Germany.
39
 In nineteenth-century Britain, Priestley was revered as an 
experimental scientist but was largely forgotten as a philosopher of religion.    
 My aim in this thesis has not been to argue for the enduring relevance of Priestley 
as a philosopher or as a theologian. Rather, it has been to illuminate an episode in 
eighteenth-century intellectual history. I have illustrated how Priestley’s philosophical 
and theological ideas were developed within an intellectual culture of rational dissent, 
and were then diffused through this culture through Priestley’s and Belsham’s work as 
author, polemicist, and teacher. My survey of the writings – in books, essays, lectures, 
reviews, and private letters – of some of the previously overlooked figures from within 
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this intellectual culture has shed some light on the way in which these ideas were debated 
and understood in their historical and, most importantly, in their theological contexts. The 
thesis will, I hope, have demonstrated to historians of eighteenth-century religious dissent 
the rich philosophical tradition generated by the rational dissenters’ attempts to formulate 
metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical foundations for their emerging theological 
beliefs. I hope it will have demonstrated to historians of eighteenth-century philosophy 
the necessity of engaging with the period’s theological debate in order to formulate a 
fuller interpretation of its philosophical writings. If Priestley does not deserve a place in 
the canon of eighteenth-century philosophers, then his work should remain of interest to 
us as an example of the complex interactions between the philosophical and the 
theological discourses of the period. A better understanding of these interactions might 
fruitfully illuminate the writings, not just of Priestley, but of other authors who are and 
who will remain in the philosophical canon.        
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Appendix I: ‘DWL MS L.57 (10)’ 
  
‘General Scheme of Business’ 
 
 Monday Tuesday     Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
I] Messrs 
Moore 
Blake 
Gellibrand 
Cutler 
Evid of 
Christianity 
(10) 
CA 
Schemes 
 
(10) 
CA 
Evidences 
of 
Christianity 
(10) 
CA  
analysis 
Or homil 
(10) 
twice in a 
fortnight 
Evid of 
Xty 
(10) 
CA 
Jewish 
Antiquity 
(10) 
CA 
II] Messrs 
White 
Mercer 
Robins 
Scholefield 
Jackson 
Philosophy 
(10) 
Mr. Clark 
Ethics 
(10) 
Mr. 
Clark  
Philosophy 
(10) 
Mr. Clark 
Orations 
theses 
(10) 
once in a 
fortnight 
Ethics 
(10) 
Mr 
Clark 
Jewish 
Antiquity 
(10) 
CA 
III] Messrs 
Holland 
Alexander 
Bunyan 
Priestley 
Rollestone 
Algebra 
11 
Pneumat 
11 
Algebra 
11 
Orations 
1 in a 
fortnight 
reading 
 
Pneumat 
(11) 
reading 
Reading 
 
 
The above is a reproduction of a document held at DWL among a selection of 
miscellaneous papers from the New College collection. The document is a timetable from 
the Daventry Academy, established in 1751 following the death of Doddridge at 
Northampton. ‘CA’ stands for Caleb Ashworth, the tutor, and ‘Mr. Clark’ is Samuel 
Clark, the sub-tutor. From a number of marks on the bottom left hand corner of the 
document it is evident that Clark was also the tutor of the algebra class taken by the 
students in class III. The document is torn at the bottom along the fold of the page and it 
is likely that there was another year group listed below the three shown, as the course at 
Daventry was four years long at this period.  The timetable proves that in the early years 
at Daventry Ashworth and Clark adhered closely to the syllabus followed by Doddridge 
at Northampton, with philosophy, ethics, and divinity constituting the core of the 
syllabus.  
 ‘Pneumat’ is pneumatology, the study of spirits or spiritual beings; ‘Schemes’ is 
schemes of divinity; ‘analysis’ is scriptural analysis; ‘homil’ is homiletics, or the art of 
preaching. The document can be usefully compared with the extract from Joseph 
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Priestley’s journal from 1754, which indicates that this syllabus was supplemented by 
lectures in anatomy, most of which appear to have been given by Clark.
1
 
 
Dating 
 
The minutes of the Coward Foundation indicate that Priestley was admitted as a student 
at Daventry on 10 November 1752.
2
 In his Memoirs Priestley wrote that he was ‘excused 
all the studies of the first year, and a great part of those of the second’.
3
 This suggests that 
when Priestley entered the academy in 1752 he joined the second year class towards the 
end of the year, completing the final seven months of the term until the end of the 
academic year in May. Thus, assuming the year group denominated III on the timetable is 
the second of the four years, this would date the document to between November 1752 
and May 1753. Priestley’s Memoirs also confirm that John Alexander and Henry Holland 
were in his class, and that Nathaniel White and Radcliffe Scholefield were in the class 
above him.
4
 This confirms that class II is the third of the four years and class I the final 
year. In his Memoirs Priestley also referred to Thomas Taylor as being in the class below 
him, again suggesting that there was originally a class IV on the document, which has 
since been lost.
5
 
  Of the other students listed in Priestley’s year, Henry Holland had been at 
Northampton between 1750 and 1751, where he had presumably completed the first year 
class, and moved to Daventry in 1751. John Alexander had been at Northampton since 
1750, and in 1751 moved to Daventry. Matthew Rollaston is listed in the CSI as being at 
Northampton since 1750, and presumably also moved to Daventry in 1751. John Bunyan 
was at Daventry until 1753. The minutes of the Coward Foundation record in April 1753 
‘A letter of Mr. Ashworth’s being laid before the Trustees wherein he complains of the 
great extravagance & misbehaviour of John Bunyan one of the pupils under his tuition’, 
and note the subsequent order ‘that the said John Bunyan be dismissed the Academy but 
                                                 
1
 On 9 May 1754, for example, Priestley recorded a ‘lecture upon the larynx with Mr. Clark’, Rail and 
Thomas, ed., ‘Joseph Priestley’s Journal’, 59.  
2
 DWL New College MSS CT.1 Coward Trust Minute Book, May 1738 – Nov 1778, 139. 
3
 Rutt, I, i, 13. 
4
 Rutt, I, i, 25-6. 
5
 Rutt, I, i, 27. 
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that his exhibition be paid up to Lady day next’.
6
 This presumably explains why Bunyan 
is not mentioned in Priestley’s journal of 1754. 
Of those students listed in year II (the third year), Nathaniel White entered 
Northampton in 1749 and had left the academy at Daventry to begin his ministry at the 
Old Meeting house in Hinckley, Leicestershire by 1753. The minutes of the Coward 
Foundation indicate that on 9 November 1753 it was ‘ordered that the sum of £8 be given 
to Mr Nath
l
 White as a poor dissenting minister’.
7
 It is therefore likely that White left 
after completing the third year without taking the classes of the final year; however, this 
is somewhat problematic as White is referred to by Priestley in his journal on 26 April 
1754. Samuel Mercer had been at Northampton between 1749 and 1751, was at Daventry 
between 1752 and 1754, and began his ministry at Tockholes, Lancashire in 1754. 
Thomas Robins had been at Kibworth school under John Aikin, presumably in 1749, at 
Northampton between 1750 and 1751, and entered Daventry in 1751. The CSI records 
that Robins began his ministry in Stretton-under-Fosse in Warwickshire in 1755; 
however, a note in the minutes of the Coward Foundation on 11 October 1754 ‘that £6 be 
given to the Revd Mr Robins Minister of Stretton in Warwickshire as a poor dissenting 
minister’ indicates that he must have been at his ministry by 1754.  Radcliffe Scholefield 
had been at Northampton between 1750 and 1752, and at Daventry between 1752 and 
1754. He was at Whitehaven in Cumberland between 1757 and 1772. William Jackson 
entered Northampton in 1750.  
Of those students listed in year I (the fourth year), William Blake was at 
Northampton from 1749, was admitted to Daventry in 1752 and began his ministry in 
Crewkerre, Somerset in 1754.
8
 Priestley’s journal records that William Blake left the 
academy on 30 April 1754. Joseph Gellibrand was at Northampton in 1749. Priestley’s 
journal records that Gellibrand left the academy on 29 April 1754. Henry Cutler was at 
Northampton in 1749. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 DWL New College MSS CT.1 Coward Trust Minute Book, May 1738 – Nov 1778, 141. 
7
 DWL New College MSS CT.1, 144. 
8
 The CSI records the year as 1740 although this is likely to be a mistake. 
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Appendix II: ‘HMO MS Seddon 6: problems of dating and authorship’ 
 
MS Seddon 6 is a bound volume held among the collection at HMO, comprising eighteen 
separate notebooks, each of about fourteen pages, containing notes in longhand on 
theological and philosophical topics.
1
 Since the mid-nineteenth century the volume has 
been attributed to John Seddon, and is thought to be a series of lectures delivered at the 
Warrington Academy between 1767 and 1770.
2
 However, this dating and attribution is 
problematic. Although the manuscript might be a copy of an earlier set of lecture notes by 
Seddon it contains at least some material added after Seddon’s death in January 1770.  
 What is clear is that the notes form a series of lectures on philosophy and 
theology, most of which are modelled very closely on Doddridge’s lectures. It is well 
known that Doddridge’s text book was used at the liberal dissenting academies, including 
Warrington, until the early nineteenth century.
3
 Several of the notebooks in MS Seddon 6 
are labelled with references to propositions or definitions corresponding to those in 
Doddridge’s lectures; the references to page numbers among the notes indicate that the 
lecturer was working from a printed volume, most likely the 1763 edition by Clark. Each 
of the notebooks, excepting one, is numbered, but they do not appear to be in any 
numerical order. Assuming that they once comprised a continuously numbered sequence, 
a number of books are now missing. The content of the books further suggests that the 
sequence is incomplete; several of the notebooks appear to begin mid-way through the 
discussion of a particular topic and there is at least one reference to an earlier discussion 
which does not appear to have survived.
4
 Among the eighteen surviving notebooks 
thirteen relate to specific lectures on philosophy or theology from Doddridge’s course. 
The remaining five contain notes for lectures on language and logic, the references in 
which indicate that the lecturer was using Isaac Watts’s Logick: or, the Right Use of 
Reason in the Enquiry after Truth (1725), which had been used by Doddridge at 
Northampton and by Ashworth and Clark at Daventry. Each of the lectures modelled on 
Doddridge comprises a commentary on one or two propositions or definitions and their 
                                                 
1
 One of the notebooks, ‘No 34’, contains some notes in shorthand. 
2
 Denis Porter, A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Harris Manchester College Oxford (Oxford, 1998), 259. 
3
 Rivers, The Defence of Truth through the Knowledge of Error. 
4
 See for example the first page of the notebook labelled ‘No 12’. 
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subsequent corollaries and scholia from Doddridge’s lectures. However, in some of the 
notebooks Doddridge’s text serves only as a starting point for a discussion which 
introduces the students to developments in the subject occurring after Doddridge’s death 
in 1751. 
 The notebooks themselves are undated, yet a label inserted loosely between the 
first notebook and the binding reads ‘Manuscript Lectures of the Rev. John Seddon First 
Rector of Warrington Academy A.D. 1767-70 Presented by H.y Arthur Bright’. It is also 
noted that Henry Bright donated the volume to the Renshaw Street Chapel in Liverpool in 
1857. According to Bright’s account, the volume was discovered among a selection of 
papers at a cheesemonger’s shop in Liverpool in the 1850s.
5
 The volume is one of five 
collections of lecture notes attributed to Seddon now held at HMO. The other four consist 
of two volumes of lectures on language and two volumes of lectures on oratory delivered 
at Warrington ‘on Dr. Priestley’s leaving the Academy’. Both of these can be confidently 
attributed to Seddon. They are both listed in manuscript catalogues of the Warrington 
Academy library which were probably drawn up in 1786 when the library was transferred 
to Manchester College. The first of these can be dated from internal evidence to 1767.
6
 
The volume of philosophical and theological lectures is listed among the sources in 
‘Appendix I’ of Herbert McLachlan’s English Education under the Test Acts (1931), and 
is briefly described in his Warrington Academy: Its History and Influence (1943).
7
 
McLachlan notes that in the 1930s the notebooks were in the library of the Ullet Road 
Church in Liverpool, which has since been dissolved, and confirms that the notebooks 
were written by Seddon himself.
8
  
 From the surviving accounts it is difficult to ascertain exactly what subjects 
Seddon did lecture on during his years at Warrington.
9
 However, it seems clear that 
                                                 
5
 Henry A. Bright, ‘A Historical Sketch of the Warrington Academy’, Transactions of the Historic Society 
of Lancashire and Cheshire, 11 (1858-59), 1-30, 15. 
6
 Porter, A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Harris Manchester College Oxford, 258-9; MR, 8, second series 
(1813), 290. McLachlan, Warrington Academy, 66-7. 
7
 McLachlan, English Education under the Test Acts, 280; Warrington Academy, 66. 
8
 McLachlan, English Education under the Test Acts, 280. 
9
 It is clear from the MS Minute Books of the Trustees and Committee at HMO that Seddon did lecture on 
moral philosophy at Daventry at some point in 1760, see chapter 1. However, in Bright’s account of the 
Warrington Academy he mentions only that Seddon lectured on oratory and grammar, Bright, ‘A Historical 
Sketch of the Warrington Academy’, 15. To this McLachlan, on the evidence of MS Seddon 6, adds that 
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Seddon’s duties as a tutor were not his principal role at the academy. Seddon was the first 
secretary of the Warrington Trustees, a driving force behind the founding of the academy, 
and the first Rector, with responsibility for student discipline. Seddon’s surviving 
correspondence from the 1760s, now held at DWL and HMO, indicates that Seddon was 
occupied during these years with acquiring subscriptions for the academy and with the 
administration of student affairs.
10
 He was away from Warrington  for short periods in the 
late 1760s, as, for example, in December of 1768 when Seddon was in Bolton, between 
March and April of 1769 when he was in Leeds, York, and Hull, and in August of the 
same year when he was in Hereford.
11
 
 Despite Bright’s and McLachlan’s assertions that the notes were written by 
Seddon, a number of passages in the notebooks make both the dating of 1767-1770 and 
the attribution of the lecture notes to Seddon problematic. Firstly, the lectures on 
philosophy and theology are clearly in a different hand to those on language and oratory. 
There is also no mention of any lectures on philosophy or theology in any of the extant 
Warrington library catalogues. Secondly, the notebooks contain some references to works 
published after 1770, and thus too late to have been known to Seddon. The notebook 
labelled ‘No 11’, for example, contains a reference to Priestley ‘introducing 
materialism’.
12
 It is certainly possible that Seddon could have discussed with Priestley his 
ideas on the nature of matter and his Hartleian epistemology at Warrington in the 
1760s.
13
 It was Seddon who introduced Priestley to John Canton (1718-1772), through 
whom the latter met Benjamin Franklin and became a fellow of the Royal Society.
14
 
However, it is difficult to see in what sense Priestley could be said to have been 
‘introducing materialism’ before the year 1775, when he published the prefatory essays to 
his edition of Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind. According to Priestley’s own account 
of his intellectual development, it was not until 1774 that he ‘first entertained a serious 
doubt of the truth of the vulgar hypothesis [i.e. the theory that man is composed of two 
                                                                                                                                                 
Seddon lectured on theology and philosophy from Priestley’s resignation in 1767 until his sudden death in 
January of 1770, McLachlan, English Education under the Test Acts, 222. 
10
 See DWL MS 38.103; HMO MS Seddon 1. 
11
 DWL MS 38.103 (112; 124-7). 
12
 See chapter 5. 
13
 See chapter 1. 
14
 See John Seddon to John Canton, 18 December 1765, CR (1861), 44-5. 
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entirely distinct and independent principles]’.
15
 Even stronger proof for a later dating of 
the lecture notes can be found in the notebook labelled ‘Prop 83’. Towards the end of the 
notebook there is a reference to ‘some of the late answers’ to Priestley’s materialist 
theory.
16
 The earliest ‘answer’ to Priestley’s materialism which I am aware of and which 
the author could possibly have been referring to was James Seton’s letter published in the 
London Review in 1775.
17
 However, it is much more likely that the comment in the 
notebook is a reference to the more developed responses to Priestley’s ideas published in 
the late 1770s. The earliest of these was Berington’s Letters on Materialism (1776).
18
 
This would date the notebook to, at the earliest, 1776. However, the majority of the 
responses to Priestley’s materialism did not appear until 1778. Between 1778 and 1781 at 
least five book-length replies to Priestley’s materialist theory were printed.
19
 The fact that 
the author refers to ‘answers’ (in the plural) indicates that he had seen at least two of 
these works which, even if he was aware of Berington’s reply, makes the earliest possible 
date 1778. 
 One further piece of evidence for a later dating is a slip of paper inserted loosely 
in the volume. On one side the paper reads ‘Dod Pt 2 Metaphysics No P 32’, and on the 
other ‘Dod 77 Jany 28.81’. This is probably a reference to Definition 32, which comes in 
Part II on page 77 of Doddridge’s lecture course. Of course, it is impossible to know 
when this paper was inserted into the volume. However, it does appear to be in the same 
hand as the lectures. ‘Jany 28.81’ might well be the date, 28 January 1781, on which this 
passage was studied. 
 To account for these problems I propose the following hypothesis, which I adopt 
in discussing these lectures in this thesis: at least some of the notes now catalogued as 
MS Seddon 6 are copies of an earlier set of lectures drawn up by Seddon (explaining how 
they came to be among his papers and came to be attributed to him) made in the late 
1770s or early 1780s by one of his successors at Warrington, to which were added the 
extra references to Priestley’s works. This could possibly make the author of the notes 
                                                 
15
 Disquisitions, xiii. Alan Tapper argues that Priestley’s early materialism derives from his encounter with 
Reid in 1774, Alan Tapper, ‘The Beginnings of Priestley’s Materialism’, 73-81. 
16
 See chapter 5. 
17
 London Review, 1 (1775), 525-9. See Yolton, Thinking Matter, 117-8.  
18
 See chapter 2. 
19
 See chapter 3 for details of these works. 
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either Enfield, who succeeded Seddon as minister at the Cairo Street Chapel and as tutor 
and Rector Academiæ at Warrington in 1770, or Clayton, who succeeded Aikin as 
divinity tutor in 1781, where he remained until the dissolution of the academy in 1783.
20
 
It is also possible, however, that the notes were written up and the references to Priestley 
added by a student; there is some evidence that it was common practice at Warrington for 
students to copy lectures from dictations or from shorthand notes borrowed from the 
tutors.
21
 
 That the notes now comprising MS Seddon 6 contain an amalgamation of an older 
source and material added at a later date seems apparent from a closer analysis of the 
notebook labelled ‘Prop 83’. This is probably the sequel to another notebook on the same 
subject which has since been lost: the notes begin in mid-sentence (‘and that is that…’) 
and, following a brief preamble, the commentary on Doddridge’s lectures begins at 
scholium 6, approximately half way through Doddridge’s lecture 95. The lecturer then 
follows Doddridge’s text closely through lecture 95, until a passage in the notebook reads 
‘I shall conclude with giving you an account of Plato’s arguments for the Immateriality of 
the Soul’ after which follow six numbered points ending with the assertion: ‘These 
arguments are founded on good sense’.
22
 It is reasonable to assume that in an earlier 
document this point marked the end of a section, given that it corresponds to the end of a 
lecture in Doddridge’s textbook and that the notes refer to the six arguments from Plato 
as a conclusion. However, in MS Seddon 6 there follows a further six pages of text in the 
course of which the references to Priestley occur.
23
 
 It is difficult to even conjecture as to who might have added these notes on 
Priestley to MS Seddon 6. However, a number of facts, including the interest in 
Priestley’s theory of matter, suggest that it might have been Enfield. Having compared 
the hand of a letter written by Enfield to the Trustees of the Academy dated 7 January 
1788 it is certainly not inconceivable that at least some of the notebooks comprising MS 
                                                 
20
 On Enfield and Clayton see chapter 2. 
21
 See, for example, Benjamin Vaughan to John Seddon, 25 July 1767, DWL MS 38.103 (99), in which 
Vaughan speaks of Priestley’s lectures on Oratory and Criticism which he and another student had copied. 
See also McLachlan, Warrington Academy, 56.  
22
 MS Seddon 6. See chapter 5 for a fuller account of this lecture. 
23
 See chapter 5 for details. 
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Seddon 6 could be in Enfield’s hand.
24
 In 1788 Enfield described having ‘spent many 
years in preparing lectures for the instruction of my Pupils’.
25
 As with Seddon, it is 
difficult to ascertain exactly what Enfield taught at Warrington.
26
 However, some of the 
textbooks which Enfield prepared during his years at the academy would have made him 
particularly qualified to have inserted some of what appear to be additions to MS Seddon 
6. In 1781 Enfield published a translation of the Elements of Geometry from the French 
work by Jean Joseph Rossignol (1726-1807). In addition to the fact that there is a strong 
emphasis on geometry in the commentaries on metaphysics and logic in MS Seddon 6 
there is, on the fourth page (verso) of the notebook labelled ‘No 4’, a geometrical 
diagram almost identical to that found on page 86 of Enfield’s translation.
27
 In 1791 
Enfield published his abridgement and translation of Brucker.
28
 He seems to have begun 
work on the translation in the late 1780s, however, according to McLachlan, the 
translation had its origin at Warrington where Enfield ‘borrowed from the original work 
in drawing up a course of lectures for his students’.
29
 The references to Zeno, Hierocles, 
and the Jewish Rabbis as holding a similar theory concerning the unity of the body and 
the soul found on the sixth page (verso) of the notebook labelled ‘Prop 83’ can all be 
found in Enfield’s translation of Brucker.
30
 Enfield was also familiar with the theory of 
matter developed by Priestley. Enfield’s own Institutes of Natural Philosophy, which, 
                                                 
24
 William Enfield to the Trustees of the Warrington Academy, 7 January 1783, DWL MS 93.A (4). 
25
 DWL MS 93.A (4). 
26
 McLachlan states that Enfield lectured on reading, speaking, composition, belles lettres, geography, and 
commerce, McLachlan, English Education under the Test Acts, 222. According to a ‘Report of the State of 
the Warrington Academy, by the Trustees, at their Annual Meeting’ of 28 June 1770 Enfield was 
responsible for languages, commerce, and history, Bright, ‘A Historical Sketch of the Warrington 
Academy’, 16. Bright notes that Enfield undertook the mathematics lectures following George Walker’s 
resignation in 1774, Bright, ‘A Historical Sketch of the Warrington Academy’, 17; this is confirmed in 
John Aikin jnr’s biographical account of Enfield printed with his Sermons on Practical Subjects, 3 vols 
(1798), vol. I, xii. In the preface to Enfield’s Institutes of Natural Philosophy, Theoretical and 
Experimental (1785) he refers to classes in Natural Philosophy which he had taught at the Warrington 
Academy. McLachlan also states that Enfield took over the natural philosophy and the mathematics classes 
from Walker, Warrington Academy, 72.  
27
 See Enfield, Elements of Geometry translated from the French of J. J. Rossignol (1781), 86; ‘No 4’, 
HMO MS Seddon 6. 
28
 See chapter 2. 
29
 William Enfield to Nicholas Clayton, 2 May 1787, Nottingham Record Office 920 NIC 9/12/1; William 
Enfield to Nicholas Clayton, 22 April 1788, Nottingham Record Office 920 NIC 9/12/9; McLachlan, 
Warrington Academy, 72. 
30
 William Enfield, The History of Philosophy from the Earliest Periods: drawn up from Brucker’s Historia 
critica philosophiæ, 2 vols (1791), vol. I, 395 (for Hierocles); vol. I, 333-4 (for Zeno); vol. II, 220 (for the 
Jews). For details of the references in MS Seddon 6 see chapter 5. 
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according to McLachlan, contained the substance of his teaching at Warrington on 
Natural Philosophy, open with a definition of matter (‘Matter is an extended and solid 
substance’), to which is added the following scholium: 
 
Extension and Solidity are discovered to be properties of matter by the senses. Both by 
the sight and touch we perceive material substances to have length, breadth and 
thickness, that is, to be extended: and from the resistance which they make to the touch, 
we acquire the idea, and infer the property, of solidity. It is unnecessary here to inquire 
whether solidity necessarily supposes impenetrability. Natural Philosophy, being 
employed in investigating the laws of nature by experiment and observation, and in 
explaining the phenomena of nature by these laws, has no concern with metaphysical 
speculations, which are generally little more than unsuccessful efforts, to extend the 
boundaries of human knowledge beyond the reach of human faculties.
31
 
 
Enfield’s comment on the futility of ‘metaphysical speculations’ here echoes his remarks 
on the fruitlessness of trawling through ‘the refinements and subtleties of metaphysics’ 
made over a decade previously as part of his criticism of the syllabuses at the dissenting 
academies.
32
 However, the passage, particularly the query whether ‘solidity necessarily 
supposes impenetrability’ and the description of the ways by which the properties of a 
substance are derived solely through sense perception, suggests a familiarity with the 
theory of matter espoused by Priestley in his Disquisitions. Although there is no direct 
evidence of Enfield being familiar with Priestley’s work, he did read Robert Young’s An 
Examination of the Third and Fourth Definitions of the First Book of Sir Isaac Newton’s 
Principia, and of the Three Axioms or Laws of Motion (1787) in 1787 and discussed the 
work in a letter to Nicholas Clayton.
33
  
 Ultimately, however, it is probably impossible to say definitively who added the 
notes on Priestley to MS Seddon 6. Nevertheless, the notes show that Priestley’s ideas on 
matter were discussed, not long after their publication, as part of the philosophy lectures 
at the Warrington Academy. The comments in MS Seddon 6 illustrate that at Warrington 
the theological and philosophical implications of Priestley’s ideas had been well 
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33
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understood and that a critical response to them was being developed. Even if the 
attribution to Seddon is incorrect, the notes provide interesting information on the 
lectures delivered at Warrington at some point prior to 1783, and provide substantial 
evidence concerning the connections between the Scottish universities and the English 
liberal dissenting academies.
34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 See chapter 1. 
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